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This thesis analyses the impediments of inconvertible currencies on intra-regional trade within 
the Eastern and Southern African region. Currency inconvertibility is a non-tariff trade 
barrier which limits and distorts international trade expansion. Therefore, alternative 
arrangements that may be used in order to remedy this problem are considered. 
Exchange rate misalignment is identified as a major cause of currency inconvertibility. It 
is shown that the implementation of macroeconomic policies and exchange rate regimes 
which are not complementary cause exchange rate misalignment resulting in balance of 
payments disequilibria leading to currency inconvertibility. 
Since the preconditions for transformation to full currency convertibility have not been met 
by most countries in the region this thesis suggests a mechanism tliat will enable the use of 
local currencies for intra-regional trade (partial currency convertibility). The most viable 
arrangement under the prevailing conditions in the Eastern and Southern African region is 
the reserve fund to which member countries contribute a fraction of their international 
reserves. This contribution will be determined according to the levels of intra-regional trade 
in which they engage. This arrangement will guarantee that even if a member state cannot 
honour its payments' obligation it will be able to draw on the facility to make payment. The 
advantages of this facility are that it will guarantee that payments for intra-regional trade will 
be made and that the contributions by member countries will be more affordable than the 
other arrangements as well as its potential for assisting in creating closer economic relations 
in the region. The thesis concludes, however, that member countries should be encouraged 
to move towards full currency convertibility and hence an arrangement for purposes of intra-
regional currency convertibility should be strictly transitionary. 
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The economic challenges which face the East and Southern African region are immense. 
Recent political changes which have taken place in other regions (e.g. Eastern Europe) have 
made a strong impression on the political and economic outlook in Africa. The world-wide 
move towards democratisation has also changed the economic conceptualisation of international 
trade. Governments in the region which were opposed to free trade in the past (to a large extent 
for political reasons) are now accepting the advantages of interacting in world trade. 
A substantial move of focus with respect to economic aid, away fyom East and Southern Africa 
to other regions has taken place. New avenues for investment in Eastern Europe, previously not 
open, are now becoming more attractive than those in the Sub-Saharan region. Furthermore, the 
• • < 
last few years have seen significant political changes in South Africa. This has made it 
I -1· ., 
acceptable for other countries in the region to commit themselves t_o political relations and open 
. . . 
trade with South Africa. 
. . 
A solution to some of the region's economic problems ~ay n:sult from the incorporation of 
South Africa into regional trade. With a new political dispensation in the making, other 
countries in the region are regarding South Africa as a viable political and economic ally. South 
Africa has the largest and most advanced economy _in East and Southern Africa which, through 
trade, has the potential of augmenting the rest of the region's. well-b~ing as well as that of its 
own. South Africa's advantageous position derives from: . ~ ·: , · 
(a) a wealth of human, natural and financial resources; 
(b) a highly developed infrastructure of roads, railways and ports; 
(c) advanced banking and telecommunications systems; and 
(d) increasingly strong ties with the countries of Europe·, Asia and America. 
1 
Regional economic co-operation has gained momentum in recent years and both developed and 
developing countries are looking to create trading blocks. The most powerful trading blocks are 
the European Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA). These trading 
blocks, which are in effect gigantic markets, impose tariffs on external trade. This will, 
unquestionably, have a negative effect on the economies of developing countries if they have to 
compete with these blocks individually. 
These developments, more than ever before, bring about the necessity of eliminating regional 
tariff and non-tariff' barriers, in Eastern and Southern Africa. One of these non-tariff trade 
barriers - currency inconvertibility, which is the focus of this thesis, - is a result of the 
nonacceptance of local currencies for settlement of regional trade payments. Since most Central 
Banks in the region do not guarantee the convertibility of local currency balances which are held 
by foreigners into any other currency, regional trade is often settled in foreign currencies (or 
convertible currencies such as the US dollar). The inconvertibility of currencies may then divert 
potential regional trade to outside the region where currency convertibility is assured. 
Difficulties with payments for international trade can be attributed to the fact that most countries 
have their own individual currencies. 2 These monies can be permitted, by the government of 
a particular country, to be used for trade transactions in different ways. At the one extreme, 
governments may legislate that their currencies are to be inconvertible, that is, not freely 
exchangeable for other currencies, thereby restricting foreign trade. At the other extreme, the 
government can choose to eliminate all restrictions on foreign trade and make its currency 
perfectly convertible. 
Currency inconvertibility is often a result of balance of payments difficulties. Lack of foreign 
1It has been found that non-tariff barriers are more of an impediment to intra-regional trade than tariffs 
(SADCC, 1991). 
2It is clear that if all countries were to use the same currency this barrier to trade would be eliminated. This is 
not to say that a single world currency is ideal as the theory of optimal currency areas demonstrates. This is not a viable 
condition for economic as well as political reasons. 
2 
currency, often as a result of misaligned exchange rates, leads governments to follow the route 
of currency inconvertibility rather than implementing the correct exchange rate and other 
macroeconomic policies. Ideally, in terms of expanded international trade, currencies should 
be made fully convertible for current account transactions. 3 However, transformation to full 
currency convertibility may be problematic if the preconditions are not met. Therefore, it may 
be necessary to implement a transitional arrangement on the way to full currency convertibility. 
The transitional arrangement may take the form of non-monetary arrangements such as imposing 
other trade restrictions or allocating a fixed amount of foreign exchange through the market, or 
monetary arrangements using a clearing mechanism for regional trade payments. 
In the Eastern and Southern African area there are two monetary arrangements which assist in 
eliminating the problem of currency inconvertibility among its members ( or partial currency 
convertibility). These are the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States 
(PTA)4 and the Common Monetary Area (CMA).5 However, the two arrangements are 
separate and do not create currency convertibility for the area as a whole. Effectively, since 
Lesotho and Swaziland are members of both arrangements it is only those PTA currency 
balances held by South Africans (excluding Lesotho and Swaziland) which are inconvertible. 
Since the rand is a fully convertible currency, all rand balances held by PTA members are 
guaranteed convertibility. 
Chapter two discusses the definition of currency convertibility and the extent to which PT A 
currencies are convertible. This is followed by an examination of the motivation for currency 
inconvertibility. The benefits from a fully convertible currency and the costs that may be 
3See chapter two for the exact definition. There is no discussion of capital account convertibility. 
4By the end of 1994 the PTA was made up of 22 countries: Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, 
Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. However, at the commencement of the study Eritrea, 
Madagascar, Namibia, and Seychelles were not members and therefore the analysis does not consider these countries. 
It is believed that the omission of these countries will not detract from its findings. 
5The CMA includes Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland. Since Namibia has joined after the commencement of 
the study the analysis will not consider it. This does not in any way detract from the analysis itself. 
3 
associated with transformation ~ e considered and the preconditions for currency con ertibility 
are established. 
The choice as to the mechanism to be used for making international trade payments is closely 
related to the country's exchange rate regime. It may be pressure on the balance of payments 
which motivates governments to make their currency inconvertible which is a result of the 
exchange rate regime being inappropriate or badly managed. 
Chapter three assesses the appropriateness of different exchange rnte regimes for the economic 
conditions of Less Developed Countries' (LDCs). The viability of different exchange rate 
regimes and their effects on currency convertibility are examined. It is shown that where 
governments attempt to maintain an exchange rate regime which is inconsistent with their 
macroeconomic policies, the result may be currency inconvertibility. However, the choice of 
an exchange rate regime inconsistent with the macroeconomic policy is undesirable at the outset 
and unsustainable in the long-run. Sooner or latter adjustments wi1~ have to be made. It follows 
therefore that currency convertibility can help avoid policy inconsistency and the misallocation 
of resources implied by this. 
Chapter four considers levels of trade and potential for trade among South Africa and the PT A. 
It is imperative to consider South Africa's present and future trade with PTA members as it has 
implications as to which payments arrangement is viable and whether it is necessary at all. 
Although difficulties for assessing the exact levels of trade are appa-;-ent a general indication of 
trade levels is possible. Despite the fact that levels of trade between South Africa and PT A 
members have been low, potential for future expanded trade does exist. 
Chapter five reviews the history and evolution of the Rand Monetary Area (RMA) and the 
CMA, and how those arrangements led to currency convertibility among the participating 
members. It is then argued that the economic conditions of Lesotho and Swaziland are such that 
they can both maintain a partially convertible currency without the CMA agreement. This 
chapter illustrates the importance of a transitional mechanism creating partial currency 
4 
convertibility (where full convertibility does not exist) for improved and more advanced regional 
trade, as a stage towards full currency convertibility. 
Chapter six investigates the other arrangement in the East and Southern African region which 
enables partial currency convertibility among member countries - the PT A Clearing House. It 
first describes the general objectives of the PTA, and then focuses on the objectives of the PTA 
Clearing House and how these are achieved. It is apparent that although the PTA Clearing 
House is a well functioning facility (no payments default has been experienced since its inception 
and settlements have been made timeously) the level of utilisation of it is low. The main reasons 
for the low utilisation of the PTA Clearing House are to be found in export incentive schemes, 
private sector resistance as to the advantages of the Clearing House, discouragement by 
commercial banks, and intra-regional trade imbalances. 
Since the utilisation of the PT A Clearing House is low it is necessary to consider whether PT A 
members would not be well advised to transform their currencies to fully convertible currencies 
rather than allowing only partial currency convertibility. It is found that most PTA currencies 
have not met the preconditions for transformation to full currency convertibility. Of particular 
relevance are their misaligned exchange rates and their inadequate levels of international 
liquidity. 
Given the lack of currency convertibility between the CMA and the PTA trade finance is risky 
and therefore restricted and expensive. Chapter seven looks at the types of risks that are 
involved in international trade finance and how currency inconvertibility increases this risk. It 
is shown that PT A members are perceived by the international financial community as being 
highly risky countries to trade with (not only for currency convertibility reasons). 
In order to demonstrate the restrictiveness of currency inconvertibility on trade finance a brief 
comparison is made between the use and the costs of different trade finance instruments between 
countries with convertible currencies and those without. It is apparent that only the less risky 
and more costly instruments for trade finance are used for trade in the PTA. Looking at the 
5 
costs of guaranteeing trade finance instruments and the confirmation costs charged by South 
African banks indicates the restrictive nature of currency inconvertibility. 
Chapter eight examines possible transitional payments arrangements between the MA and the 
PTA. It argues that a gradual approach to full currency convertibility is necessary as a one step 
approach may be so detrimental to an economy that it will have to revert to currency 
inconvertibility thereby worsening ts initial position. It suggests that imposing other non-trade 
barriers as a transitional arrangement may not succeed in the PT A as they have been 
unsuccessful in the past. Therefore, a look is taken at possible: monetary arrangements which 
will create partial currency convertibility and enhance intra-regional trade in the CMA-PTA 
region. 
The PT A Clearing House is found to be inappropriate when adding South Africa to it. Since 
the PT A Clearing House has been only partially successful, to a Jarge extent because of intra-
regional trade imbalances, incorporating South Africa will only e,.acerbate the problem. South 
Africa will increase intra-regional trade imbalances which may m..:1ke it unwilling to join such 
an arrangement. Therefore, a Payments Union is considered which will be structured in such 
a manner that it will encourage intra-regional trade while allowing for short-term finance for 
countries that may not be able to make payments timeously. The difficulties of introducing a 
PTA Payments Union (which includes South Africa) are that it may impede the progress towards 
achieving full currency convertibility by disrupting the lifting of ~ertain exchange controls and 
regulations as well as the large contribution which South Africa would have to make. A third 
possibility is the introduction of a reserve fund to which each member will contribute and 
countries that cannot honour their payments requirements will be able to draw. This facility 
could also be made available to members for global balance of payments difficulties purposes. 
The problem with this is that South Africa will be by far the largest contributor to the reserve 
fund making it, potentially, a financier of other members to the fund. It is therefore apparent 
that unless other member countries indicate that they have serious intentions to meet the 
preconditions for full currency convertibility and take the necessary measures to do so no 




DEFINITIONS AND PRECONDITIONS 
2.1 Introduction 
The potential gains from trade and the effect of restrictions on trade are well documented. 
Limitations on trade, particularly in LDCs, usually result from government policies aimed 
at gaining political popularity rather than economic realities. A specific problem arises when 
it comes to the payment for trade between countries. An exporting country will accept 
payment in the importing country's currency only if that currency is convertible or needed 
for reciprocal trade. The concept of currency convertibility is a broad one and has been used 
by different authors to indicate different degrees of convertibility. Some authors such as 
Green and Isard (1991) have used it, in its broader sense, to indicate the ability of residents 
and nonresidents to exchange a domestic currency for foreign currency without limit 
regardless of how the balances have arisen. Others such as Gold (1979) and Gilman (1990) 
have used the narrow definition of a convertible currency as given by Article VIII, sections 
2(a) and 4 of the articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund (International 
Monetary Fund, 1966, p.196) which read as follows: 
Article VIII, Section 2(a) 
"Avoidance of restrictions on current payments. - (a) ... no member shall, without the approval 
of the Fund, impose restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current 
international transactions." 
Article VIII, Section 4 
"Convertibility of foreign held balances. - (a) Each member shall buy balances of its currency 
held by another member if the latter, in requesting the purchase, represents 
(i) that the balances to be bought have been recently acquired as a result of 
7 
current transactions: r 
(ii) that their conversion is needed for making payments for current transactions. 
The buying member shall have the option to pay either in currency of the member making 
the request or in gold". (Or, in practice, payments can be made in another currency such 
as United States dollars or German marks). 
The narrower IMF definition will be used in this thesis. Only current account convertibility 
is considered here. Full (current account) currency convertibility is defined as: the ability 
of residents and nonresidents to exchange domestic currency for foreign currency when 
the balance arises from current account transactions regardless of the country from 
which the balances have arisen. Partial currency convertibility, on the other hand, is 
defined as: the ability of residents and nonresidents to exchange domestic currency for 
foreign currency when the current account balances have arisen from trade with a 
specified country or countries. 6 
The motivation for the refusal of an exporter to accept an inconvertible currency is clear. 
As long as s/he is not sure of the usefulness of the currency s/he will not accept it. The 
currency will become useful only if the authorities guarantee convertibility, or if imports 
from the trading partner cover export receipts. 
2.2 Currency Convertibility in the CMA and the PT A 
Table 2.1 shows that all but three of the nineteen countries that belong to the PT A or the 
CMA either peg their currency or allow it to float on a managed basis and only three of these 
countries have accepted Article VIII. Although table 2.1 gives a general idea as to the 
exchange arrangements and restrictions, a more detailed account as to restrictions on visible 
trade payments in the CMA and PTA is given in appendix A.7 The most stringent 
restrictions on imports are imposed by Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Uganda, and 
6Internal convertibility, where residents are allowed to hold domestic holdings of certain assets denominated in 
foreign currencies, is not considered here as it is not relevant to the PT A and CMA. 
7Payments restrictions are official actions directly affecting the availability or cost of exchange, or involving 
undue delay on payments to member countries, other than restrictions imposed for security reasons. 
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Zimbabwe. Imports into these countries require an import license. The granting of such 
licenses depends on the receipts of foreign exchange. Comoros, Somalia, and Zambia 
require import licenses for only some imports. Imports into Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, and Somalia are mostly free of licensing requirements other 
than for purposes of security and statistical reasons. However in Kenya, although licenses 
are not required, a foreign exchange allocation is necessary. Furthermore, it is important 
to note that in the cases of Malawi and Tanzania, although most import controls have been 
done away with, trade finance difficulties and bureaucratic delays in gaining access to foreign 
currency are restrictive. 
The issue here is that although in certain cases licences are not required, no PT A members 
apart from Djibouti and Swaziland have accepted Article VIII of the IMF. Therefore, even 
if licences are not required a foreigner exporting goods to any of these countries faces the 
danger of not receiving payment in a convertible currency.8 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.3 The Motivation for Currency Inconvertibility 
McKinnon (1979, p.40) associates currency inconvertibility with fixed exchange rates. 9 He 
argues that governments of LDCs lack the political power and the administrative capability 
to allocate resources through a centralised mechanism, as in centrally planned economies. 10 
Nevertheless there has been a tendency, in the past, to use this system rather than 
decentralising economic decision making. 
These governments use the market for foreign exchange as an instrument for internal 
economic control1 1 by regulating the clearing of international trade payments. This is done 
because of the relative ease of monitoring imports and exports compared with commerce in 
the domestic hinterland. Being the foreign exchange authority a government can: 
"1) Allocate import licences and the associated economic rents to particular firms and 
individuals while excluding others. 
2) License in favour of particular importable (exportable) commodities ... so as to reduce 
(raise) their domestic-currency prices relative to the potential. imports that are 
disallowed. 
3) Raise general revenue for the government by: 
i) Auctioning off licences to import to the highest bidder. 
ii) Raising the domestic-currency price of foreign exchange charged to 
importers above that paid to exporters. 
iii) Formally levying tariffs or other taxes on potential. importables. 
4) Introduce multiple exchange rates, such that different imports can enter at several 
different prices for foreign exchange; or export proceeds can be sold for domestic 
money at favoured or less favoured rates of exchange". (McKinnon, 1979, p.41) 
9This is not to say that a fixed exchange rate regime necessitates an inconvertible currency, but that it may result 
in an inconvertible currency under certain macroeconomic policies. 
10It became apparent, from recent past events in Eastern Europe that it is not political power or administrative 
capability that are the problem but rather the system itself. 
11Internal economic control refers to the authorities control over domestic economic variables such as the level 
of prices and employment. (Mckinnon, 1979, p.41) 
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As markets are segmented and different individuals are meant to see different prices for 
exportable or importable goods, currency inconvertibility is imperative. If domestic firms 
and individuals were allowed · to use the local currency for imports through the commercial 
banks, government control would be frustrated. 
A critical reason for currency inconvertibility is that of balance of payments constraints (e.g. 
shortage of reserves or lack of export base). In the case where there is a shortage of foreign 
reserves and a current account deficit which is not complemented by sufficient capital inflows 
the authorities will make the currency inconvertible so as to reduce the current account 
deficit. As balance of payments disequilibria are generally caused by inappropriate exchange 
rates , currency overvaluation can be seen as a major cause of currency inconvertibility. 
Under conditions of currency inconvertibility the clearing of payments for international trade 
transactions are generally done by the Central Bank or by commercial banks which are highly 
regulated and closely controlled by the authorities. The Central Bank collects all the foreign 
currency received from exports, as residents are not allowed to hold foreign currency, and 
then sells the foreign currency to licensed importers. 12 This restricts commercial banks 
from creating a unified market for both spot and forward foreign exchange transactions. 
2.4 Benefits and Costs of a Convertible Currency 
Currency convertibility may be associated with both benefits and co:its to an economy. As 
mentioned above, it is well accepted that engaging in international trade holds benefits for 
an economy. Since currency inconvertibility is a barrier to free trade, making the currency 
convertible will bring with it direct and indirect benefits. Possible direct benefits include 
greater choice of consumption, increased consumption, increased consumer satisfaction, and 
increases in domestic output by improving access to production inputs and modern 
technology. 
12PT A countries are now allowing limited retention of foreign exchange proceeds. This will be discussed further 
in chapter 6. 
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Following McKinnon's (1979) argument the important indirect benefits of currency 
convertibility arise from a more competitive environment where prices are determined by 
market forces. A more competitive environment should lead to production and investment 
decisions which are consistent with a country's comparative advantage. A convertible 
currency will create such an environment as it exposes domestic producers to competition 
from abroad and helps to introduce the relative prices for different goods prevailing on world 
markets. The competitive environment and correct price signals will create a more efficient 
allocation of factors of production creating economies of scale where the advantage lies. 
Economic concentration is reduced when it exists for reasons other than economies of scale 
such as the size of the domestic market. Increased competition can also promote innovation 
and quality improvements in the domestic industry. Profit maximisation will induce 
management to introduce new technologies and efficient production structures. (Green and 
Isard, 1991) 
As a counter to the benefits of currency convertibility the associated costs should be 
considered. The risk that is attached to making a currency convertible is twofold. (1) 
Unemployment and idle capacity. The opening of the current account might make imports 
attractive to the extent that demand for locally produced goods and services is significantly 
reduced, resulting in idle capacity and unemployment. (2) Reduction in real wage levels. 
The adjustment of the exchange rate will increase the price of imports reducing the risk of 
idle capacity and unemployment. However, the increased price of imports will translate into 
lower real wages with negative effects on the economy. Unemployment and idle capacity, 
and reduction in the real wage level will result in a negative impact on the standard of living. 
Although these conditions should change in the long-run, when the advantages discussed 
above come into effect, they may be unsustainable for political reasons. 13 
2.5 Preconditions for Currency Convertibility 
In order for an economy to reap the benefits of a convertible currency while minimising the 
13Political agendas are often short-term rather than long-term. The reason is that a government will find it very 
difficult to persuade its voters that short-term hardships may lead to higher future standards of living. 
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risks of macroeconomic instability certain preconditions must be met. Three basic 
preconditions for a successful transformation to currency convertibility are considered here. 
These are: (1) an appropriate ·exchange rate; (2) an adequate level of international liquidity; 
and (3) sound macroeconomic policies. 
2.5.1 An appropriate exchange rate 
The exchange rate regime a country adopts must allow for the real exchange rate to be 
compatible with sustainable long-term balance of payments equilibrium. This means that 
domestic prices must be roughly aligned with international prices. This will usually entail 
a depreciation of the overvalued official exchange rate to the more depreciated (closer to the 
equilibrium real exchange rate) parallel market. 
There are two important reasons why it is necessary to have an appropriate exchange rate 
before transformation to currency convertibility. First, without the realignment of the 
overvalued currency the efficiency and competitive advantages mentioned in section 2.3 will 
be lost. Secondly, if currency convertibility is allowed while the currency is overvalued, 
speculative pressures arising from an expected depreciation will make currency convertibility 
unsustainable. 
2.5.2 Adequate international liquidity 
Inadequate international liquidity will make transformation to currency convertibility difficult 
even if the exchange rate is on a path consistent with a current account balance. Without 
sufficient international liquidity14 a country might be unable to maintain a stable 
macroeconomic environment for domestic producers and consumers, because of the difficulty 
of stabilising both the exchange rate and the interest rate in the face of adverse short-term 
disturbances to the volumes or prices of exports or imports. Furthermore, inadequate 
14These comprise foreign exchange reserves and access to foreign financing. 
14 
international liquidity may e seen as a weakness to adjust to an unforseen external shock 
encouraging speculative actions against the currency. (Green and Isard, 1991, p.10) 
2.5.3 Sound macroeconomic policies 
The macroeconomic policies implemented must be such that an environment of 
macroeconomic stability is created which is conducive to reform. Such policies would help 
restrain overall demand in line with a country's productive and debt servicing capacity. 
(Gilman, 1990, p.33) If these are not in place, the doubts about the authorities' willingness 
and ability to exercise macroeconomic control will arise. These will then lead to external 
payments imbalances and to unsustainable speculative pressure. (Green and lsard, 1991, 
p.10) 
The three preconditions for currency convertibility are closely related to the exchange rate. 
Allowing for real exchange rate equilibrium will assist in maintaining an equilibrium current 
account, assist in protecting international reserves and also impact on the effect of 
macroeconomic policies on the economy. It is therefore necessary to look at the appropriate 
exchange rate regime for allowing currency convertibility. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CHOICE OF EXCHANGE RATE REGIME 
3.1 Introduction 
As was indicated in chapter 2 an important precondition for transformation to full currency 
convertibility is following an exchange rate regime which will minimise long-term balance 
of payments disequilibrium. Also, it was argued that the rationale for currency 
inconvertibility is protecting the balance of payments. This chapter argues that following an 
inappropriate exchange rate regime is the reason for balance of payments difficulties, which 
in turn results in currency inconvertibility. It is therefore necessary to consider the 
appropriate exchange rate regime for currency convertibility. Th is chapter looks at the 
optimal exchange rate regime in the context of macroeconomic and mic:oeconomic efficiency 
focusing on: (1) insulating properties of the exchange rate; (2) the feasibility of the different 
exchange rates; and (3) macroeconomic policy under different exchange rates. 
3.2 The Optimal Exchange Rate Regime 
There is no unambiguous answer to the question of what the optimal exchange rate regime 
is . The appropriate choice of an exchange rate regime depends on the objectives of exchange 
rate policy, the source of shocks to the economy, and the structural characteristics of the 
economy in question. The latter include the degree of capital mobility, the degree to which 
prices and wages are rigid, and the degree of openness. 
Establishing the optimal exchange rate regime necessitates the formation · of optimality 
criteria. This thesis, as is common in the theoretical literature on exchange rate regimes, 
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will concentrate on both macroeconomic stability15 and microeconomic efficiency bJectives 
to determine the optimality of the exchange rate regime. This will enable an evaluation of 
the different exchange rate regimes as a tool for achieving macroeconomic policy objectives. 
Collier and Joshi (1989, p.95) identify three important objectives of exchange rate policy. 
These are: 
(1) External balance - Edwards (1989, p.16) defines the equilibrium external balance as 
the point where "the intertemporal budget constraint that states that the discounted 
sum of a country's current account has to be equal to zero is satisfied". This does 
not imply that the current account should be balanced at all points in time. Current 
account deficits are often desirable when financed by a sustainable inflow of foreign 
capital. The exchange rate regime affects the external balance through its effect on 
total spending and the competitiveness of tradable commodities. Both can be affected 
for example by an overvaluation of the domestic currency as imports become 
relatively cheaper - increasing total spending, and exports of tradable goods are 
reduced due to higher costs - thereby reducing international competitiveness. 16 
(2) Internal Balance is defined by Edwards (1989, p.16) as the point where "the 
nontradable goods market clears in the cu"ent period, and is expected to be in 
equilibrium in future periods". An economy is in a state of internal balance when 
employment and inflation are at the best attainable combination. Governments 
attempt to reduce inflation to the lowest level and increase employment, achieving 
employment at its "natural" level. Here too, as in the case of the external balance, 
the exchange rate regime affects the internal balance through the price of the domestic 
currency. For example an increase in domestic expenditure will lead to an 
15Macroeconomic stability is defined in terms of the external and internal balance with the objective of 
minimising the variance of real output and the price level in the face of random external or domestic shocks. 
16The model assumes price-taking. The decline in competitiveness comes through the increasing costs associated 
with the rise in non-tradable goods prices which are inputs in production. 
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overvaluation of the currency (assuming it is fixed). 17 
(3) Microeconomic efficiency refers to efficiency of resource allocation in the economy. 
The ideal would be for the limited resources to be employed in the most profitable 
industry, maximising real income. This may be affected to some extent if the real 
exchange rate is misaligned, distorting prices of tradable and nontradable goods. 
Collier and Joshi (1989, p.95) have cited the possibility of economic uncertainty, 
particularly on foreign exchange transactions, and the likelihood of the imposition of 
trade restrictions as two of the reasons for the exchange rate regime affecting 
microeconomic efficiency. 
3.2.1 Insulating properties under different exchange rate regimes 
The general argument in favour of a system of flexible exchange rates was initially prompted 
by the difficulties arising from the Bretton Woods agreemem. 18 The conventional 
justification of this type of regime lay in the fact that external balance is achieved without 
interfering with the pursuit of internal economic objectives. Balance of payments imbalances 
will automatically be eliminated through changes in market prices for foreign exchange. As 
government does not have to intervene in the foreign exchange market in order to achieve 
an external balance it can control the money supply to achieve imernal balance. 
17 An increase in domestic spending will result in the price of non-tradable goods going up while the price of 
tradable goods is constant. This is an overvaluation of the exchange rate. 
18Much of the original advocacy for flexible exchange rates is credited to Milton Friedman. 
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When determining the most appropriate exchange rate regime for its insulating properties19 
it is important to identify the type and source of the shocks that the economy may face. 
These are: 
i) Shocks originating externally -
(a) Nominal shocks, where movements in the foreign price level may affect 
domestic prices; and 
(b) Real shocks, originating in the international goods market. 
ii) Shocks originating domestically -
(a) Nominal shocks, originating in the domestic money market; and 
(b) Real shocks, originating in the domestic goods market. 
(i) External nominal and real shocks 
When the shocks are nominal and originate externally the most appropriate exchange rate is 
a flexible one. Aghelvi, Khan, and Montiel (1991; henceforth A-K&M, p.5) show that under 
a flexible exchange rate regime when foreign prices change, domestic prices can be stabilised 
by a suitable adjustment in the exchange rate. 
Friedman (1976, p.159) uses a-simple asset market approach to explain the superiority of the 
flexible exchange rate regime as a mechanism for reconciling demand for and supply of a 
specific currency. He argues that this type of regime is superior to fixing the exchange rate, 
due to its insulating properties of foreign shocks on the domestic economy. If there is a 
change in the exchange rate and the reasons responsible for the change are regarded as 
temporary, holders of the country's currency will change their holdings in such a way that 
19Insulating properties are those which help to maintain economic stability in the economy (i.e., maintain the 
economy at a level as close to full employment as possible). These are in fact different from internal economic 
control since internal economic control does not necessarily mean economic stability in practice. Krueger (1985, 
p.130) defines the degree of insulation, /, as: 
dv 1=1--
dv* 
where dv is the change in the magnitude of the domestic variable v and v" is the corresponding foreign variable that 
was altered. 
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will moderate the movement in the exchange rate. 20 If, on the other hand, a change in the 
exchange rate is permanent, resulting from a change in "real" conditions, 21 speculation will 
lead to a rapid adjustment of-the exchange rate to its new equilibrium position. Therefore, 
assuming developed and integrated foreign exchange markets, under the asset market 
approach, this regime will not adversely effect the microeconomic efficiency or internal and 
external balances. 22 
Similarly, Black (1976) shows that the impact of a fall in the world price of tractable goods 
decreases their domestic price under a fixed exchange rate regime. This will result in a 
departure from the initial equilibrium and to money market disequilibrium. Under a system 
of flexible exchange rates this disequilibrium will be avoided as the exchange rate will adjust 
to maintain equilibrium. 
Krueger (1985, p.128), however, argues that the insulation properties of flexible exchange 
rates are challenged by the Mundell-Fleming model on the basis that capital flows respond 
to interest differentials. Within the framework of this model a foreign monetary shock would 
have an effect on the domestic economy because a change in the foreign interest rate would 
induce capital flows. This in tum would induce a change in the exchange rate in order to 
cause the current account to move in the direction opposite to the capital account movement. 
Fischer (1977), using a monetary model of the balance of payments, reaches a different 
conclusion to that of the Mundell-Fleming model. He argues that a foreign monetary shock, 
affecting foreign prices, does not affect domestic price levels. It or.ly affects the exchange 
rate. On the other hand he found that under fixed exchange rates the domestic price level 
20If the domestic currency appreciates as a result of temporary changes, speculators will sell some of their 
domestic currency and buy foreign currency in order to make a profit. By doing so they in fact provide the 
additional domestic currency to meet some of the excess demand responsible for the initial depreciation in the 
exchange rate. 
2 1He refers to real conditions determining international trade as weather, technical conditions of production, and 
consumer tastes. 
22Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.6 will deal with real shocks further. 
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as well as the level of real consumption were affected. Krueger (1985, p.129) notes, 
however, that the Fischer model assumes no capital flows which is an important qualification 
of his results. 
Helpman and Razin (1979) argue that a flexible exchange rate is superior to a fixed exchange 
rate. They use an intertemporal optimisation model which considers the current account 
balances as a long-term phenomenon (as defined on page 17). This permits a preferred time 
path of consumption. They conclude that " ... there is a.floating exchange rate equilibrium 
allocation which is preferred to every fixed exchange rate equilibrium allocation. The 
equilibrium is attained when a country pursues an optimal interest rate policy. In a fixed 
exchange rate regime countries cannot pursue independent interest rate policies, and a 
country which pegs its exchange rate ends up imponing the monetary inefficiency that exists 
abroad." (Helpman and Razin, 1979, p.405) 
(iia) Domestic nominal shocks 
The optimality of a flexible exchange regime becomes questionable when the shocks originate 
in the domestic money market. Black (1976) argues that under such circumstances the 
optimal exchange rate regime is one of fixed exchange rates since, through the use of 
reserves, the domestic economy can be better insulated. This will lead to greater 
microeconomic efficiency since there will not be an undue shift of resources. 
A-K&M (1991, p.6) agree with Black (1976) and explain that if the domestic shock 
originates in the money market a fixed exchange rate is more effective in minimising 
fluctuations in output. Since domestic money supply is endogenous under this exchange rate 
regime, disruptions in the money supply will be absorbed by changes in the foreign exchange 
reserves, leaving the goods market unaffected. 
Although there is a clear indication that, in cases of negative nominal shocks, macroeconomic 
stability is better served under ·a fixed exchange rate regime this is not the case with regard 
to microeconomic efficiency. Edwards's (1989) analysis points to the fact that under these 
conditions the exchange rate becomes overvalued. A domestic monetary shock will lead to 
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an increase in the price of non-tradable goods. The price of the tradable goods will remain 
unchanged since the nominal exchange rate is fixed. Therefore, there is an advantage for 
local agents to shift resources into the more profitable non-tradable goods sector. 
Microeconomic inefficiency derives from the fact that if the market were allowed to 
determine the exchange rate, more resources would have been allocated to the tradable goods 
sector. 
In order to fix the exchange rate there is a need for sufficient foreign exchange reserves or 
access to foreign borrowing. Friedman (1976, p.170) argues that if the shocks are 
temporary, reserves will probably suffice and the fixed exchange rate is feasible. However, 
if the shocks are temporary then fixing the exchange rate is unnecessary since, under flexible 
exchange rates, private speculative transactions will provide the additional . domestic or 
foreign currency demanded with only minor movements in exchange rates. If the shock is 
a prolonged one the fixed exchange rate will not be feasible as a result of lack of foreign 
reserves. 
(iib) Domestic real shocks 
When the shocks originate domestically and are real, A-K&M (1991) argue that the more 
appropriate exchange rate to follow, in order to minimise the fluctuations in output, is a 
flexible exchange rate. The exchange rate will adjust to stabilise output by generating or 
reducing external demand. An exchange rate appreciation will cushion the effect of a 
positive shock to domestic demand on output by directing part of the additional demand 
abroad. 
Friedman (1976, p.165) argues that changes in internal prices could produce the same effects 
on trade as changes in exchange rates. For example, a decline of 10 percent in the price 
level in Germany with an unchanged dollar price of the mark would have the same effects 
on the relative costs of domestic and foreign goods as a decline of 10 percent in the dollar 
price of the mark, with all internal prices unchanged. However in reality, internal prices are 
not as flexible as the exchange rate. Therefore, in order to insulate the economy from such 
shocks, this is the most desirable exchange rate regime. 
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What emerges from the above discussion is that there is no clear optimal exchange rate 
regime in the face of various shocks, as countries usually face more than one type of shock 
at a given time. Therefore, it is not su rising that some LDCs have adopted an intermediate 
exchange rate regime in order to combine the advantages of both extremes.23 
3.2.2 Structural characteristics affecting insulation 
Although the general case is as given above, there are structural characteristics of the 
economy that will affect the insulating properties of the exchange rate. A-K&M (1991, p.6) 
consider three structural characteristics: 
(1) The degree of openness in the economy - they argue that the greater the degree of 
openness the stronger the case for fixing the exchange rate. This is a result of the 
cost of frequent exchange rate adjustments that may take place due to transitory 
shocks as well as channelling some of the domestic monetary shocks abroad. Branson 
and Katseli-Papaefstratiou (1981; henceforth B-K) share this view with A-K&M 
(1991) but for different reasons. They maintain that an economy can be open to such 
an extent that if the exchange rate is flexible, domestic citizens would demand 
contracts effectively denominated in foreign currency. In such a case there will be 
no demand for the local currency other than for legal requirements. 
On the other hand A-K&M (1991) argue that if a country becomes more vulnerable 
to external shocks as a result of its openness, exchange rate adjustments will be 
necessary more frequently, thus requiring a flexible exchange rate. 
(2) Capital mobility - If there is an external increase in demand which is a result of 
expansionary monetary policy, under fixed exchange rates and capital mobility 
domestic interest rates will also fall. This will cause destabilisation in the domestic 
output as a result of increased imports. Therefore, the currency needs to be 
23Intermediate exchange rate regimes will be discussed in section 3.2.6. 
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appreciated in order to maintain domestic output stability. If the increase in external 
demand is a result of expansionary fiscal policy, interest rates will rise countering the 
destabilising effect of the increased external demand. 
It is possible, however, depending on the elasticities of the aggregate demand and 
supply functions , that the increase in external demand may be more than offset by a 
decrease in domestic demand thereby necessitating a depreciation of the domestic 
currency. As for shocks originating domestically, they argue that when the shock is 
a real one, under a fixed exchange rate, capital mobility intensifies the destabilisation 
of domestic output (because domestic exchange rates will not change in order to 
stabilise output). When the shock is nominal , a high degree of capital mobility 
justifies the use of a fixed exchange rate as it assists in stabilising domestic output by 
limiting the destabilising movements in domestic interest rates . 
(3) Degree of wage rigidity - The general argument here is th2.t if there is a devaluation 
of the domestic currency, its effect on macroeconomic and microeconomic variables 
will depend on the degree of wage indexation. A devaluation of the domestic 
currency will translate into a fall in the price of domestically produced goods, in 
foreign currency terms, improving the external balance through increased exports. 
However, if local wages· are fully indexed the devaluation of the currency will have 
no real effect. If wage indexation is less than the level of the devaluation, not only 
will the external balance improve, but a reallocation of resources from the non-
tradable goods sector to production in the tradable goods secmr will take place. 
3.2.3 The feasibility of the different exchange rate regimes 
The issue of the feasibility of the exchange rate regime is separate from that of optimality. 
This is due mainly to the degree of sophistication and integration of the financial market in 
question. B-K (1981 , p.394), using an asset market approach, look at the conditions under 
which a flexible exchange rate regime is feasible. They find that this exchange rate regime 
is only feasible if there are asset markets which are integrated into the international system. 
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If financial markets are integrated then in the short-term the exchange rate of the currency 
in question will be determined by equilibrium conditions in those markets. Therefore, stable 
financial markets mean that in the short-term exchange rates will also be stable. If a country 
does not have financial markets which are integrated into the international markets the 
exchange rate will be determined by current account flows. The short-term stability 
conditions are therefore the Marshall-Lerner conditions of trade elasticities. The feasibility 
problem under these conditions, they argue, results from the generally low short-term price 
elasticities. In the event that the financial markets are not internationally integrated or that 
the Marshall-Lerner condition does not provide the necessary stability, the central bank will 
have to ensure exchange rate stability. This reduces the viability of a flexible exchange rate 
regime as an option and raises the need for the implementation of a fixed exchange rate 
regime in most LDCs. 
Black (1976) examined the way in which foreign exchange markets and money markets in 
LDCs differ from the institutional and market structure of developed countries. He found 
six significant differences: 
(a) "There is a low degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign securities, 
including a thin market for domestic securities and an absence of a network of 
securities brokers and dealers. 
(b) Because of .. (a) and much higher uncertainty concerning political and economic 
developments, speculation is likely to be destabilising. 
(c) There is no forward market. 
(d) Interest rates on domestic securities are likely to be pegged at unrealistically low 
rates, leading to a fragmentation of the securities markets and a multiplicity of 
interest rates paid in a disorganised market. There may be no market in short-term 
securities. 
(e) The government is likely to impose an exchange-control regime involving government 
monopoly of exchange dealings, often with multiple discriminatory exchange rates. 
As a result, the domestic network of exchange dealers will be tightly controlled and 
have a minute capital position. 
(f) Finally, less developed countries tend to have small financial markets relative to those 
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of developed countries." (1976, p.18) 
Wickham (1985, p.253) maintains that under the conditions which Black (1976) found it is 
unreasonable to allow the exchange rate to be determined by the market. He suggests that 
it would be preferable, under such conditions, to follow a fixed exchange rate regime where 
government will intervene in the foreign exchange market by setting the price at which 
payments for foreign trade are made. He argues that the type of financial markets to which 
Black (1976) refers are usually accompanied by restrictions on capital and current account 
transactions as well as controls on the yields from available financial instruments. This point 
corroborates Mckinnon's (1979) argument that fixed exchange rates are associated with 
currency inconvertibility. Black (1976, p.21) explains that in order for a successful adoption 
of flexible exchange rates to take place, a country is compelled to abandon exchange 
controls, stabilise domestic policies, abandon the pegged interest rates in the domestic 
securities market, and develop a market for securities and foreign exchange. These steps 
which he describes as necessary for a successful adoption of a flexible exchange rate, are the 
conditions that will in fact make this type of exchange rate feasible. 
Although the differences that Black (1976) finds between financial markets in developed and 
less developed countries definitely influence the effectiveness of the flexible exchange rate 
as a stable exchange rate regime·, its applicability to an argument opposing flexible exchange 
rates is questionable. A distinction must be made between the existence of such markets and 
the potential to develop such markets. Many of the differences in the markets are a result 
of government policies. The development of financial markets in LDCs is feasible and is 
picking up momentum. Therefore, he makes the point that the cost of making the necessary 
changes must be weighed against the benefits emerging from the flexible exchange rate. The 
argument that the benefits from developed financial markets are substantial, not only for 
exchange rate considerations, is well accepted and indeed many LDCs are emphasising their 
development. 
Under circumstances of under-developed financial markets it is possible that the optimal 
choice would be an intermediate exchange rate regime. The determination of the degree of 
flexibility or fixity will depend on the dominant type of shock that the economy might face 
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as well as the structural characteristics and the financial market sophistication. Possibly the 
most important consideration as to the optimal exchange rate regime is the policy goals of 
the economy concerned. 
3.2.4 Macroeconomic policy under different exchange rate regimes24 
The question that arises now is: to what extent can government manage its own monetary and 
fiscal policy under a flexible and fixed exchange rate regime? This point is of importance 
given that most PT A countries have been implementing a fixed exchange rate regime. 
The traditional argument for the implementation of a flexible exchange rate regime is that 
under this system the government can follow an autonomous macroeconomic policy in 
accordance with its domestic objectives. Governments will be able to influence the price 
level in the short-run, through fiscal and monetary policies, without being constrained by 
balance of payments considerations. This is particularly important since many LDCs attempt 
to follow expansionary macroeconomic policies due to political pressures. These lead to an 
increase in domestic prices which will be offset by a depreciation of the exchange rate. 25 
Therefore there will be no undue constraint on the country's international reserves, and the 
tradable goods sector will be in equilibrium in both the short-term and long-term. This is 
in fact consistent with external and internal balances, and microeconomic efficiency. 
This traditional view is questionable. Although macroeconomic policy independence is 
possible under a flexible exchange rate it may have negative results. Assuming that 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) holds an increase in the money supply will have a nominal 
effect only since the rise in the domestic prices will be exactly offset by a depreciation of the 
domestic currency, confirming the traditional argument. If, however, PPP does not hold, 
an increase in the domestic prices will mean that local goods have become more expensive 
for foreigners, reducing demand for domestic goods. This will adversely affect 
2Tus is closely related to section 3.2.1 (iia). 
~is regards the change in the degree of international competitiveness. If the domestic price level increases 
while the exchange rate depreciates in the same proportion there is no impact on international competitiveness. 
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microeconomic efficiency. 
Caves, Frankel, and Jones (henceforth - CF&J) (1993, p.398) find that there is strong 
evidence to suggest that PPP does not hold in the short-run.26 This means that the real 
exchange rate is not constant in the short-run. Commodity prices are in fact sticky 
(originally the monetary model assumes that prices are flexible). As a result, disturbances 
in the nominal exchange rate are reflected as disturbances in the real exchange rate, which 
diminish over time as prices slowly adjust. The fact that prices are sticky in the short-run 
was the justification for the constant-price assumption made in both the Keynesian and 
Mundell-Fleming models. CF&G (1993) argue that the assumption of fixed commodity 
prices is too extreme. At the other extreme is the flexible-price monetary model which 
assumes that goods prices adjust instantaneously. This, however, is also unrealistic. 
Therefore, it was necessary to develop the sticky-price monetary version of the monetary 
model. This model gives the result of the Mundell-Fleming model for the short-run, where 
real exchange rates diverge from the long-run equilibrium, and the monetary model, where 
the real exchange rate is in equilibrium in the long-run. This sticky-price monetary model 
is best known as the overshooting model. 27 
Looking at the five industrialised countries over the period 1973-86 CF&G (1993, p.580) 
find that national differences in interest rates do not fully reflect differences in expected 
inflation rates and that real interest differentials did exist. Consequently, the model was 
extended to include real interest differentials . 
26The reasons which they give for this are: (a) tariffs and transport costs; (b) permanent shifts in the terms of 
trade; (c) CPI measurements disparities; and (d) imperfect information, contracts, inertia in consumer habits. 
27Toe model was formalised by Dornbusch (1976). 
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Maintaining the assumptions made in the monetary model28 the uncovered interest parity is 
retained and is expressed as: 
i-t=AS (1) 
were i and t are domestic and foreign interest rates respectively and AS is the expected 
change in the nominal exchange rate. Subtracting the expected inflation differential, 
lipe-lip\ from both sides yields the interest parity condition in real terms: 
or 
(2) 
where rand r are the domestic and foreign real interest rates respectively, and (llSreail is 
the expected change of the real exchange rate. Equation (2) indicates that the real interest 
rate differential is equal to the expected change of the real exchange rate. 
When a country's real interest rates are above those of its trading partners', this is a signal 
that investors expect the local currency to depreciate in the future. They are willing to hold 
the local currency as long as they are compensated for the future depreciation by high real 
interest rates. Investors expectations will guide the real exchange rate to its equilibrium 
position. CF&J (1993) show that the real exchange rate has a tendency to slowly adjust 
toward PPP, which makes it a good indicator of the long-run, equilibrium real exchange rate. 
Investors' expectations lead to the elimination of the divergence between the short-run and 
the long-run real exchange rate equilibrium which is formulated as: 
(3) 
where S and S are the spot exchange rate and the long-run exchange rate respectively, and 
28These are: (1) expected returns are equalised across countries when expressed in a common currency, (2) there 
are no barriers to slow down portfolio adjustment, and (3) investors treat foreign bonds as perfect substitutes in their 
portfolios . 
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() is the rate (speed) at which the exchange rate will adjust towards equilibrium. This 
equation shows that when a currency is thought to be overvalued (undervalued) investors will 
expect it to depreciate (appreciate) in the future. 
In order to determine the effect of real interest rate differentials on the real exchange rate it 
is necessary to combine equations (2) and (3) and solve for the divergence of the spot from 
the long-run exchange rate as a function of the real interest rate differentials: 
(S-SJ!S=-(118 )(r-r) (4) 
which indicates that when domestic real interest rates exceed foreign real interest rates, the 
local currency is overvalued. The higher the value of () the faster the adjustment and the 
lower the degree of instability. 
The above shows that the level of exchange rate, S, relative to its long-run equilibrium, S, 
is determined by the real interest rate differential which is determined by such factors as 
monetary policy. Assuming a macroeconomic shock in the form of an increase in the money 
supply29 may lead to the real exchange rate diverging from its long-run equilibrium. This 
results from the differences in speed of adjustment of assets prices and commodity prices. 
Any "news" on the forthcoming "shock" induces an instantaneous adjustment in asset prices. 
This adjustment will lead to an overshooting of the exchange rate30 while the rate of 
inflation, adjusting slowly, will gradually bring the real exchange rate to its long-term path 
as it counters the nominal money supply growth. 
Figure 3.1 shows the short-run overshooting and the adjustment towards the long-run 
equilibrium of the real exchange rate. The exchange rate is shown on the horizontal axis and 
the price level on the vertical axis. The PPP line is an upward sloping 45° line which 
indicates that when PPP holds the change in domestic prices and the exchange rate are 
29This would be a permanent increase in the money supply. Expansionary fiscal policy will have a similar result 
but the process is different. 
'°Overshooting of the exchange rate is a term given for the exchange rate depreciating by more than its long-term 
real exchange rate path. 
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proportional. Prior to any macroeconomic shock the real exchange rate is at point A on the 
PPP line. An increase in the money supply, M, will result in an increase in the real money 
supply, MIP, since prices o(goods do not adjust instantaneously. The increase in the real 
money supply will lead to a fall in the domestic interest rates making domestic assets less 
attractive for foreign investors. The decline in demand for domestic assets will cause the 
currency to depreciate and m<?ve to its short-run position at point C, further than point A' -
the equilibrium real exchange rate, since the price level has not adjusted. 
In the long-run, however, the exchange rate will move back to point B since prices of goods 
will slowly adjust. The fall in interest rates and the· value of the currency will increase 
demand for local goods, putting upwards pressure on prices with the real money supply 
falling. The process continues for as long as real interest rates and the value of the currency 
are low. These will increase until such time as the real money supply is the same as before 
the shock. This process of the adjustment to the real exchange rate equilibrium is shown by 
the movement along the line from point C to point B. 
Source: CF&I (1993). 
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The overshooting model shows evidence of short-run deviations from PPP and long-run 
equilibrium. Therefore, contrary to the traditional view, microeconomic inefficiency may 
take place under a flexible exchange rate regime. 
The difficulties of implementing a flexible exchange rate regime have led some LDCs to 
follow a fixed or intermediate regime. The conventional argument here is that a fixed 
exchange rate acts as a disciplining factor on the authorities. However, in order to have a 
sustainable macroeconomic equilibrium it is necessary that the monetary and fiscal policies 
that are implemented are consistent with the exchange rate regime. This means that if the 
government chooses to implement a fixed exchange rate regime it will have to follow the 
same macroeconomic policies as those followed by the authorities to which the currency is 
pegged. Hence, a loss of economic independence results. Failure to do so will lead to a real 
exchange rate misalignment. 
Pegging the currency to another currency necessitates government intervention in the foreign 
exchange market.31 Edwards (1989) argues that if the government decides to follow an 
expansionary macroeconomic policy with a high fiscal deficit it will be inconsistent'2 with 
a fixed exchange rate regime. 33 In many developing countries fiscal deficits are financed by 
money creation. The inflation required to finance a fiscal deficit equal to a fraction o of 
GDP can be calculated as -,;=olA, where ,,. is the rate of inflation required to finance the 
fiscal deficit, and A is the ratio of high-powered money to GDP. If the fiscal deficit is high 
it will necessitate a high level of inflation. This will possibly result in the price of non-
tradable goods (P N) growing faster than the international price of tradable goods (P-r) and 
therefore a real appreciation. 34 
31The degree of government intervention depends on the divergence of macroeconomic policies by the 
government from those of the government to which the currency is pegged. The larger the divergence, the more 
intervention will have to take place. 
32Inconsistent macroeconomic policy refers to a situation where the macroeconomic policy and exchange regime 
create a long-term balance of payments disequilibrium. 
33This concerns a case where the other country does not follow a macroeconomic policy which is as 
expansionary. 
34The real exchange rate e is defined as: e=EP/IPN, where, Eis the nominal exchange rate. 
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Financing of the fiscal deficit through money creation will lead to an excess supply of money which 
in tum will be translated into excess demand for tradable goods, non-tradable goods and financial 
assets. The excess demand for non-tradable goods will lead to an increase in the price of those 
goods while the excess demand for tradable goods35 will result in a trade deficit, an increase in 
foreign borrowing above its long-term sustainable level, and in a loss of international reserves. The 
combined affect will be an appreciation of the real exchange rate. If there are no changes in the 
fundamental real determinants of the equilibrium real exchange rate a real exchange rate 
misalignment will occur. 
To describe the effect of inconsistencies between macroeconomic policy and the exchange rate 
regime on the level of international reserves it is useful to consider Argy's (1982, p.9) 
"conventional" model of exchange rates which uses the interest rate parity framework. 36 
The model: 
B=C + K 
C = c(Y,(pd x S) I pf) C < O. C < 031 I , 2 
K = k[rd -rf + ((Se-S) IS)] K > 0 (assuming, F=Se) 
Where: 
B = balance of payments 
C = current account 
35Prices are assumed to be tied up to world prices. 
36Tbe interest parity framework is defined as : 
%&=F+(LJ.rd-i1rj) 
F=%&+RP 
Where: Sis the exchange rate; 
Se is the expected exchange rate; 
Fis the forward rate; 
rd and rf are domestic and foreign interest rates; 
RP is the risk premium; and 
%f.. is a percentage change. 





K = capital account 
Y = gross national product 
pd= (fixed) domestic price level 
pf= (fixed) foreign price level determined in foreign currency. 
Substituting equations (6) and (7) into (5) and rearranging we get: 
M=-( 
1 
)Ml-( Ci )~Y+ ( k )(Ard-Ar/ +Me) 
C2+ k C2 + k C2+k 
(8) 
It is clear from equation (8) that intervention, represented by &3 will have an effect on the 
exchange rate. Therefore, when the interest rate differential is given and the expected spot rate is 
firmly fixed the spot rate must rise sufficiently to create an expected devaluation exactly equal to 
the new interest differential. However, since in equation (8) A.Se is in fact zero (because it is fixed) 
pressure will build up on the foreign reserves which are used for intervention. Therefore, as long as 
there is a one-sided government intervention in the foreign exchange market the fixed exchange 
rate will not be sustainable if macroeconomic policy is more expansionary than that of the country 
to which the currency is pegged. 
The irrevocably fixed exchange rate under these circumstances is unsustainable. An important 
feature of this type of exchange rate regime is the certainty in which foreign trade can take place. If 
the exchange rate is irrevocably fixed then international trade transactions can take place with little 
or no foreign exchange risk. 38 This relies on the exchange rate being unchanged, which is the same 
as saying that the government is credible and will in fact maintain the exchange rate at a 
predetermined level. However, if the exchange rate regime is inconsistent with macroeconomic 
policy then an overvaluation (undervaluation) will necessitate a devaluation (revaluation) of the 
exchange rate in order to both realign the exchange rate and to protect the foreign exchange 
reserves. This will lead to the loss of government credibility to maintain the exchange rate at the 
predetermined rate. 
38F oreign exchange risk is minimised since traders know exactly what the exchange rate will be at the time 
of payment. This is an important feature when forward exchange markets do not exist, or are unnecessary under an 
irrevocable fixed exchange rate regime. 
34 
The fact that certain macroeconomic policies are inconsistent with an irrevocably fixed 
exchange rate regime does not mean that it is unattainable in the short-run. Freedman (1991, 
p.125) maintains that a small country which has perfect asset substitutability, no exchange 
controls, and a fixed exchange rate has no autonomy in monetary policy. This, however, 
is seldom the case. In most LDCs asset substitutability is not perfect, and exchange controls 
are in place. Therefore, there may be some scope for monetary policy autonomy. He gives 
the example of a country which decides to follow a more expansionary monetary policy than 
that of its pegged currency. High monetary growth will lead to a decrease in the domestic 
interest rates. Domestic interest rates will stay lower than foreign interest rates because of 
imperfect substitutability and exchange controls and domestic prices will rise above the 
foreign price. Therefore, although these inconsistent macroeconomic policies can be 
implemented they are in fact unsustainable in the long-run on the basis of both international 
reserves limitations and credibility. Furthermore, as becomes apparent from Freedman's 
argument, the anti-inflationary anchor which is supposed to be one of the main features of 
an irrevocably fixed exchange rate regime is lost under inconsisterit macroeconomic policies. 
3.2.5 The optimal peg 
As noted above, the choice of.a government's exchange rate regime will depend to a large 
extent on its economic goals. Therefore, the choice of a fixed exchange rate rather than a 
flexible exchange rate is not enough. Rather it is also necessary to decide what is the 
optimal peg. 
Collier and Joshi (1989, p.100) argue that if the government's goal is the stabilisation of the 
price level then it should fix its currency to a stable trading partner's currency. It is 
immediately apparent that by doing so it does not necessarily fix its effective exchange rate 
since the stable partner will most probably have a floating exchange rate regime. It was for 
this reason that some countries chose to fix their currency to a basket of currencies rather 
than a single currency. The partner currency should be one which maintains reasonable rates 
of inflation, and is expected to do so in the future as well. It should have a sound track 
record as to its macroeconomic policies. Furthermore, as Freedman (1991, p.126) claims, 
35 
the country to which the currency is tied should be one which faces similar shocks to that 
of its own. The anti-inflationary discipline that fixing the exchange rate imposes is the link 
between the balance of payments and monetary growth as well as the macroeconomic policies 
that the government is forced to pursue in order to defend the exchange rate and credible 
expectations. 
Williamson (1982, p.50) summarises the literature on the optimal exchange rate peg 
according to the aim of the macroeconomic policies that the government may pursue as 
depicted in table 3.1. It shows that there is wide-spread agreement that under most 
circumstances pegging to a basket of currencies is superior to pegging to a single currency. 
There is a need however, to keep in mind that pegging to a basket of currencies is more 
difficult for administrative reasons which may be an obstacle in the case of LDCs. · 
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Suggested Aim 
Minimise variances of relative price of traded goods 
Stabilise balances of trade and output, by stabilising 
effective exchange rate 
Minimise variance of the balance of trade subject to 
a requirement on its expected level, by stabilising 
the effective exchange rate with multilateral 
exchange rate models-type weights 
Minimise variance of real income subject to a 
requirement on its expected level 
Minimise variations in resource allocation and 
income distribution, by stabilising real effective 
exchange rate 
Stabilise real effective exchange rate 
Stabilise terms of trade 
Minimise the level and variability of inflation 
iource: w1111amson (lYlSL., P.:>U) 
3.2.6 Intermediate exchange rate regimes 
Recommended peg 
Basket with weights based on direction of total 
trade in goods and services (or elasticity weights for 
country with market power), provided the benefits 
of pegging to a basket outweigh the costs of 
inability to intervene in the unit providing the peg 
Peg to imported-weighted basket, with consideration 
as to whether the SOR ;., a good proxy 
Peg to an elasticity-weighted basket. (Special case 
with price-inelastic imports and perfectly elastic 
export demand: export-weighted basket) 
Peg to a basket with large weights for competitors 
and small or even negative weights for suppliers 
Peg to a basket, with weights based on currency of 
denomination of total trade when the export and 
import-competing sectors "Ie of similar size 
Peg to elasticity-weighted basket modified by 
covariance between inflation and depreciation. 
(Special case with PPP among trading partners: peg 
to single currency with preferred inflation rate), or 
consider pegging to a basket 
Peg to basket with weights reflecting market power 
in export and import markets 
Peg to the US dollar, or perhaps to the SOR or a 
trade-weighted basket 
Whatever the optimal peg may be, the argument remains that an irrevocably fixed exchange 
rate is viable and desirable only if the macroeconomic policies pursued by the government 
are consistent with it. Since they are seldom so, some countries have opted for an 
intermediate exchange rate regime allowing them to follow a more independent 
macroeconomic policy than possible under an irrevocably fixed rate. 
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The first type of intermediate regimes is the adjustable peg. According to Collier and Joshi 
(1989, p.104), an adjustable peg regime is accompanied by trade controls as it is still 
necessary to protect the domestic currency peg, and it loses its anti-inflationary anchor. The 
trade controls which are imposed in order to assist the fixing of the exchange rate destroy 
the monetary and expectational links between the domestic and foreign prices. A country 
which follows an expansionary macroeconomic policy will face increasing domestic prices 
leading to a loss of international competitiveness. When the real exchange rate becomes 
grossly overvalued, capital controls lose their effectiveness and capital outflows do occur. 
When the government does devalue the currency due to balance of payments pressures that 
have built up, the devaluation is so large that it induces an increase in the wage level and 
prices. Therefore, the devaluation is ineffective in restoring international competitiveness. 
Furthermore, due to the necessary continued implementation of trade controls, they are 
contrary to microeconomic efficiency as they distort the market allocation of resources. 
Wickham (1985, p.270) points out that as a result of over-expansionary macroeconomic 
policies which may take place under the adjustable peg exchange rate, there will be periods 
of exchange rate misalignment. This may lead to uncertainty surrounding prospective 
economic developments as well as disruptive speculative fluctuations in the demand and 
supply of a foreign currency. This is highly detrimental to the tradable goods sector in the 
economy, as it may find itself in -Jong periods of deteriorating competitiveness. Furthermore, 
with the absence of forward foreign exchange markets, as is often the case in many LDCs, 
uncertainty in foreign trade is increased. 
Freedman (1991, p.126) adds that such a system does not yield the benefit of full credibility 
which arises from an irrevocably fixed exchange rate regime. Since economic agents are 
aware of the need for a devaluation due to the inconsistent macroeconomic policy they may 
attempt to transfer their capital abroad. Such a scenario is often reduced in LDCs by capital 
controls. Capital controls, however, do not eliminate this problem since illegal capital 
outflows do take place. Although there may be a high cost involved in illegal transfer of 
capital it becomes more profitable the higher the expected devaluation. Therefore, economic 
agents, facing larger profits the higher expected devaluation, will be willing to incur the 
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higher cost of illegal transfers. 39 
The second type of intermediate exchange rate regimes is the crawling peg. Here the 
exchange rate is fixed and allowed to change in order to maintain the real exchange rate as 
in the adjustable peg. The government can implement a rule-based crawl, in which the 
nominal exchange rate will adjust sufficiently to maintain the equilibrium real exchange rate. 
This adjustment should be equal to the difference in the level of inflation between the 
countries. Or they can implement a discretionary crawl peg in which the adjustments are 
made by bureaucrats when deemed necessary. 
Collier and Joshi (1989, p.105) maintain that the rule-based peg is superior to the adjustable 
peg as it allows for consistent profit making, it avoids uncertainty, and reduces the need for 
frequent reallocation of resources. Whereas in the case of adjustable peg there are periods 
in which the real exchange rate is misaligned, under the rule-based peg this is eliminated 
since the exchange rate is continuously adjusting to maintain real exchange rate equilibrium. 
This means that it is possible for the domestic economy to have a different inflation rate from 
its pegging partner without affecting its level of output. The disadvantage of the rule-based 
peg is therefore that the anti-inflationary discipline on the government concerned is lost. 
A further important difficulty with the crawling peg is that the real exchange rate should not 
be held constant in the face of a permanent real shock. Changes in real exchange rate 
fundamentals such as a decrease in the international prices of a country's main export will 
mean a necessary devaluation greater than that which would take place if only inflation rates 
are taken into consideration. 
This problem can be remedied by the implementation of the discretionary crawling peg. 
Under this exchange rate regime the monetary authorities will adjust the exchange rate in 
order to maintain the real exchange rate at its equilibrium level. If real exchange rate 
fundamentals have changed then the appropriate adjustment would take place. Collier and 
Joshi (1989, p.105) note that complete discretion may lead to the creation of bureaucracies 
3~ese costs would be measured in both monetary terms and in terms of the risk of making an illegal 
transaction. 
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which may be influenced by interest groups. They suggest that a modified rule-based peg 
would be more appropriate since it will limit interes_t group pressure and maintain real 
exchange rate equilibrium. 
A-K&M's (1991, p.16) analysis suggests that Collier and Joshi's (1989) advocacy of the rule-
based peg is questionable on the ground of government's competence to follow such an 
exchange rate regime. 40 Although there may be a reduction in bureaucracy involvement in 
the process of exchange rate movements compared with the discretionary peg, it assumes that 
the government is able to identify and correct for those shocks. They maintain that in 
practice this exchange rate policy will be difficult to implement as it is difficult to separate 
the impact on competitiveness of expansionary financial policies from that of exogenous 
shocks. Furthermore, they argue that in certain circumstances even if the reason for the 
misalignment is inconsistent macroeconomic policy, a devaluation will be more beneficial 
than a macroeconomic policy correction. It follows from this that a combination of rule-
based peg with a certain amount of discretion should be implemented. It does seem that 
A&KM (1991) put too much emphasis on governments ability to determine when to allow 
a change in the exchange rate or not. There should not be any major difficulties for any 
government to follow such an exchange rate regime. 
This leads to the conclusion that the crawling peg is in fact inferior from the anti-inflationary 
perspective but is advantageous from the microeconomic efficiency perspective. If the 
government can maintain a moderate monetary policy stance, the irrevocable fixed exchange 
rate leads to both microeconomic efficiency and macroeconomic stability superiority. If that 
is not possible, then the rule-based peg is probably preferable because it maintains the 
microeconomic efficiency advantages and, to some extent, macroeconomic stability. 41 The 
adjustable peg is similar to the discretionary crawling peg with the difference being that the 
latter is adjusted on a regular basis. They are both problematic, however, the adjustable peg 
on microeconomic efficiency and macroeconomic stability considerations and the 
discretionary crawling peg on the basis of being over-dependent on the discretion of 
~ickham (1985) also has reservations on the ability of LDCs governments to follow this type of exchange rate 
regime. 
410nly to some extent because inflation has adverse effects on the economy. 
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bureaucrats who are susceptible to pressure groups and may lack the necessary expertise. 
3.3 Currency Inconvertibility and Fixed Exchange Rates 
The above discussion indicates that implementing a fixed exchange rate regime and 
attempting to follow an independent macroeconomic policy is unsustainable in the long-run. 
For a country to exercise an independent monetary policy under a fixed exchange rate 
necessitates sufficient foreign exchange reserves or sustained access to foreign loans. 
Restrictions on the current account, such as making the domestic currency inconvertible are 
then an inevitable consequence to help save scarce foreign currency. Currency 
inconvertibility also operates as a non-tariff trade barrier. Thus, it means that international 
trade is restricted with the country in question losing out on the potential benefits which it 
offers. 
The restriction on currency convertibility may aggravate the problem of exchange rate 
misalignment, eventually necessitating an even greater devaluation than would have been the 
case otherwise. Adding trade barriers to those already in place will lead to further 
microeconomic inefficiencies. Revenue from exports will be less than if comparative 
advantage is allowed to function, hence increasing the problem of foreign exchange 
shortages. 42 If the authorities of a country are unwilling or unable to maintain responsible 
macroeconomic policies which will coincide with those of the country to which it tied its 
currency, it will be better off allowing its currency to float. In that way, although not 
desirable, it can pursue its independent macroeconomic policies with less restrictions on 
trade. However, the fact that most LDCs do not have the necessary financial infrastructure 
as well as the adverse effect of exchange rate overshooting makes this regime questionable. 
This has led some economists to argue for an intermediate exchange rate regime as the most 
viable for LDCs. 
Currency inconvertibility is also possible when the exchange rate is flexible. In the case of 
42This line of argument holds for the irrevocably fixed exchange rate regime as well as the intermediate exchange 
rate regimes. 
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a fixed exchange rate, currency inconvertibility is a consequence of balance of payments 
constraints. In the case of a flexible exchange rate, balance of payments constraints do not 
exist in the long-run. Therefore, currency inconvertibility under these conditions is only 
necessary as a non-tariff barrier for protectionist reasons. 
Shortages of international reserves are a severe problem among the PT A members. 
Therefore, fixing the exchange rate while pursuing independent unsustainable macroeconomic 
policies is self-defeating. Under these conditions there is no confidence in the domestic 
currency. Exchange rate misalignment leads to an increased incentive for capital outflows. 
Although these are restricted by capital controls, these controls become less efficient the 
greater the misalignment. Microeconomic efficiency is low because of the relatively cheap 
imports and expensive exports, and macroeconomic stability is not achieved as a result of 
expectations of a necessary devaluation of the domestic currency. The decision to pursue a 
fixed exchange rate regime has to be coupled with serious political dedication to follow 
responsible macroeconomic policies. If this is not possible, using currency inconvertibility 
as a shield to pursue inconsistent macroeconomic policies is erroneous. 
It has been argued that in order for a country to adopt a flexible exchange rate an important 
pre-requisite is the existence of well developed and integrated financial markets. These 
conditions are often not fulfilled in developing countries because of the low level financial 
market sophistication. However, there is a recognition that there are potential benefits from 
developed financial markets in LDCs which has led to moves to develop these markets in 
many countries. 
The recognition of potential benefits of a flexible exchange rate and the fact that developed 
financial markets do not exist in most LDCs has led to variants of foreign exchange markets 
such as the auction market. The problem is that despite this, there are still parallel markets 
with substantial discounts which indicate that the auction rate is not a true market rate. 
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CHAPTER 4 
LEVELS OF TRADE AND POTENTIAL FOR FUTURE 
TRADE AMONG SOUTH AFRICA AND THE PTA 
4.1 Introduction 
Before proceeding to discuss the regional payments arrangements in the Eastern and Southern 
African region and suggesting an appropriate mechanism for them it is important to consider 
the past trade levels and whether potential for future trade among South Africa and the PT A 
exists. If such potential does not exist at all a mechanism for trade payments will not be 
necessary.43 South Africa's trade statistics are patchy and incomple-ce because these were 
not published between 1985 and late 1992 for "strategic reasons". As economic sanctions 
against South Africa restricted trade, the South African authorities kept trade statistics secret 
in order to protect countries that breached the sanctions. Furthermore, most of the trade 
statistics that were published subsequently include the combined imports and exports of the 
SACU. Therefore, the exact levels of trade are difficult to determine but a general 
impression can be obtained by looking at the available trade data. 
This chapter first looks at the level of trade among the PT A and South Africa. Then it 
considers potential for future trade by looking at the structure of South African exports and 
PTA imports. Whether or not economic integration in the CMA-PTA region is desirable is 
not the issue considered here.44 All that will be considered in this chapter is whether the 
conditions, as they stand at present, indicate that future trade has room for expansion. 
43Potential for future trade will almost always exist. If economies are growing trade should grow as well. 
However, what is considered here is whether the share of CMA-PTA trade as a percentage of total trade can 
increase. 
44Therefore, there is no consideration of Viner's (1950) theory of Customs Unions, from which the conventional 
treatment of economic integration stems. For a survey on the Theory of Economic Integration see Hine (1994). 
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4.2 Levels of Trade 
The first trade data available after the period of concealment was published in the publication 
Finansies en Tegniek (1991)45 and are reproduced in tables 4.1 and 4.2 together with trade 
data that is now published by the Department of Trade and Industry in its monthly abstract 
of trade statistics. The problem with the 1992 and 1993 data is that it represents imports and 
exports from the SACU as a whole. Therefore it is necessary to attempt to isolate South 
Africa's trade with Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia (BLSN) in order to get a 
better idea of South Africa's trade with the PTA. 
1990 1992 1993 




Kenya 10,875 23,783 30,757 
Malawi 81,130 133,953 . 159,606 
Mauritius 14,279 12,326 19,223 
Mozambique 30,388 50,978 60,233 
Rwanda 891 
Somalia 71 
Sudan 256 357 6,278 
Tanzania 2,580 10,290 21,832 
Uganda 90 51 1,101 
Zambia 6,582 44,565 76,159 
Zimbabwe 441,553 762,332 664,292 
Total 589,268 1,039,362 1,040,612 
Total SA Imports 44,125,000 52,857,600 59,078,694 
% of SA Total 1.34 1.97 1.76 
Source: Fmans1es en Tegruek (1991) and Republic of South Africa (1993) 
4$These are not estimates made by the publications but rather data that was made available to them by the 
authorities. 
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1990 1992 1993 
Angola 49,551 365,172 263,396 
Burundi 5,791 12,003 13,187 
Comoros 21 ,128 
Ethiopia 1,138 743 3,863 
Kenya 9,902 151,044 205,433 
Malawi 378,309 697,981 593,119 
Mauritius 301,220 391,610 470,932 
Mozambique 432,151 678,262 964,577 
Rwanda 386 8,170 4,810 
Somalia 4,606 1,532 
Sudan 2,648 21,330 31,037 
Tanzania 10,319 27,659 58,563 
Uganda 2,150 
Zambia 494,350 1,112,228 1,307,156 
Zimbabwe 1,061,801 1,553,369 1,747,723 
Total 2,775,452 5,019,577 5,665,328 
Total SA Exports 60,928,500 66,774,100 79,480,860 
% of SA Total 4.56 7.52 7.13 
Source: .Finans1es en Iegruek (lYYl) and Republic of South Africa (lYYJ) 
Table 4.3 shows the main trading partners of BLSN. It is evident that no significant trade 
with African countries outside the SACU takes place. Therefore, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that the trade data available for 1992-1993 represent, to a very large extent, South 
African trade with the PT A. 
45 
Exports Imports 
S.Africa Europe Other" S.Africa Europe Other" 
Botswana 3.0 91.0 6.0 79.0 13.0 8.0 
Lesotho 42.1 27. 9 30.0 94.1 1.3 4.6 
Namibia 25.0 45.0 30.0 90.0 4.0 6.0 
Swaziland 46.5 26.5 27.0 91.3 3.3 5.4 
Source: EconoIIllsts Intelligence Unit, BI...SN, 1992-93 
Note: the figures for Botswana are 1989, Lesotho 1991, Namibia - exports 1991 and imports 1990, and Swaziland 
1989. 
'The colwnn titled "other" in the case of Botswana represents exports to other Africa. In the case of Swaziland it 
represents 3.3 percent exported to Mozambique and the rest to outside Africa. 
It would appear from tables 4.1 and 4.2 that there has been a significant increase in trade 
between South Africa and the PTA after 1990. However, since the data that is available does 
not cover a large enough time series and the fact that the data is not identical, no firm 
conclusions as to the growth in trade can be reached. What tables 4.1 and 4.2 show is that 
the levels of trade among South Africa and the PT A are low. South African imports from 
and exports to the PT A represented less than 2 per cent and 7 percent of South Africa's total 
imports and exports respectively in 1992. The fact that trade data published in the monthly 
abstract of trade are given for . the SACU as a whole overestimates South Africa's trade 
levels. However the statistics published do not give the figures for all African countries 
individually. All African countries for which statistics are not given separately are combined 
into a category of 'other Africa', underestimating the levels of trade, albeit only slightly. 
4.3 The Potential for Future Trade 
Although levels of trade between South Africa and PT A countries were low in the past it 
does not mean that potential for trade expansion in the future does not exist. It is therefore 
necessary to consider the structure of trade of both the PT A and South Africa. A perquisite 
for future expanded trade is that trade structures are complementary. In other words that 
South Africa can offer the PT A what the PT A wishes to import and visa-versa. 
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Considering 55 Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) categories46 the issue of 
trade complementarity and potential is confirmed. PT A imports in these selected categories 
were valued, in 1989, at US$3,568 million while total South African exports of these selected 
categories were US$2,364 million. The data does not show what proportion of PT A imports 
come from South Africa. However, since South African exports to the PT A accounted for 
less than 5 percent (7 percent) of total South African exports in 1990 (1993), it is reasonable 
to consider that very little of the trade potential with the PT A is fulfilled. Therefore, as 
Davies et al (1993) maintain "there are several niches in the market worth $3.5 billion 
annually where South African industries could potentially compete". (p.5) 
Davies et al (1993) show how even fairly small increases in the market share could result 
in significant growth of trade. For example, Angola's total imports in 1990 were US$1.2 
billion. Angola's imports from South Africa in that year amounted to US$19.1 million which 
accounted for 1.6 percent of Angola's total imports. If Angola's imports from South Africa 
were to increase to 15 percent of total imports this would have translated into an increase of 
trade of US$160 million. 
Table 4.4 shows the percentage of PT A countries imports that originate from South Africa. 
In 1990 total PTA (excluding Lesotho and Swaziland) imports amounted to US$12.9 billion 
of which US$1.1 billion was imported from South Africa making South Africa's share in 
PTA imports as small as 8.3 percent of total PTA imports. Therefore, if South Africa's 
exports to the PTA were to increase to 15 percent of total PTA imports, this would translate 
into an increase in trade of US$866. 9 million. 
46See table Bl in the appendix. 
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Total Imports Imports from SA Imports from SA 
(US$m) (Value US$m) (% total) 
Angola 1,200 19.l 1.6 
Burundi 235 2.2 0.9 
Ethiopia 1,081 0.4 0.1 
Kenya 2,124 4.0 0.2 
Malawi 576 146.1 25.4 
Mauritius 1,616 116.3 7.2 
Mozambique1 680 166.8 24.5 
Rwanda 279 0.1 0.1 
Somalia 360 1.8 0.5 
Sudan 600 1.0 0.2 
Tanzania 935 3.9 0.4 
Uganda 458 0.8 0.2 
Zambia 873 190.8 21.9 
Zimbabwe 1,851 410.0 22.1 
Total 12,868 1,063 
Source: Davies et al (1993) 
"1989 
It is apparent, therefore, that although past levels of trade have been low there is potential 
for future expanded trade. Although expecting the removal of all obstacles to trade in the 
short-term may be over-optimistic, it is evident that even partial removal of trade barriers 
may increase the level of trade substantially. 
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CHAPTERS 
MONETARY ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA, 
LESOTIIO, AND SWAZILAND 
5.1 Introduction 
Before the independence of the present PT A and CMA countries, the problem of currency 
inconvertibility did not exist. There were three important arrangements which dealt with 
trade payments, making their currencies partially convertible. These were the East African 
Currency Board, the Southern Rhodesian Currency Board, and the RMA. Under the East 
African Currency Board, Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Somalia, and Ethiopia (the latter two 
only for a short period) used the East African shilling which was guaranteed conversion into 
sterling. 
The Southern Rhodesian Currency Board, which under its arrangement included Northern 
Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, bought and sold Southern Rhodesian currency 
in exchange for sterling at a . fixed rate, thereby guaranteeing onvertibility. After the 
countries belonging to the East African Currency Board and the Southern Rhodesian 
Currency Board obtained independence these agreements were terminated and their currencies 
became inconvertible. 
This chapter looks at the evolution of the monetary arrangement between Lesotho, South 
Africa and Swaziland and the conditions which enabled partial currency convertibility among 
CMA members. 47 It argues that the CMA was instrumental as a transitional currency 
convertibility arrangement but is no longer necessary for the creation of partial currency 
convertibility among Lesotho, South Africa and Swaziland. Lesotho and Swaziland have 
reached the stage where they can achieve partial and even full currency convertibility, as 
470nce independence was granted to Namibia the agreement, de facto, also included it. 
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indeed Swaziland has already done. 48 
5.2 The Period Prior to the 1974 Agreement 
The RMA originally included South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Botswana in which the 
rand was the only currency in circulation. The rand became legal tender in 1960 after the 
pound sterling (1921) and later the South African pound were taken out of circulation. At 
independence, which Botswana gained on 30 September 1966, Lesotho on 4 October 1966, 
and Swaziland on 6 September 1968, there were no formal monetary arrangements between 
these countries and South Africa. However, these countries and South Africa comprised a 
de facto unified monetary area with the rand being legal tender in the four territories. Being 
part of the sterling area, they were not subject to the United Kingdom's exchange controls 
on capital movements. However, on the fourth of July 1972 these countries were reclassified 
as non-scheduled territories, resulting in South Africa amending its exchange controls and 
regulations accordingly. 
The reclassification of the four countries as non-scheduled territories by the United Kingdom 
encouraged negotiations to reach a formal agreement. _ The South African government 
imposed, as a result of it becoming a non-scheduled territory, new exchange controls on all 
countries except Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland (BLS). This was made possible by the 
BLS governments cooperating informally, but closely, with South Africa to enforce the new 
restrictions. This prevented the BLS territories from being used as loopholes to the South 
African exchange controls. (PT A, 1990, p.10) 
The negotiations were prompted by perceived negative net benefits of the previous informal 
arrangement. Lesotho and Swaziland believed that in order for them to benefit from the 
arrangement they should: 
48Having partial currency convertibility with a country that has a fully convertible currency does not make that 
currency fully convertible as well since the balances must arise from trade among the two countries that have a 
partially convertible currency. For example a Zambian getting paid in maloti cannot convert it to rand at the Lesotho 
Central Bank and then convert them into dollars at the South African Reserve Bank. 
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(1) be compensated for the loss of income (by way of interest foregone) that they would 
have earned on their external reserves if they had their own currency; 
(2) have access to capital· and money markets in South Africa; 
(3) be consulted prior to policy decisions being made by the South African Reserve Bank 
as to interest, exchange rate and exchange control issues; 
(4) have the right to authorise the transfer of capital and profits abroad. (Trade Monitor 
1993a, p.19) 
5.3 The Monetary Agreement Between the Governments of South Africa, Lesotho 
and Swaziland. 
On the fifth of December 1974 the Governments of South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland 
entered into a formal agreement concerning monetary arrangements between them. In this 
treaty (2/1974) the three countries acknowledged the advantages of maintaining a common 
monetary area as monetary arrangements should provide for the sustained economic 
development of the RMA as a whole. The agreement stated that the arrangements should 
benefit all parties, but a special emphasis was put on encouraging the advancement of the less 
developed members. It was agreed that each country would be responsible for its own 
monetary policy and control over financial issues. However, the South African authorities 
were responsible for the management of the rand currency, gold reserves, and foreign 
exchange reserves of the RMA. 
Using Guma's (1985, p.169) classification, the eleven articles in the agreement are divided 
into two categories: operational and economic. Articles seven to eleven deal with the 
operational procedures necessary to make the agreement workable. These articles dealt with 
the collection and exchange of monetary statistics; consultations and the RMA commission; 
settlement of disputes; entry into force, accession, tennination and withdrawal; and, notices 
and requests respectively. The first six articles deal with economic issues of the agreement. 
Article 2 - Legal tender, is of central importance as it dealt with the currency to be used in 
the RMA. Although the rand was the only legal tender, article 2 allowed Lesotho and 
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Swaziland to issue their own national currencies, pending a further agreement with the South 
African Government. 49 Any new currency issued would not constitute legal tender outside 
the issuing country. 
Article 3 - Transfer of funds within the RMA. Article 3 provides that even when the rand 
is not the only legal tender in the RMA partial currency convertibility is maintained. It states 
that "[a] contracting party shall not apply any restrictions on the transfer of funds whether 
for current or for capital transactions, to or from the area of any other contracting party ... " 
(Treaty Series, 2/1974) 
Article 4 - Access to the South African capital and money markets and related markets, 
allows Lesotho and Swaziland to participate in the South African financial markets. Of 
particular importance is the fact that section 4 of article 4 states that in order to preserve 
monetary stability in the RMA the South African Reserve Banlc, in its capacity as lender of 
last resort, will make available, when the need arises, credit facilities to the monetary 
authorities of the other countries. This article makes the South African Reserve Bank the 
RMA' s ultimate controlling monetary authority. 
Article S - Gold and.foreign exchange transactions, reinforces the role of the South African 
Reserve Bank as the RMA's ·central bank. In terms of this article the governments of 
Lesotho and Swaziland agree to impose the same exchange controls as the South African 
government does. 
Article 6 - Compensatory Payments. This article compensates Lesotho and Swaziland for 
seigniorage loss as a result of the agreement. Since the rand is the legal currency in the 
RMA, Lesotho and Swaziland incur an opportunity cost in the form of seigniorage foregone. 
It deals with the amount that the South African government will have to pay the other two 
members as compensation for opportunity cost. Section 3 of article 6 provides a formula for 
the calculation of the amount to be paid as compensation to each country. The formula is: 
49In fact the need for a further agreement was only in regard to Lesotho. Swaziland had already reached an 
agreement (1/1974) with South Africa prior to the RMA agreement allowing it to issue a new currency, the 
emalangeni. In that agreement, Lesotho and Botswana were only observers. 
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(2/3)XYwhere: X represents the annual yield to redemption of the most recent issue of long -
term domestic South African government stock, and Y represents the estimated amount of 
rand notes and coins in circulation in each of the countries. This is in fact 2/3 of what the 
respective country would earn if all its currency in circulation was invested in long-term 
South African government stock. (Collings et al, 1978, p.108) 
Prior to this trilateral agreement an agreement between South Africa and Swaziland was 
reached with regard to the issue of notes and coins. That agreement (1/1974) had already 
raised most of the important issues. However, the importance of this agreement (2/1974) 
is that it formally established the RMA between the three independent states. 
On September sixth 1974 Swaziland exercised its right, under article 2 of the 1974 treaty, 
and issued its new currency, the emalangeni (all conditions of reserves, and convertibility 
were fulfiled). (Legum, 1975, p.495) 
Botswana had been part of the RMA and took part in the negotiations as to the formulation 
of an agreement on monetary cooperation but withdrew from the negotiations in August 
1974. Following its withdrawal from the RMA, the government of Botswana announced that 
within two years a Central Bank would be established and its own currency would be issued. 
This currency would replace the rand and become the only legal tender within the country' s 
borders. Although it withdrew from the negotiations it remained part of the RMA for the 
transition period. 
Botswana's break away from the RMA was prompted by the belief that the agreement would 
not be beneficial to all parties as South African government policy would not be able to 
accommodate all the members of the monetary area. Furthermore, the excess savings which 
took place in Botswana at the time were, to a large extent, invested abroad. Breaking away 
from the RMA would enable the authorities to channel those savings to domestic investment. 
(Legum, 1975, p.368) 
On the twenty third of August 1976 the Bank of Botswana issued its new currency, the pula 
(notes) and thebe (coins) replacing the rand as legal tender. The exchange rate was fixed at 
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par until the thirteenth of November 1976 after which a 3 percent commission was charged 
on the exchange of rand for pula. 
The rationale behind Botswana's withdrawal from the RMA can be found in the authorities' 
desire for greater independence in monetary, financial and exchange rate policies. New 
exchange controls were implemented, particularly restrictions on the capital account 
transactions, which necessitated the Bank of Botswana's approval. Foreign exchange for 
imported goods was made readily available from commercial banks, and interest or exchange 
allowances applicable to non-resident companies or individuals were unrestricted. 
Approximately 50 percent of Botswana's official reserves were held in South African rand 
and 75 percent of the country's imports were purchased from South Africa. (Legum, 1976-
1977, p.B751) The bank kept and continues to keep a rand account in South Africa for 
payments of creditors of the Botswana government, thus making the rand and the pula 
convertible. 
5.4 The Amendments to the Original Agreement 
The original 1974 trilateral agreement stipulated that in order for a new currency to be issued 
a further agreement between South Africa and the issuing country would be necessary. 
When the Lesotho government decided to exercise its right to issue its own currency a new 
agreement was reached on the twelfth of January 1979. This was based on the original 
agreement with the addition that the new currency would have to be backed 100 percent by 
the sum of: 
(a) "Rand currency held by the Lesotho monetary authority; 
(b) a Special Rand Deposit with the SARB; and 
(c) South African stock provided this does not exceed 10 percent of the backing of the 
national currency." (6/1986, Article 2, p.3)so 
30The agreement was signed in 1979 but was published in the treaty series only in 1986. 
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The amount to be backed in this way is calculated on the average of the Lesotho notes and 
coins in circulations during the previous 14 days. 
Furthermore, the agreement stated that the South African government will pay, on the Special 
Rand Deposit, an annual interest of 2 percent below the yield to redemption at which the 
most recent long-term domestic South African government stock was offered. This payment 
was to be paid quarterly and calculated on a daily average of the Special Rand Deposit. This 
agreement enabled the government of Lesotho to introduce the new currency, the maloti, on 
the nineteenth of January 1980, when the Lesotho Monetary Authority was launched. The 
motivation for issuing · the maloti was that it would allow the Lesotho authorities to exercise 
increased control over its monetary and fiscal policy, although it would continue to be a 
member of the RMA. (Legum, 1979-80, p.8713) 
On the first of June 1985 the governments of South Africa and Swaziland amended the 
original agreement. They added to article 2 the provision that the government of Swaziland 
can, on special request, have the Special Rand Deposit invested in short-term stock issued 
by the South African government or the Corporation of Public Deposits. This allowed, 
potentially, a better return than that in the original agreement. Later in that year (1 April 
1986, 30/1986) the bilateral agreement between South Africa and Lesotho was altered to 
allow Lesotho the same conditions as those available to Swaziland. 
The government of Swaziland decided to terminate the rand as legal tender in its territory 
as of the first of April 1986. This was executed in an agreement between the parties 
(31/1986) which also discontinued the compensatory payments to Swaziland. The rand and 
the emalangeni did, however, remain convertible by the respective monetary authorities. 
This convertibility is achieved by the stipulation that Swaziland must hold an account in the 
South African Reserve Bank in order to maintain convertibility. It is important to note, 
however, that Swaziland has not as yet, more than eight years after the agreement was 
reached, de-linked the emalangeni from the rand. 
The RMA was renamed the CMA on the first of April 1986 (32/1986). This change was due 
to the fact that there were three currencies in the area and the rand was not the only currency 
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in circulation as was the case in the past. The important difference is the fact that this title 
means that it is an area in which exchange arrangements are coordinated regardless of the 
currency. 
An important aspect of the CMA agreement is that of gold and foreign exchange reserves. 
These are held and managed by the respective monetary authorities of each country. 
However, both Lesotho and Swaziland have access to the foreign exchange market in South 
Africa. In the case of Swaziland it is stipulated that this will be allowed "on the 
understanding that the net foreign exchange requirements of Swaziland are in the first 
instance met from the foreign exchange reserves of Swaziland". (freaty Series, 31/1986, p.5) 
In the case of Lesotho this stipulation is not made, implying that there is free access to South 
African reserves. In order to enable the South African authorities to manage the gold and 
foreign exchange reserves, and monitor the exchange control of the CMA, the monetary 
authorities provide the South African Reserve Banlc with a monthly statement of gold and 
foreign exchange holdings, and transactions that have taken place during the period. (freaty 
Series, 31/1986 article 4.2, and 4/1989 article 9.2) 
On the twentieth of March 1990 Namibia was granted its independence from South Africa. 
Prior to its independence, Namibia was part of the RMA and later the CMA as it was part 
of South Africa. The Namibian constitution stated that Namibia would have its own 
currency. (Article 128(1)) Once independence was granted the Namibian authorities 
established the Banlc of Namibia on the second of July 1992. 
On the fifteenth of September 1993 Namibia introduced its own currency (the Namibian 
dollar) making both the rand and the Namibian dollar legal tender in Namibia and convertible 
at par by the banlcing system. It was made clear by the Namibian authorities that this would 
continue as long as the latter's value does not fall sharply: the decision to fix the dollar to 
the rand stems from the close trade relations between the two countries. 
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S.S Achieving Currency Convertibility Through the CMA Agreement 
The most important aspect · of this agreement, for the purpose of this study, is the 
achievement of currency convertibility. Article 6 of treaties 31/86 and 4/89 provides that 
ti ••• the contracting panies shall permit notes and coins issued by them to be repatriated ... ti. 
Thus currency (maloti and emalangeni) repatriated from South Africa to the Central Banks 
are convertible into rand. Any rand currency surplus held by the smaller members may be 
placed in the South African money and capital markets or may be used to purchase foreign 
exchange in that market. Therefore, the currencies are partially convertible but this does not 
mean that the holding of rand leads to a loss of income by way of interest foregone. 
As a result of the maloti and emalangeni being convertible within the CMA, payments for 
trade are unrestricted for imports from other members. It is worth noting that although 
Botswana is not a member of the CMA the pula is convertible within the CMA. Settlement 
of trade transaction between Botswana and South Africa are identical to those between the 
CMA members. Commercial banks in these countries will finance trade and enable payments 
as they are assured that the foreign currency which they receive can be exchanged for the 
local currency. This is different from the situation where the currencies are inconvertible. 51 
5.6 Currency Convertibility among South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland if the CMA 
Agreement is Terminated 
The advantages that Lesotho and Swaziland derive from the CMA are access to the South 
African foreign exchange and capital markets. The allowance made in the CMA agreement 
for access by Lesotho and Swaziland to South Africa's foreign exchange markets (and hence 
reserves) does not mean unrestricted access to reserves. In order for the smaller members 
to acquire foreign exchange on the South African market they will have to draw down their 
rand deposits in South African banks. Since these are limited so is their ability to draw on 
'
1Payments for trade among countries with and without convertible currencies will be discussed in chapter 7. 
57 
South Africa's foreign exchange reserve. Furthermore, as table 5.1 shows, Lesotho and 
Swaziland have a relatively superior capital account and reserve position than that of South 
Africa. 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Current A/C: 
Lesotho -12 -3 24 -25 10 65 83 38 
South Africa 2622 3153 2936 1218 1579 2253 2664 1388 
Swaziland -39 10 62 65 4 45 3 25 
Basic Balance: 
Lesotho 17 14 64 34 56 126 126 81 
South Africa 1987 1850 1628 831 1089 1549 1691 866 
Swaziland -17 42 89 96 71 21 43 71 
L\T capital: 
Lesotho 29 17 40 59 46 61 43 43 
South Africa -636 -1303 -1308 -387 -490 -704 -973 -522 
Swaziland 22 32 27 31 67 24 40 46 
Reserves: 
Lesotho 44 60 68 56 49 72 115 157 
South Africa 315 370 641 780 960 1008 899 992 
Swaziland 83 97 127 140 181 217 172 309 
,ource: lMl'·, (International :.'inancial Statistics, 1994). 
The preconditions for a convertible currency are fulfilled by both Lesotho and Swaziland. 
Their exchange rates can continue to be fixed to the rand at par or, if such a decision 
reached, be fixed to a basket of currencies as in the case of Botswana. In fact a strong 
argument can be made for Lesotho breaking away from pegging to the rand only. Looking 
at table 5.2 it is evident that Lesotho's trade with South Africa has lessened (in relative 
terms) since 1979. In the case of Swaziland, however, trade has increased (in relative terms) 
since 1970. 
58 
1970 1979 1984 1989-1991° 
Country 
S.A R.o.W S.A R.o.W S.A R.o.W S.A R.o.W 
Botswana 52.S 36.4 48.2 44.2 44.3 49.3 41.0" 52.0 
Lesotho 90.2 9.8 91.4 8.6 72.4 27.4 68.lb 29.0 
Swaziland 51.1 46.0 54.9 43.6 66.9 32.3 68,g8 21.4 
South Africa 88.0 90.3 93.5 
The current account position of both Lesotho and Swaziland is such that there is no indication 
that the exchange rate is overvalued to the extent that available reserves will not be sufficient 
to continue guaranteeing partial currency convertibility with South Africa. Also, there is no 
indication that macroeconomic policies implemented by the Lesotho and Swaziland authorities 
will be such as to create an unsustainable current account position. 
The remaining issue then is that of access to the South African capital market. If the CMA 
agreement is terminated South Africa will probably impose the same restrictions on capital 
account transactions with Lesotho and Swaziland as those imposed on other countries. The 
impact of such an action on the economies of Lesotho and Swaziland is difficult to determine. 
However, the long-term capital account position of both Lesotho and Swaziland, as shown 
in table 5 .1, indicates that the impact may only be marginal. 
It is apparent therefore that the CMA agreement was instrumental in establishing partial 
currency convertibility among South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland. However, as it stands 
today, partial currency convertibility can be maintained without the CMA agreement. 
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CHAPTER 6 
PAYMENTS ARRANGEMENTS WITHIN THE 
PREFERENTIAL TRADE AREA FOR EASTERN AND 
SOUTHERN AFRICAN STATES 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 has shown that most countries in the PT A have a currency which is not fully 
convertible. However, partial currency convertibility among the PT A members does exist. 
The trade payments mechanism that facilitates partial currency convertibility is the PT A 
Clearing House. In the CMA all current account transactions are guaranteed convertibility 
by the respective monetary authorities whereas in the PT A only trade payments which are 
channelled through the Clearing House are guaranteed convertibility. Therefore, although 
there is partial currency convertibility, not all transactions among PT A members are 
convertible. 
As the PT A Clearing House . is the most important tool facilitating partial currency 
convertibility within the PT A, this chapter, after looking at the general objectives of the PT A 
agreement, takes a close look at it. Because the Clearing House is not fully utilised, 
indicating that partial currency convertibility is only partially obtained, the reasons for low 
Clearing House utilisation are considered. 
The chapter then considers whether the PT A countries can and should move immediately to 
full currency convertibility in terms of the criteria set out in chapter 2. This requires looking 
at the profile of individual countries' exchange rate, international liquidity and 
macroeconomic policies. 
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6.2 The Preferential Trade Area and its Objectives 
The treaty establishing the PTA was signed in Abuja, Nigeria on 21 December 1981 within 
the Framework of the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos. It entered into force 
on 30 September 1982 and became operational on 1 January 1984. (Kumar, 1989) It 
established the objectives and institutional framework for the PTA region. 
The objectives of the PT A were defined in the 12 protocols of the treaty and can be 
summarised as follows: 
(a) "to promote co-operation and integration covering all tlze.fields of economic activity, 
particularly trade, customs, industry, transport, communications, agriculture, natural 
resources and monetary affairs; 
(b) to raise the standard of living of the people by fostering closer relations among 
member states; 
( c) to create a Common Market by the year 2(X)() in order to allow free movement of 
goods, capital and labour within the subregion; and 
(d) to contribute to the progress and development oftlze otlzer African countries". (PTA, 
1991, p. l) 
In order to facilitate achieving the objective of cooperation in monetary affairs, Protocol 6 -
Protocol on Clearing and Payment Arrangements, was introduced. The committee in charge 
of the monetary harmonisation of the treaty is the Clearing Payments Committee which has 
the governors of the Central Banks as its members. It determines the maximum debit and 
credit limits in relation to the Clearing House and daily interest rate for outstanding debit 
balances, as well as dealing with all issues on monetary and financial cooperation. 
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6.3 The PT A Clearing House 
As discussed in chapter 2 the problem of currency inconvertibility is a hindrance to trade. 
The administrative complexities involved in trade payments as well as waste of resources 
makes it highly desirable to have a convertible currency. Since the currencies of the PTA 
members were not convertible, the PT A Clearing House was introduced and is instrumental 
in creating partial currency convertibility. 
6.3.1 The PTA Clearing House objectives 
The PTA Clearing House was established on the 1st of February 1984. The objectives of 
the Clearing House (Article 22) indicate that the Clearing House will assist: 
(a) "to promote the llSe of national currencies in the settlement of all transactions 
between the member states; 
(b) to establish adequate machinery for the settlement of payments among the member 
states; 
(c) to economise on the llSe of foreign exchange by member states in their inter-state 
transactions; 
(d) to encourage the member states to promote and liberalise trade among their countries; 
(e) to promote monetary co-operation among the member states and closer 
relations among the banks in member states so as to contribute to the expansion of 
trade and economic activity among the member states". (PTA, 1992d, p.l) 
(i) Workings of the PTA Clearing House - Objectives (a and b) 
The workings of the PT A Clearing House are best demonstrated with the aid of an example. 
Consider a Zambian importing commodities from Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean exporter will 
not accept payment in kwacha as it would be worthless to her/him since (1) s/he is forbidden 
by the authorities to hold foreign currency; and (2) the Central Bank of Zambia will not 
guarantee exchanging the kwacha for a convertible currency or Zimbabwean dollars (unless 
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settlement takes place through the Clearing House). This is a result of a shortage of 
convertible currencies and the fact that Zambia has a significant trade deficit with Zimbabwe 
(shortage in Zimbabwean dollars). Therefore, the Zambian importer will be invoiced by the 
Zimbabwean, usually in Zimbabwean dollars. The Zambian importer will have her/his 
commercial bank issue a letter of credit on her/his behalf after the equivalent amount of 
kwacha is deposited in the bank. The Zambian commercial bank will then advise its 
correspondent bank in Zimbabwe of the terms of the letter of credit. 
Once trade has taken place, on the presentation of the necessary documents, the Zimbabwean 
commercial bank will pay the Zimbabwean exporter from the Zambian bank account which 
is held at that bank. The account is replenished using the Clearing House facility. The 
Zambian commercial bank then transfers the necessary amount to the Zambian Central Bank. 
The Zambian Central Bank is debited by the Zimbabwean dollar amount [in Unit of Account 
PTA (UAPTA)] at the Clearing House, and the Zimbabwean account is credited. This 
clearing procedure can be summarised in a flow chart as illustrated figure in 6.1. 
FIGURE 6.1 
Flow Chart of the Operations of the Pf A Clearing House 
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The numbers in the figure correspond to the following stages: 
1. The Zimbabwean exporter invoices goods and/or services in Zimbabwean dollars or 
in UAPTA. 
2. The Zambian importer pays her/his commercial bank in kwacha for the imports. 
3. The Zambian importer's commercial bank opens a letter of credit in favour of the 
Zimbabwean exporter which would be advised through the Zimbabwean exporter' s 
commercial bank in Zimbabwe. 
4. The Zambian importers's commercial bank in Zambia approaches the monetary 
authority to buy Zimbabwean dollars, and instructs that the commercial bank in 
Zimbabwe be credited accordingly. 
5. The monetary authority in Zambia requests the monetary authority in Zimbabwe to 
credit the specified commercial bank in Zimbabwe, against credit through the 
Clearing House. 
6. The monetary authority in Zambia, at the same time, advises the Clearing House of 
the transactions, requesting that its account be debited and the account of the 
monetary authority in Zimbabwe be credited. The monetary authority in Zimbabwe 
also advises the Clearing House as to the expected receipt of cover from the monetary 
authority in Zambia. 
7. The Zimbabwe monetary authority then pays (on the due date) the exporter's 
commercial bank the amount due for the goods and/or services. 
8. The Zimbabwean exporter's commercial bank then pays the exporter. 
9. Clearing House records transactions and arranges settlement at the end of the 
transactions period. 
(ii) Saving Foreign Currency - Objective (c) 
All trade transactions which are channelled through the PT A Clearing House are settled every 
two months. The PTA Clearing House calculates the values of the transactions in UAPTA 
which is fixed in hard currency terms at one UAPTA per SDR. Fifteen days after each 
settlement date the net debtor countries are required to deposit hard currency (usually US 
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dollars) in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Net creditors receive the amount owed 
to them in their accounts at the same bank. In this way the PT A Clearing House provides 
member states the opportunity to pay for trade transactions, within the region, in their own 
currency. The way in which the Clearing House reduces the use of foreign currencies for 
payments for trade within the region is explained in table 6.1. 
It is assumed that there are four countries, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia 
which are engaged in trade and use the PTA Clearing House for settlement of payments. 
Mozambique and Tanzania are net debtors, at the date of settlement. If payments for trade 
would not have taken place through the PT A Clearing House but rather through a foreign 
bank, US$38.52 million would have to be used. However, when using the PTA Clearing 
House, only the net debtors, being Mozambique US$12.11 million (imports of US$13.34 
million less exports of US$1.23 million) and Tanzania US$6.6 million (imports of US$9.1 
million less exports of US$2.5 million), would have to make payments in US dollars. 


























It is important to clarify that Mozambique and Tanzania still have to come up with the net 
balances in convertible currencies. Therefore, ''foreign exchange might be saved only to the 
extent that: 
a) "Commissions arising out of foreign trade .financing are appropriated by member 
country commercial banks and not by banks outside the region; 
b) Interest incomes from shon term foreign trade credit .financing is earned by member 
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country commercial banks". (Musokotwane, 1991, p.137) 
(iii) Encourage and Promote Regional Trade - objective (d) 
Trade transactions which are settled through the PT A Clearing House are guaranteed 
payment in a usable currency.52 Therefore, the PTA Clearing House eliminates the 
preference of trading outside the PT A on grounds of currency inconvertibility. 
The PT A agreement stipulates a 25 percent credit limit and a 20 percent debit limit that 
participating countries are allowed in respect to others. The existence of persistent deficits 
of some countries puts pressure on net creditor countries to import more from the net debtor 
countries. By importing from the net debtor they will be saving foreign exchange that would 
otherwise have to be used for imports from a non-PTA member. 
Musokotwane (1991, p.138) points out that the emergence of persistent net debtors has led 
to complaints by those countries as to the low level of imports by the net creditors from 
them. As a result some countries, such as Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, 
Swaziland and Zimbabwe, 53 have entered into bilateral agreements which stipulate that 
credit balances can be utilised in the debtor country only. 
(iv) A form of Finance - Objective (e) 
The fact that the settlement period is two months plus 15 days to deposit the foreign currency 
by the net debtor countries means that the net creditor countries are providing interest free 
loans to net debtor countries. This constitutes a form of cooperation and benefits both the 
net debtor and net creditor countries. It is an interest free loan for the net debtors and will 
create a greater incentive for them to trade with PT A members as imports from net creditors 
become relatively cheaper. 
'2This would either be a convertible currency or the local currency. 
'
3In fact two-thirds of PTA member states have bilateral payments arrangements.(Kumar, 1989, p.108) 
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6.3.2 Utilisation of the PTA Clearing House 
The PT A Clearing House has proved itself as a well functioning facility for trade payments 
which has the potential for saving foreign exchange. Table 6.2 shows that net settlement in 
convertible currencies as a percentage of total settlements has decreased from 74.6 percent 
in 1984 to 33.1 percent in 1992 implying that objective (c) in 6.3.1 above is being fulfilled . 
It has also proved to be a smoothly operating mechanism with participating countries 
fulfilling their obligations for payments. To date no country has defaulted although some 
countries have been late with payment. 54 This, however, has been made possible by a 
deliberate policy to limit imports through the Clearing House to avoid accumulation of 
excessively large net debit balances to settle in hard currency at the end of the transaction 
period. 
YEAR Volume of Business Utilisation level (% of Net Settlement in 
(UAPTA million) Percent Increase Intra PTA Trade) Forex as % Total 
1984 74.6 8.7 74.6 
1985 98.1 31.5 11.8 85.7 
1986 118.8 37.2 17.2 51.7 
1987 175.8 48.0 24.9 54.8 
1988 283.1 -61.0 32.3 50.1 
1989 441.0 55.8 55.7 46.9 
1990 389.0 -11.8 45.7 42.3 
1991 348.0 -15.2 32.8 33.7 
1992 272.4 -21.7 25.1 33.1 
1993 197.8 -27.4 
Source: Calculated from the YlA Annual Report (1994). 
Criticism has been directed at the appropriateness of the PT A Clearing House on the grounds 
that total PT A trade has increased at an annual average rate of 11.53 percent while intra-
regional trade has increased at a rate of only 5.82 percent between 1984 and 1992. Garner 
et al (1992, p.6/140) make the point that criticising the PTA Clearing House on the basis of 
such analysis, using US dollars to establish trends in trade, is unjustified. This is because 
the rapid depreciation of the region's currencies lead to a reduction in the value of trade, in 
541.ate payments carry an interest charge at the SDR rate plus one percent for every week overdue. 
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US dollar terms. In other words, even if the volume of intra-PT A trade is unchanged or 
increases by less than the depreciation of the currency, in terms of US dollars it will have 
decreased. Therefore, the correct way to evaluate intra-PT A trade is by using the total 
volume of trade in inflation - adjusted local currency terms. The difficulty with their 
argument is that most PTA currencies, as will be shown in section 6.4.1, have not 
experienced real exchange rate depreciation. Therefore, measuring trade trends in local 
currencies or in US dollars will have the same result. 
The issue of the low degree of utilisation of the PT A Clearing House for intra-PT A trade 
payments settlement is an important one. Although the level of utilisation has increased 
during the 80's, the PTA Clearing House was only used to settle 25.1 percent of intra-PTA 
trade in 1992. ss This relatively low level of utilisation means that there is still great 
potential for foreign exchange savings on current intra-PT A trade. It further indicates that 
there are still substantial barriers for it to realise its full potential. 
Although the PT A Clearing House is not utilised for settlement of all intra-regional trade it 
is not obvious that this is undesirable. It must be remembered that the issue is the creation 
of convertible currencies. Therefore, does low utilisation actually indicate a move away 
from convertible currencies? In order to establish if this is the case, it is necessary to 
consider some of the reasons for low PT A Clearing House utilisation. 
6.3.3 Reasons for the low utilisation of the PT A Clearing House 
The reasons for under-utilisation of the PTA Clearing House are closely related to the low 
level of intra-PTA trade as a percentage of total PTA trade. The larger the intra-regional 
trade imbalances the larger the amount of trade transactions that will not be channelled 
through the PT A Clearing House in order to avoid payment default. The main reasons for 
the under-utilisation do not derive from the PT A Clearing House itself. Some of the barriers 
to full utilisation are unique to individual countries resulting from government policies and 
55This trend seems to only be getting worse. From private correspondence it appears that intra-regional exporters 
are increasingly demanding payments in hard currency. 
68 
regulations, while others result from PT A policies and regulations. 
Export Incentive Schemes 
(i) As a result of balance of payments constraints some countries have implemented 
schemes to increase the volume of exports. One of these schemes allows exporters 
to retain part of the export earnings in foreign currency. This, although an incentive 
for increasing of exports, is a disincentive to the utilisation of the PT A Clearing 
House. The Ugandan authorities, for example, allow exporters to retain 100 percent 
of their export earnings. It is not surprising, therefore, that in 1988, 1989, and 1990 
the proportion transacted through hard currencies was 94 percent, 83 percent and 89 
percent respectively. (African Development Bank (Uganda), 1992, p.13) 
(ii) A similar problem to that of individual countries incentive schemes is that of the 
Open General Import License (OGIL) which has been adopted in Mozambique, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Under this scheme, which eliminates the need for import 
licenses on particular goods that originate in the PT A, part of the export receipts can 
be retained by the exporter in foreign currency (hard currency). Therefore, many 
exporters refuse to use the Clearing House since they demand payment for intra-PTA 
exports in hard currency: This means that the Clearing House's potential for foreign 
exchange savings is not fulfilled. In some cases (eg. Zambia), the utilisation of the 
PT A Clearing House is limited because most of the metal trade within the region is 
not processed through the Clearing House for OGIL related reasons. (African 
Development Bank (Zambia) 1992, p.12) 
Foreign exchange retention schemes and the OGIL can be seen as an attempt to encourage 
currency convertibility and improve the allocation of foreign exchange. Foreign exchange 
retention schemes are an incentive for exporters. This in turn should increase foreign 
exchange earnings and alleviate balance of payments constraints, one of the reasons for 
currency inconvertibility. 
OGIL is aimed at reducing the costs involved in import licences and improving the allocation 
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of foreign exchange by allowing exporters to retain some of the foreign currency they have 
earned. Although it reduces the utilisation of the PT A Clearing House it does not necessarily 
create currency inconvertibility. In fact if export retention schemes and OGIL increase 
exports then current account deficits may be reduced allowing currency convertibility without 
the use of the PT A Clearing House. Therefore it is apparent that low utilisation is not 
necessarily negative, as long as it does not discourage moves towards currency convertibility. 
Private Sector Resistance 
(iii) There is an entrenched lack of faith in the region's currencies by the private sector 
leading to some members still insisting on payments with hard currencies, particularly 
US dollars. This is, to a large extent, a result of lack of knowledge by the private 
sector as to the services the PT A Clearing House provides and the advantages it 
represents for the PTA member states. The demand for hard currencies is not 
surprising when the exported goods have a high import content. In many cases the 
exporters are forced to import machinery from outside the PTA necessitating the use 
of foreign currency. Because of foreign exchange shortages the authorities allocate 
foreign exchange to importers. Therefore, they get around the foreign exchange 
allocation by insisting on payment in hard currency for their intra-PTA exports. 
Discoura2ement by Commercial Banks 
(iv) In many cases commercial banks discourage the use of the PTA Clearing House. In 
Uganda, for example, a 1 percent commission on UAPTA travellers cheques is shared 
by three agencies and commercial banks obtain only 0.3 percent of it. Therefore 
banks prefer customers to buy US dollar denominated travellers' cheques rather than 
the UAPTA travellers cheques. (African Development Bank (Uganda), 1992) 
(v) An even more severe case of commercial banks discouraging the use of the PTA 
Clearing House, is as a result of the delayed export payments. As a result of the 
settlement period of the Clearing House, the exporters themselves are those who 
extend credit to importers. This can often be detrimental to an exporter who imports 
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from outside the PT A. Because of the inadequacy of forward markets (see appendix 
A) for foreign exchange the time delay of export receipts increases the uncertainty of 
the exporter as to his ability to pay for imports particularly when exchange rates are 
volatile. (African Development Bank (Kenya), 1992, p.18) 
In order to alleviate this problem, commercial banks should be allowed to pay 
exporters with the guaranteed reimbursement from the Central Banks. There is little 
risk in the Central Banks extending such a facility since payment to them is assured. 
Furthermore, this will lead to a situation where net creditor countries extend credit 
to net debtor countries rather than individual exporters doing so. 
Intra-Regional Trade Imbalances 
(vi) Intra-PT A trade is small in absolute terms and is of limited importance to most of the 
countries in the region. In 1980, total intra-PTA trade (exports plus imports) 
amounted to US$1,281 million or 6.3 percent of total PTA trade. The corresponding 
figures for 1991 (in 1980 prices) were US$801.55 million and 5.4 percent. (PTA, 
1993a) While the percentage of intra-PTA trade as a share of total PTA trade has 
decreased by 0.9 percent, total PTA trade in 1980 prices has fallen by approximately 
37 percent over the period. 
The major trading partners in the PTA are Kenya, Zimbabwe, Uganda and Zambia. 
Together, in 1992, they accounted for more than half of trade within the region.56 
This indicates the very skewed trade relationship which is found in the PTA. Kenya's 
intra-PTA trade over the period has been more than a quarter of total intra-PTA 
trade. This figure, although large, has declined since the 1973-1980 period when it 
amounted to about one third of trade. (Anjaria et al. 1982, p.4) 
The significance of intra-PT A trade varies substantially and does not necessarily 
follow the value of trade. The best indication of the importance of intra-PTA trade 
56See table B2 in the appendix. 
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is its share of total trade as can be seen in table 6.3. Although Djibouti ranks ninth 
according to its value of intra-PTA trade, intra-PI'A trade accounted for 16.3 percent 
of total PTA trade between 1980 and 1991, making it the second most dependent 
country on intra-PTA trade (Uganda being the first). Countries like Djibouti, Kenya 
and Malawi are highly dependent on the PI'A markets for their exports, while the 
majority (e.g. Uganda) are more dependent on the PI'A for their imports. The fact 
that there are a substantial number of net debtors and net creditors is a serious 
impediment to the effectiveness of the PTA Clearing House. This means that there 
is only limited potential for foreign exchange savings. In order for the PI'A Clearing 
House to be effective, it is necessary that multilateral intra~regional trade by countries 
in the region be as balanced as possible. H this is not the case a situation could arise 
where net debtors will not be able to honour their payments commitments as they 
have to be settled in convertible currencies. 51 
S7Regional net creditors in 1992 were: Djibouti (1991), Ethiopia, Kenya, Swaziland (1991), Tanzania, and 
Zimbabwe. The regional net debtor countries in 1992 were: Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia (1991), Sudan (1991), Uganda, and Zambia. Only Angola, Swaziland 
and Zimbabwe were overall net creditors during the period analysed. 
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Exports% Imports% Total % 
Angola 5.77 16 17 0.00 0.46 0.17 
Burundi 35.25 12 3 4.38 17.54 12.71 
Comoros 4.45 17 11 1.68 8.08 5.62 
Djibouti" 46.92 9 2 41.95 11.38 16.32 
Ethiopia 39.39 10 14 8.34 1.12 3.11 
Kenya 271.21 1 4 21.37 1.64 9.52 
Lesotho 3.23 18 12 1.69 6.26 4.78 
Malawi 58.28 6 5 9.93 8.55 8.98 
Mauritius 15.79 14 16 0.55 1.59 1.01 
Mozambique 66.30 5 7 4.96 8.02 7.33 
Rwanda 48.71 8 3 4.43 17.16 12.71 
Somalia" 24.18 13 8 1.52 7.56 6.10 
Sudan 
. 
37.16 11 15 0.13 3.24 2.39 
Swaziland" 14.37 15 10 4.45 4.96 5.67 
Tanzania 55.09 7 13 5.75 3.50 4.20 
Uganda 113.81 3 1 1.61 30.76 16.90 
Zambia 104.84 4 9 5.14 7.38 6.07 
Zimbabwe 167.85 2 6 9.82 7.49 7.87 
Source: cru.culated trom table 1'.l m the appendix. 
1Rank according to total value. 
2Rank according to share of intra-PT A trade in own total trade. 
"The share of intra-PTA trade in own total trade, annual average 1980-1991. 
6.4 The Preconditions for Transformation to Currency Convertibility and the Pr A 
Currencies. 
Given the advantages of having a convertible currency, as were described in chapter 2, it is 
worthwhile considering whether transformation to full currency convertibility by PTA 
members is possible at present. Therefore a closer look is taken at the key economic factors. 
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6.4.1 An appropriate exchange rate 
An overvalued exchange rate-is detrimental to both trade and transformation to a convertible 
currency. It is therefore necessary to consider whether PT A countries have misaligned 
exchange rates. Ghura and Grennes (1993) have constructed a "Real Exchange Rate 
Misalignment Index" (RERMIS) to measure the level of overvaluation or undervaluation of 
the exchange rate. The RERMIS is measured as: 
ERER , 
RERMISit= ( ie -1) 
RER1 t 
(1) 
where RER is the real exchange rate and ERER is the equilibrium real exchange rate, t is 
time index, and i is a country index. 
The RER is defined as: 
(2) 
where E is the official nominal exchange rate measured as the amount of domestic currency 
per unit of U.S. dollars, and P and "I' are the local price index of tradables and the foreign 
currency price of tradables respectively. The U.S. consumer price index (CPIUS) is used 
as proxy for p• and the domestic CPI as the proxy for P. 
Hence, (3) 
A positive value for the index indicates an exchange rate overvaluation while a negative value 
indicates an exchange rate undervaluation. Using a PPP approach the exchange rate 
misalignment is measured as the deviation of the real exchange rate from the base year where 
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the real exchange rate was at equilibrium. Following Cottani et al (1990), this thesis uses 
the average of the three highest values of the RER over the period as a proxy for equilibrium 
RER. 58 Hence the PPP measure of misalignment is 




The results of the PPP measure are shown in the first two columns of table 6.4. The first 
column shows Ghura and Gernnes's results for the period 1972-1987 while the second 
column shows the results calculated here for the period 1980-1993. 
The weakness of the PPP measure, however, is that it does not allow for changes in the 
ERER that may occur as a result of sustainable changes in economic fundamentals. 
Therefore, they use a second measure of RER misalignment which is based on a formal 
model of ERER determination. This model-based measure of misalignment is superior to 
the PPP measure as it allows for the ERER to change continuously. The results of this 
model are given in column three of table 6.4. 
A third measure of RER misalignment is that of the black market premium. When a local 
currency is believed to be more expensive (in foreign currency terms) in the official market 
than what the market rate is, an informal market for it emerges - the black market. The 
exchange rate in the black market therefore gives an indication as to the degree which the 
exchange rate is overvalued. The black market proxy for RER misalignment is calculated 
as: (black market exchange rate/official exchange rate)-1. The result will always be positive 
because a negative figure would mean a RER undervaluation. Under such conditions then 
the black market would not emerge. The results of the black market proxy are shown in the 
fourth column of table 6.4. 
"They assumed that these years correspond to those where the real exchange rates were closest to the equilibrium 
rates. 
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It is important to note that Ghura and Grennes (1993, p.167) find that the correlation 
coefficients with the model-based measure of misalignment for the PPP and black market 
measures are high. 
PPP Measure of RER Model Measure of RER Black Market Proxy for 




Burundi 17.4 27.0 23.8 26.0 
Ethiopia 29.5 44.6 19.5 48.7 
Kenya 13.6 21.8 18.8 14.0 
Lesotho 38.9 29.1 25.7 
Malawi 23.6 16.7 25.3 53.2 
Mauritius 21.0 15.8 22.6 
Mozambique 76.6 11.2 
Rwanda 47.3 23.2 30.3 
Somalia 50.2 51.7 49.1 72.2 
Sudan 25.5 91.2 39.8 130.1 
Swaziland 26.6 
Tanzania 34.4 155.3 56.2 6.9 
Uganda 115.9 145.6 
Zambia 103.0 78.4 32.8 47.0 
Zimbabwe 26.4 32.4 15.1 19.0 
Average 42.1 49.4 36.5 
Source: Ghura and Grennes (1993, p.166). 
"The 1980-1993 figures were calculated in the thesis. 
"Rates from Africa Analysis (1993, December). 
Table 6.4 shows the results of different measures of real exchange rate misalignment. All 
these measures show that over the period measured the exchange rate of all these countries 
were overvalued, on average, irrespective of the measure used. However, the first three 
measures give the average exchange rate overvaluation. According to these measures it is 
possible that there were certain years in which the exchange rate was not overvalued. Only 
the black market proxy for 1993, in the fourth column, gives an indication of the level of 
misalignment for a particular year. It may, therefore, be helpful to identify the direction in 
which the RER of the PT A currencies are moving. 
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To find the direction of RER movement a 'traditional' real exchange rate measure which 
relies on the PPP approach is used. 59 The nominal exchange rates and consumer price 
indices, as published in the Internation Financial Statistics, for the relevant countries were 
used. The RER was calculated using equation (3) in section 6.4.1 above. The results of the 
measurement are shown in figures 6.2 to 6.14. These show RER trends over the period 
considered. A segment of the graph with a positive slope indicates a real exchange rate 
depreciation. A segment of the graph with a negative slope indicates real exchange rate 
appreciation. 
Figures 6.2 to 6.14 show a mixed trend of real exchange rates of PT A members. 60 The 
Ethiopian birr, Mozambique metical, Tanzanian shilling, and the Zimbabwean dollar have 
followed a depreciating trend. Nonetheless, according to the 1993 black market proxy for 
real exchange rate misalignment these currencies were overvalued. The currencies of 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Swaziland and Zambia have either maintained a stable 
exchange rate or experienced a currency appreciation. Here too the 1993 black market proxy 
establishes that the Malawi kwacha and the Zambian kwacha are overvalued. It is apparent 
therefore that in certain cases the exchange rate policy pursued had good intention, that of 
depreciating the currency, attempting to bring it in line with its equilibrium rate. However, 
other accompanying policies were not complementary to these attempts. 
59This is the same RER measure as discussed above but does not take into consideration the ERER. The reason 
for this is the fact that the three years with the highest RER may be the closest to ERER, but are not exactly the 
ERER (because they are an average). Therefore, using the PPP measure of misalignment for the presentation of 
the RER trends may imply that in the year that the RER is highest it was undervalued. 
600nce again unavailability of data has restricted the analysis. Sufficient data was only available for thirteen 
countries. 
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The trends that are apparent in the PTA currencies in recent years may seem encouraging 
as RER depreciation is taking place in some cases. However, since the PPP measure does 
not allow for ERER changes, a depreciation of the RER does not necessarily indicate a 
movement towards equilibrium. 61 Therefore, to get a better approximation of the 
currencies' position with regard the ERER it is necessary to look at each country's current 
account, international reserves, and the level of international debt. 
A persistent current account deficit would indicate that the exchange rate is in fact overvalued 
since imports are cheaper than they would have been if the real exchange rate was at 
equilibrium. However, looking at the current account on its own is not sufficient since 
consideration must also be made as to the level of international reserves. If international 
reserves are positive then a current account deficit could indicate a healthy economy with an 
appreciating equilibrium real exchange rate as economic growth occurs and economic 
fundamentals improve. Thus under these conditions the appreciation of the real exchange 
rate may not mean that the real exchange rate is moving away from equilibrium. 
Table 6.5 shows the current account position of PTA countries since 1985 and table 6.6 
shows the reserve position of these countries in terms of months of import cover. The only 
PT A countries that have not had a persistent current account deficit since 1985 are Lesotho 
and Swaziland.62 International reserves of most PTA members do not show particular 
strength to indicate that the persistent current account deficits are not problematic with the 
possible exception of Burundi, Djibouti, and Mauritius. 
61This could of been established if the black market rates were available for all PTA countries. For the countries 
that it is available, as was shown, the currencies are overvalued. 
62South Africa's debt standstill has, no doubt, a hand in this. 
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1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Angola -303 447 -469 -132 -236 -580 -511 
Burundi -42.2 -37.6 -96.5 -70.6 -12.1 -66.2 -31.3 -54.0 
Comoros -14.3 -15.6 -21.4 -6.5 5.4 -9.3 -8.9 -9.0 
Djibouti 
Ethiopia 105.9 -327.3 -217.5 -227.9 137.1 -284.1 174.0 -120.0 
Kenya -112.9 -38.1 -497.7 -460.4 -579.6 502.1 -230.9 -98.0 
Lesotho -12.1 -2.8 23.6 -24.6 10.4 65.0 83.0 38.0 
Malawi -124.7 -89.9 -55.3 -53.1 -130.0 -78.0 -156.0 
Mauritius -29.5 94.1 63.0 -63.6 -104.4 -119.9 -18.0 -2.0 
Mozambique -301.0 -409.0 -389.0 -359.0 -460.0 -415.0 -344.0 -381.0 
Rwanda -64.1 -69.2 -134.3 -144.5 -122.6 -108.8 -34.1 -85.0 
Somalia -102.8 -125.7 -114.0 -98.5 -156.7 
Sudan 148.4 -17.4 -231.7 -358.0 -150.3 -369.2 -957.8 -506.0 
Swaziland -39.0 11.0 62.0 65.0 4.0 45.0 3.0 25.0 
Tanzania -37.5 -321.8 -446.0 -375.8 -358.8 -426.0 
Uganda 4.6 -3.8 -112.0 -195.2 -259.5 -263.3 -170.0 -100.0 
Zambia -398.0 -350.0 -248.0 -295.0 -222.0 -597.0 -307.0 
Zimbabwe -75.7 6.8 48.0 116.6 -3.0 -172.0 -489.0 




















,ource: world uevelopment .Report l world Bank, 1994) 
• 1991 . 
Furthermore, looking at table 6. 7 which shows the PT A member countries debt to the IMF, 
it is evident that most PTA countries have drawn on IMF credit and loans63 in the form of 
the General Resource Account (GRA), Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF), and the 
Enhanced SAF (ESAF) to a large degree. Since some of the reserves would be used to pay 
back for credit and loans outstanding the level of reserves is even less favourable than that 
which is given by the months of import cover. 
631.ooking at the capital account would be of little help here since a positive capital account balance may be a 
result of IMF credit and loans. This would in fact distort the result since these do not necessarily mean an 




















Source: international !<'manc1al :stausucs tll~ .t', 1994) 
1This includes outstanding use of Fund's credit within GRA, SAF, ESAF, and Trust fund loans. 
The above analysis therefore indicates that the problem of exchange rate overvaluation is still 
prevalent in most PT A countries. Since there is no indication of an improvement in the real 
exchange rate fundamentals coupled with the 1993 black market proxy of real exchange rate 
misalignment which shows exchange rate overvaluation, it can be concluded that the PTA 
currencies are overvalued. It is important to note, however, that there are different degrees 
of overvaluation among PT A currencies. 
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6.4.2 Adequate International Liquidity 
International reserves and access to foreign financing, are necessary for transformation to full 
currency convertibility. The sufficient level of international reserves cannot be accurately 
quantified as the exact pressure on them can not be predicted. However, it can be argued 
that the level of international reserves of countries about to transform to full currency 
convertibility should be higher than those of countries that have already got a convertible 
currency. 
The first indicator is that of months of imports covered. Here, as has been discussed, the 
situation is anything but promising. Seeing that the generally accepted necessary level of 
reserves under normal circumstances is three months of import cover, in most PT A countries 
this is not the case. The second indicator is that of access to international loans. Table 6. 8 
shows that both official development assistance and total external debt as a percentage of 
GNP are high. This indicates that these countries may find it difficult to get any additional 
assistance from outside sources. This means that PT A members will have difficulty in 
accessing international financial markets. 64 
~he related issue of credit ratings is discussed in more detail in chapter 7. 
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Establishing whether PT A countries pursue sound macroeconomic policies is a difficult task 
due to the unavailability of necessary data. Time series reflecting levels of taxation, money 
supply growth, and government consumption expenditure, but to mention a few, are 
incomplete. The only data available that may assist in evaluating macroeconomic policies 
is that of the external debt as a percentage of GNP shown in table 6. 8 and inflation shown 
in table 6.9. Both of these measures are indicating that macroeconomic policies pursued are 
not sound. 
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85 86 " 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 
Angola 
Burundi 3.6 1.9 7.0 4.7 11.6 7.0 8.8 4.5 9.7 
Comoros 
Djibouti 
Ethiopia 19.1 -9.8 -2.4 7.1 7.8 5.2 35.7 10.5 3.5 
Kenya 13.1 3.9 7.6 11.2 12.9 15.6 19.8 29.5 45.8 
Lesotho 18.1 11.8 11.4 14.7 11.6 17.7 17.2 13.9 
Malawi 10.5 14.0 25.2 33.9 12.5 11.8 12.6 22.7 
Mauritius 6.7 1.6 0.5 9.2 12.7 13.5 7.0 4.6 10.5 
Mozambique 91.0 50.1 40.1 47.0 33.3 45.2 76.2 
Rwanda 1.7 -1.1 4.1 3.0 1.0 4.2 19.6 9.6 12.4 
Somalia 37.8 35.8 28.2 81.9 
Sudan 45.4 24.5 64.7 66.7 65.2 123.6 117.6 101.4 
Swaziland 20.5 13.7 13.4 12.5 8.3 11.0 10.8 8.2 17.0 
Tanzania 33.3 32.4 30.0 31.2 25.8 19.7 22.3 22.1 23.5 
Uganda 158 161 200 196 61.4 33.1 28.1 52.4 6.1 
Zambia 37.3 54.0 45.6 54.7 129 111 92.6 197.4 189.0 
Zimbabwe 8.5 14.3 12.5 7.4 12.9 17.4 23.3 42.1 27.6 
,iource: Internauona Financial Statistics, , 1,,4) 
The above analysis indicates that transformation to full currency convertibility cannot take 
place as yet in most cases. Rather a gradual attempt to correct the problems that are standing 
in the way of full currency convertibility are necessary. There are strong signs, however, 
that PT A members are attempting to achieve the prerequisites to transformation to full 
currency convertibility. The most notable cases of exchange rate reforms that have taken 
place recently are those in Angola, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. The 
new Angolan kwanza has been devalued repeatedly by the authorities during 1994 in an 
attempt to bring the official exchange rate to " ... a point of macroeconomic equilibrium". 
(Africa Research Bulletin, 5/1994) Ethiopia has introduced a fourthnightly foreign exchange 
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auction. The Kenyan shilling's exchange rate has been floating since early 1993 and 
regulations on foreign exchange transactions were abolished in early 1994. This means that 
foreign visitors are now able to use Kenyan shillings instead of hard currency and that 
restrictions on local borrowing by foreign - controlled companies are removed. Malawi and 
Tanzania have both introduced a weekly foreign exchange auction sale. At the beginning of 
1994 the Zimbabwean authorities made it clear that they will attempt to bring the official and 
black market exchange rates closer together, clearing the way for the abolition of the 
remaining exchange controls. The Zimbabwean dollar was devalued by 17 percent in 
January 1994 which led to the official exchange rate being 4 percent to 5 percent below the 
black market rate, down from 19 percent at the end of 1993. (Africa Research Bulletin, 
3/1994) In July 1994 the Zimbabwean Reserve Bank announced that the gap was almost 
eliminated. 65 (EIU, 4th quarter, 1994) 
Although these are positive moves there are already signs that some of these reforms are 
problematic and may be reversed as has happened often in the past. One example is that of 
Malawi where the auctions are dominated by a small cartel of bidders. Furthermore, 
companies which are part of an international conglomerate can buy foreign currency from 
sister companies at lower rates than those in the auction market, giving them an unfair 
advantage. (EIU, 3rd quarter, 1994) In the case of Tanzania the authorities fix the price of 
the foreign exchange that is offered for sale with the result being that demand is almost three 
times greater than supply, a clear indication that the exchange rate is overvalued. (Africa 
Research Bulletin, 7/1994) 
65This seems to be a rather optimistic view of the Zimbabwean Reserve Bank. There are indications that the gap 
has indeed narrowed but not to that extent. 
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CHAPTER7 
PAYMENTS FACILITIES AND PRACTICES 
7 .1 Introduction 
When currencies are convertible, international trade payments are settled primarily through 
commercial banks as any arising balances will be guaranteed currency convertibility. 
However, when currencies are inconvertible commercial banks would be very cautious of 
dealing in such currencies as arising balances may not be converted into usable currencies. 66 
Take for example a UK bank having a debit balance with a US bank. If the UK has not got 
sufficient US dollars to make payment, it can pay the US bank with sterling. 67 The US 
bank can then go to the Bank of England and convert those pounds into US dollars. 
However, if for example, a Malawian bank has a debit balance with a US bank and cannot 
come up with the necessary amount of dollars, payment in Malawian kwacha will be useless 
to the US bank because the Malawian Central Bank will not guarantee convertibility of the 
Malawian kwacha to a convertible currency such as US dollar. 
When currencies are partially convertible the commercial banks are able to function within 
the partially convertible area in a similar manner to the US and UK banks discussed above. 
They will not be concerned about the availability of a usable currency because this is 
guaranteed. Therefore, the instruments for short-term trade finance are similar when 
currencies are convertible or partially convertible and the risk involved is lower than when 
currencies are inconvertible. 
This chapter discusses the different types of risks that originate from international trade and 
how these are reduced when currency convertibility or partial currency convertibility are 
66Usable currencies are either convertible currencies or the domestic currency. 
67It would probably just buy the dollars in the foreign exchange market, but for the sake of illustration this option 
is disregarded here. 
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established. It considers the different methods of short-term trade finance which are used 
considering first the actual instruments which are available and their use in the region, 
followed by those which would be used if the level of risk was lower. Finally it determines 
the importance of correspondent banking in the region and its role in intra-regional trade due 
to its credit risk reduction. 
7 .2 Types of Risks Involved in International Trade 
When an exporter decides on the most appropriate way in which payment should take place 
the main considerations are the risk and the transactions cost. The precautions which will 
be taken in order to be protected from default of payment will depend not only on the 
financial standing of the potential trading partner but also the country in question. The 
greater the chance of default the more precaution is necessary and hence the higher the cost 
of insuring against it. The important risk categories which have to be considered when 
deciding on the appropriate payment method are the credit ( commercial) risk, country 
(sovereign) risk, and currency (transaction) risk. 68 
7.2.1 Credit risk 
When a bank considers granting an exporter a loan in order to finance trade it will, as in the 
case of any other type of loan, appraise the ability of the exporter to repay. The risk of the 
borrower being unable to repay the loan when it becomes due is known as credit risk. (Blake, 
1990, p.5) The ability of the exporter to repay the loan will also depend on the ability of 
the importer to pay for the exported goods. Furthermore, the bank will have to consider the 
standing of the importer's bank, and of the confirming bank. Therefore, the assessment of 
the credit risk involved in the financing of trade is not the normal domestic credit risk 
assessment but must include the importer's, importer's bank and the confirming bank's 
6'The definition of currency risk often includes credit and country risk. However, here currency risk is used 
in its narrowest sense of transaction risk which is the risk of fluctuations of the exchange rate. 
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financial standings. 69 
The assessment of credit risk requires information collection which becomes more difficult 
once the information required is abroad. This leads to difficulties in distinguishing between 
good-quality debt and bad-quality debt resulting in costs to both the bank and the exporter 
since bad-quality debt may force out good-quality debt. 70 
7.2.2 Country risk 
Country risk is best expressed as the risk which arises from the possibility of the exporter 
not receiving payment due to the fact that they are sold abroad. It arises from the possibility 
of payments default as a consequence of economic, social, and political events which take 
place in a foreign country. These do not include the credit risk which was discussed above. 
Although the political factors in the CMA-PTA region are particularly important, only the 
economic factors will be considered. These are: 
i) Balance of payments prospects - A country's ability to repay loans (short-term and long-
term) depends on its foreign currency earnings. In the case of a country facing a current 
account deficit it may borrow from abroad in order to finance imports. However, these loans 
have to be repaid and a persistent deficit will decrease the ability to pay for trade. The 
factors which will influence the ability to repay loans are those which affect the level of 
exports and imports. 
ii) Prospects for long-tenn growth - A current account deficit is not always undesirable. If 
loans from abroad are taken in order to finance imports of goods and services which will be 
instrumental for future economic growth these are desirable. Therefore, country risk arises 
69This will become more clear in section 7.4 where there is a discussion of the finance instruments. 
~anks will often limit the amount of trade finance that they grant for trade with certain countries. Therefore, 
if a bank helps finance exports which are not paid for (bad-quality debt) reaching the limit for trade finance with a 
country, then exporters which would have been paid for (good-quality debt), would not be able to get the finance 
required for trade. 
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only if these loans are taken in order to finance current consumption or failing industries. 
(Williams, 1982) 
Indices of country risk are used by banks in order to determine exposure limits and charges 
on loans to different countries. The ranking of countries according to the degree of risk that 
is involved in dealing with them is published in several publications such as Institutional 
Investor and Euromoney. In 1993, PTA members fared very poorly in the Euromoney 
country risk rankings. Out of 170 countries in the survey the PT A members which were 
included were ranked as follows: Mauritius (67) , Zimbabwe (69) , Kenya (81) , Lesotho (88) , 
Dj ibouti (98), Malawi" (105), Burundi (121), Rwanda (123), Tanzania (135), Zambia (136), 
Uganda (140), Ethiopia (141), Angola (143), Moz.ambique (158), Sudan (168), and Somalia 
(169) .71 (Euromoney, 1993) 
The above data shows how poorly most PT A countries are regarded by the international 
banking community. The Euromoney country risk method considers ten separate categories 
and gives each one a different weight. 72 The political risk, for example, holds a 25 percent 
weighting in the calculations. Therefore, although currency convertibility may reduce 
country risk due to the guarantee that foreign exchange will be available, it will not eliminate 
it. 
7 .2.3 Currency (transaction) risk 
Where a financial transaction involves a foreign currency and there is a time gap between 
the agreement and actual payment, currency risk will occur. Currency risk, for the purpose 
of trade payments, can be defined as the prospect of loss as a result of fluctuations in the 
exchange rate of the currencies involved in the transactions. Currency risk can be eliminated 
71South Africa was ranked 49th. 
72Economic data (25 percent), political risk (25 percent), debt indicators (10 percent), debt in default or 
rescheduled (10 percent), credit ratings (10 percent), access to bank finance (5 percent), access to short-term finance 
(5 percent), access to international bonds and syndicated markets (5 percent), access to and discount on forfeiting 
(5 percent). 
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by buying or selling currency forward. This however, may become more costly the less 
developed the forward market is. In ten of the eighteen PT A members there are no forward 
exchange facilities offered for trade transactions at all. In the other countries the available 
forward cover is underdeveloped and not widely used. In all cases the cost of forward cover 
is high.73 
7.3 Currency Convertibility and Risk Reduction 
A significant non-tariff trade barrier is that of various categories of risk involved in 
international trade. The higher the risk involved the higher the cost of insuring against loss. 
The increased cost translates into higher prices for the importer or lower profits margins for 
the exporter. Therefore, the removal or decrease of export risk becomes beneficial to both 
parties. Establishing partial currency convertibility will reduce country risk because it will 
guarantee that foreign currency will be made available for all debit balances that have arisen 
from trade with certain countries. Furthermore, it will assist in reducing the credit risk 
because of an overall change in the commercial environment. For example, commercial 
links which may follow will assist in evaluating credit risk and hence reduce it. As a result 
of the lower costs involved in intra-regional trade74 exporters can lower their prices giving 
importers an incentive to buy from them. Consequently, achieving partial currency 
convertibility will assist in reducing the risk exposure which is associated with regional trade 
and will encourage intra-regional trade.75 
73See appendix A for foward cover availability. 
74That is the region for which partial currency convertibility is established. 
"There is the risk of overemphasising the importance of partial currency convertibility on improved trade 
relations. However, from private correspondence it seems that this risk is significant. It is apparent that finding 
new reliable trade partners is extremely difficult as there is doubt as to their ability to pay. Even with available trade 
finance instruments which reduce the risk, trade is constrained due to scepticism. 
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7 .4 Trade Financing by Commercial Banks 
There are numerous instruments of short-term trade finance available from commercial 
banks. These include open accounts, revolving credit, back to back credits , and standby 
credits amongst others. Most of these instruments are not offered by South African banks 
for short-term finance for regional trade. Although non-documentary credits are not often 
used in the PT A it is worth explaining briefly what they are since once partial currency 
convertibility is established they may become useful. However, it is necessary to first 
discuss the frequently used methods of payments, namely documentary credit instruments. 
It is important to note that although the same type of documentary credit facilities are 
available for trade among developed countries and LDCs they have different 
characteristics. 76 In order to demonstrate this difference the general case will be discussed 
followed by the differences which occur when used for LDCs. 
7.4.1 Types of documentary credits 
The agreement on the method of payment for trade is negotiated by the trading parties and 
is embodied in the contract of sale. The decision on the method of payment and the currency 
in which the payment will be made will depend on the risk involved. As to the decision in 
which currency the payment will be made, there is an advantage to the party whose currency 
is used for quotation in the sale documents since foreign exchange fluctuations do not affect 
the amount that it will receive.77 In this way the foreign exchange risk is reduced. The 
agreement as to what currency will be used for the transaction will be determined according 
to the scarcity of the good traded and the currency in question. If the good is widely 
available, quotation of the price will be made in the currency that the importer will choose. 
However, if the currency of both parties to the agreement is unstable, and forward cover 
does not exist, as is the case with most PT A countries, the quotation could be made in a third 
76Developed countries are regarded here as low risk countries while LDCs are high risk countries. 
77The advantage is a result of certainty of the amount paid if forward cover is not used or unavailable. 
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currency. Under these conditions both parties face a currency risk, with a possible advantage 
to one of the sides. 78 
The first and most popular documentary credit 1s the Export Letter of Credit19 which 
provides a high level of protection to the exporter. Take the example of a UK company 
importing telecommunication equipment from a South African company. The UK company 
wants to pay for the equipment once it arrives in the UK while the South African company 
wants payment to be made at the time it is shipped from South Africa. It is assumed that the 
parties to the contract have agreed that payment will be made in sterling. The UK company 
then arranges with its bank to provide an irrevocable Letter of Credit'° to cover the cost, 
insurance and freight of the equipment. The letter of credit is issued in favour of the South 
African company (see figure 7 .1). 
If the UK company is not able to cover the costs at the time the Letter of Credit is requested, 
the bank will consider the company's credit worthiness. In this case the UK bank will have 
the equipment as collateral for the credit line. The UK bank will inform a South African 
bank of the opening of the credit and the reimbursement instructions,81 which will then 
inform the South African company. The South African bank may also be requested to 
confirm (guarantee) the letter of credit although this is not common when a first class 
international bank is involved. · 
78If the price is quoted in US dollars and the exporter's currency depreciates s/he will end up receiving more 
of the domestic currency than what s/he would have if the quotation was made in her/his currency. This does not 
necessarily mean that s/he would gain in real terms, but rather in nominal terms compared to her/his trading partner. 
There are obviously other possible outcomes but probably the more relevant one is that mentioned above. 
79 An Import Letter of Credit is the mirror image of the Export Letter of Credit, but for purposes of clarification 
only the more common one will be explained. 
1JJ Although they can use a revocable letter of credit this is disregarded as it does not constitute a legally binding 
undertaking of the banks concerned and may be modified or cancelled at any time. 
81It is assumed here, for the sake of simplicity, that the reimbursing bank is the same as the advising bank. This 
means that one South African bank may advise, reimburse and confirm the lettet of credit. 
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FIGURE 7.1 
Establishing a Documentary Letter of Credit 
UK 
f 
Contract 1 SA COl\llPANY of COMPANY sale 
Notifies that 
Application to Letter of Credit baa been opened open credit (optional 
,J, Confi.cmation) 
I 
UK I Advice that Letter of , SA BANK I Credit has been opened BANK 
Reimbunment Instructions --------~._ __ a_~ __ _, 
Source: Adapted from Standard Bank SA, (1993a). 
Figure 7.2 shows how payments actually take place. The South African company has the 
equipment shipped and prepares and presents the documents to the South African bank which 
checks the documents against the Letter of Credit. It then effects payment to the South 
African company in terms of the Letter of Credit. 
FIGURE 7.2 
Presentation of Documents 
J co~ ANY t--------------------
1' f 




Source: Adapted from Standard Bank SA, (1993a). 
- - - - - --------------- · J co~ ANY j 
I t 
Documenta Payment 
Doc ..... en .. -~ 
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The South African bank will then claim reimbursement from the UK bank which wiU receive 
the documents and check them against the credit. If the documents conform, the UK bank 
will release the documents to the UK company and claim payment from it. If the documents 
do not conform, the UK company may refuse to pay and the UK bank will request a refund 
from the South African bank (if it did guarantee the Letter of Credit). The South African 
bank then in turn will demand repayment from the South African company. If the documents 
do conform, the final transaction will be that the South African bank's account will be 
credited in the books of the UK bank. 
7 .4.2 Cost of trade payments with LDCs inconvertible currencies 
The main difference between the use of documentary credits among developed and 
developing countries involves the establishment of the ability to pay. If there is a risk for 
the exporter that the importer's bank will not be able to honour the Letter of Credit then it 
will demand that it is confirmed by its bank, thus reducing its own risk. The bank, also 
facing the risk, will turn to a third bank, usually a first class international bank, to confirm 
the Letter of Credit. The third bank will guarantee the Letter of Credit on deposit in its 
account of the necessary amount by the importing country's bank. 
This scenario is pertinent to the South African-PTA situation as can be seen from tables 83.1 
and 83.2 in the appendix. Standard Bank of South Africa requires that a Letter of Credit be 
confirmed in the case of all (Kenya, Malawi, TaIWillia, Uganda, and Zambia) but one 
(Zimbabwe) of the PT A members for which it offers a country profile. First National Bank 
of South Africa also requires confirmation for letters of credit for all (Angola, Kenya, 
Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia) but one (Zimbabwe for which it recommends 
confirmation) of the PT A members for which it offers a country profile. 
The difference between a confirmed Letter of Credit and one which is not confirmed, is 
explained in figures 7.3 and 7.4. In figure 7.3 the seller's (exporter) bank does not 
guarantee payment to the seller (exporter). Under such circumstances the seller (exporter) 
may face payment default. Since the buyer's (importer) bank is committed to make payment 
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the only difficulty which may be encountered is that the buyer's bank will not have sufficient 
foreign exchange to pay with. If the currency is inconvertible the seller (exporter) would 
have incurred a loss. In figure 7.4 the seller's ( exporter) bank confirms the Letter of Credit 
and therefore is assured that payment will be made. In certain cases a further step is taken 
by the bank. It may ask for confirmation from a first class international bank, in order to 
safeguard itself from possible default.82 This eliminates the exporter's risk as her/his bank 
commits to pay her/him ands/he will have knowledge of her/his bank's ability to pay. 
FIGURE 7.3 
Irrevocable Letter of Credit (not confirmed) 





1----Com=m=•=tm=en=•:..___ No CommJ.tm.e,n I ADVYSIN"O BANK 
Source: Potgieter et al, (1991). 
82 A confirmation by a first class international bank is used mainly in order to eliminate the exposure to the 
country risk by the local bank. 
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FIGURE 7.4 





OPENING BANK Definite Commitment to Pay ' ADVISING BANK ~ 
Source: Potgieter et al, (1991). 
Another source of protection available to South African exporters derives from the Credit 
Guarantee Insurance Corporation.83 Using this method of protection can eliminate the 
danger of all type of risks. However, this type of cover is costly. The cost of obtaining 
such insurance depends on the type of instrument used for payment. The more protective 
the instrument, the lower the cost of insurance. 
Using the export shipment poli~y offered by the Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation for 
trade with the PTA (other than CMA members) is at least twice as expensive as insuring for 
trade with Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. Table B4 in the appendix shows the costs of 
insuring exports from South Africa to another country. The costs vary according to the 
method of payments used and the country of destination. The premium rate varies from 0.06 
percent of the value of shipment when using a method of an irrevocable Letter of Credit in 
the case of exports to Japan84 to 2.23 percent when open credit is used and the destination 
83Zimbabwe is the only other country in the region that offers viable export credit insurance (Zimbabwe Credit 
Insurance Corporation). 
~he premium rates to Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland are similar to that charged on exports to Japan. Japan 
is used as an example of a country with low country risk as indicated in the Euromoney (1993) country ratings. 
99 
of exports is to Mozambique. 85 
The costs for confirmation of Letters of Credit are closely related to the premium rate 
charged by the Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation. This is a result of the banks 
themselves seeking guarantee from the Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation. In most 
cases exports to PT A countries are accompanied by very high confirmation costs. 86 By 
establishing partial currency convertibility between CMA and PTA the risk involved in 
financing trade will be reduced as discussed in section 7.3, and therefore it can be expected 
that Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation charges will become lower. 
7.4.3 Non-Documentary methods of payments 
Non-Documentary methods of payment are more common among developed countries. They 
are available and viable only where risk exposure is low as they offer little protection for the 
exporter. Therefore, although not popular in the PTA, it is possible that once partial 
currency convertibility is achieved along with an improvement in the correspondent banking, 
they will become a cheaper option in the region. 
The important87 non-documentary payments include: 
i) Open Account - The exporter will send the shipping documents to the importer 
directly and will require that payment be made to her/his bank's correspondent bank 
in the importer's country. 
ii) Consignment - The exporter will ship the equipment which will be released by her/his 
agent in the importers country where it will be stored. When payment is effected by 
the importer to the exporter the equipment will be handed over. 
~ozambique is the lowest ranked PTA country to which the Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation offers 
insurance for. No insurance is offered for trade with Somalia and Sudan which are ranked lower than Mozambique. 
16See Table B3.1 and B3.2 in the appendix. 
"These are the most used by South African exporters to outside the PT A. 
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iii) Foreign Bill of Collection - The importer's bank will receive the shipping documents 
from the exporter and will act as her/his agent. Once payment has been made the 
goods will be released by the bank. This method requires a relationship with a bank 
in the importer's country. 
Non-documentary credits are very simple and cheap. However it exposes the exporter and 
the commercial bank which finances the exporter to a high risk. The open account is the 
most risky method of payment as it exposes the exporter to both a country and commercial 
risk. Consignment reduces credit risk as does a guaranteed foreign bill for collection. 88 
7 .5 Common Methods of Payments between South Africa and the PTA 
The fact that most PT A countries have an inconvertible currency and the poor credit ratings 
that are given to them is an indication that trading with the PT A members is risky. 
Appendix B3 gives a good indication as to the most common method used for trade finance 
between South Africa and PT A countries. Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland all 
have a convertible currency vis-a-vis South Africa. Therefore, exports to these countries 
have a low cost of confirmation with finance instruments available across the board. 89 On 
the other hand PT A countries such as Malawi, Mo.zambique, Kenya and Z.ambia should be 
exported to only with the use ofa confirmed Letter of Credit. These are associated with high 
or very high costs of confirmation as there is often a need for confirmation by a first class 
international bank in order to eliminate country risk. 
An important issue to note is that trade finance instruments which are used for trade between 
South Africa and the PTA, and within the PTA are similar. The differences are the cost 
associated with trade finance and the instruments which are offered by the commercial banks. 
~ey reduce credit risk, but there is still the danger that the importer will not be able to pay after the goods 
have already been shipped. Therefore, although the exporter still has the goods s/he has incurred production, 
transport, and storage costs. 
89partia1 currency convertibility reduces country risk and therefore the cost of insurance. 
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7 .6 Correspondent Banking in Southern Africa 
The importance of correspondent banking is that of economic relations normalisation. This 
emerges at two levels. First, without correspondent banking relations, it becomes very 
difficult and costly to arrange risk-free payments for trade. Correspondent banking means 
that the risk of the foreign bank not fulfilling its obligation to pay the local bank, is avoided. 
The second issue is that of enhancing general economic relations among countries. A 
correspondent foreign bank will assist the local bank in determining the credit-worthiness of 
an importer. In fact having correspondent banking will increase the available types of 
payments arrangements. For example, the non-documentary instruments mentioned m 
section 7.4.3 will become more viable once there are correspondent banking relations. 
At both levels correspondent banking can lead to increased competitiveness via risk 
reduction. Runge (1993, p.2) points out that the lack of correspondent banking is a problem 
that is pertinent in South Africa's case. He argues that: 
"South African banks do not have direct correspondent relationships and credit 
lines with many African countries. In using foreign intermediary banks and 
institutions, substantial delays and costs are incu"ed; (eg. opening and 
confirmation charges)". · 
Bucknor (1993, p.12) finds it curious that African banks have neglected the development of 
correspondent banking, an area where, he believes, they have a natural advantage, in an 
effort to promote the financing of intra-regional trade. He finds that the financial 
performance of African banks has weakened in recent years. As a result overseas banks have 
reduced credit lines and other forms of technical support to African banks in order to reduce 
their exposure to this risky market. Furthermore, the adoption by the Bank of International 
Settlements of international risk-based capital adequacy standards90 has meant that many 
international banks are withdrawing from developing countries in order to reduce their 
SJOThe risk weighting system applied by the Bank of International Settlements has become more restrictive under 
this standard. Therefore, in order to achieve the rninimwn capital adequacy requirements banks are increasing their 
retained earnings while emphasising credit and cost control. This comes at the expense of LDCs. 
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exposure. Therefore, credit facilities for intra-regional trade have become prohibitive and 
as a result very costly. 
One of the reasons that necessitate the usage of third banks91 is the fact that there is minimal 
information interchanged among banks in the region about their activities and their clients. 
The lack of technological sophistication is another obstacle to correspondent banking. For 
example the fact that many banks are not members of SWIIT2 means that banks are 
constrained to handle their international banking operations using outdated systems. These 
difficulties lead to substantial delays and costs of trade. 
Standard Bank of South Africa has already been increasing its correspondent banking with 
PTA and other African countries93 recognising the potential market and assisting in regional 
development. The bank has acquired the African operations of ANZ Grindlays Bank which 
gives the Standard Bank representation in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Kenya, Uganda, Zaire, 
Ghana, and Nigeria. A substantial portion of its operations is in providing Letters of Credit, 
foreign exchange and trade related financial services. (African Connexion International, 
1993) 
91This would be the first class international bank. 
92Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Transmission. 




ALTERNATIVE INSTITUfIONAL PAYMENTS 
ARRANGEl\IBNTS FOR THE CMA-PTA REGION 
8.1 Introduction 
The mechanisms for trade payments used by the CMA and the PT A bear no resemblance. 
The CMA has an advanced monetary arrangement which allows for partial currency 
convertibility for all type of transactions. The PTA, on the other hand, uses the most 
elementary form of arrangement, allowing for partial currency convertibility for trade 
payments only through the PTA Clearing House. 
The type of institutional payments arrangements are determined by the objectives of the 
agreements and the degree of integration which they are supposed to create. The objectives 
of the arrangements range from achieving partial currency convertibility to the achievement 
of a full currency union. It will depend on the level of present integration, exchange rate 
practices, the degree of financial market sophistication, balance of payments position, the 
level of intra-regional trade as well as the potential for future trade among the countries 
involved. 
This chapter looks at transitional arrangements for transformation to currency convertibility 
which are available and are being implemented in other regions. First, non-monetary 
institutional arrangements which are either based on foreign exchange allocation restrictions 
or import protection are considered. This is followed by a discussion of institutional 
payments arrangements or monetary arrangements, which allow for partial currency 
convertibility. The experience of existing arrangements may assist in determining the type 
of payments arrangement that is most suitable for the CMA-PTA region. 
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It is seldom the case that countries move from having an inconvertible currency to a 
convertible currency in one step. Postwar Europe, the newly industrialised Asian economies 
and the formerly centrally planed economies in Eastern Europe94 have all taken a step-wise 
approach to establishing currency convertiblity. As chapter 2 argued, transformation to full 
currency convertibility when the preconditions have not been met may have negative results. 
Even when these preconditions have been met, some countries may wish to retain certain 
restrictions on the current account due to fears that allowing for currency convertibility 
without limiting the level of imports will lead to large current account imbalances, exchange 
rate fluctuations, and cause large declines in the level of output. (Green and Isard, 1991) 
Non-Monetary Transitional Arrangements 
Green and Isard (1991) suggest two kinds of transitional arrangements in order to mitigate 
the risks of allowing for full currency convertibility. The first type of arrangements is 
exchange restrictions which allows for free access to foreign exchange while enabling the 
authorities control over the level of imports. Foreign exchange, import licences, or foreign 
exchange licenses could be offered for sale by the authorities. The amount of these that will 
be offered for sale by the authorities will depend on the availability of foreign exchange to 
the authorities. This will, however, necessitate foreign exchange surrender by exporters. 
The advantage of this type of arrangement over one where foreign exchange is allocated and 
granted by the administration is that price signals will determine where the limited foreign 
exchange will be allocated. 
The problem with this arrangement is that even though foreign exchange or import licences 
are offered and sold on the free market, the initial sale is done by the administration. There 
is the inherent danger that this type of administrative allocation will result in corruption and 
pressure groups receiving special treatment. Even under such a system there is no question 
that the preconditions for transformation must be either fully or at least partially obtained. 
Zambia is an example of a country in which such an arrangement was attempted. The sale 
94These have not established full currency convertibility as of yet. 
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of a fixed amount of foreign exchange by the authorities on the open market proved 
unsuccessful. As a result of the overvaluation of the kwacha, the Zambian authorities 
introduced an auction market for the sale of foreign exchange in October 1985. This resulted 
in a very significant depreciation of the K wacha with the authorities withdrawing the auction 
market and fixing the Kwacha to the dollar in June 1987. (African Development bank 
(Zambia), 1992) 
The second arrangement, first suggested by McKinnon (in Green and Isard, 1991), involves 
imposing temporary import tariffs on goods in order to dampen the potential high increase 
in imports. Here full currency convertibility will be established immediately and all 
quantitative trade restrictions will be removed. Temporary tariffs which will initially be set 
at high levels to protect local industries will be introduced in order to limit imports in the 
short-term. Gradually the rates at which the tariffs are set will be reduced until such time 
that they will be abolished. 
The advantage of this system is that there will be limited administrative involvement. 
Industries would not be "targeted" but rather a blanket rate of tariffs will be introduced. The 
problem with this arrangement is similar to that of infant industry protection. The imposition 
of tariffs may reduce the exposure of local industries to international competition. If 
industries are "targeted" and differential tariffs are imposed the result is that local prices do 
not adjust to international prices, 95 causing distortions of domestic production and 
investment decisions. Furthermore, it is often the case that domestic industries, once under 
protection of high tariffs, will resist the reduction of tariffs because it will reduce their profit 
margin and they may never become competitive enough (due to protection) to compete. 
(Green and Isard, 1991, p.15) 
95Imposing differential tariffs (protecting an industry) will affect "untargeted" industries. For example, 
imposition of tariffs on motor vehicle electronic equipment raises the price of electronic devises that the South 
African motor vehicle manufacturers have to pay, making it more difficult for them to compete against foreign motor 
car industries which buy the electronic equipment more cheaply. 
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Monetary Transitional Arrangements 
Institutional payments arrangements are either part of a broader type of economic 
cooperation, in which case there are further arrangements, or exist for the sole purpose of 
supporting payments for trade. Some agreements only have a clearing arrangement while 
others may have a financing facility to aid members with balance of payments difficulties. 
Regional cooperation agreements which use clearing arrangements include the Latin 
American Integration Association (ALADI), 96 the Central American Clearing House, rn the 
Clearing Facility of the Caribbean Common Market,98 the West African Clearing House,99 
the Clearing Arrangement of the Economic Community of Great Lake States, 100 the PT A, 
the Asian Clearing Union, 101 and the Regional Cooperation for Development Group. 102 
Other Regional cooperation agreements which do not use a clearing arrangement include the 
Arab Monetary Fund103 and the Andean Reserve Fund. 104 
Agreements on monetary cooperation can be categorised into three different groups according 
to the degree of integration which they entail (Michalopolous, 1973). These are: 
~e participating members are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The ALADI system involves the multilateral agreement coupled with 
bilateral agreements between each pair of countries that specify eligible transactions and interim credit arrangements. 
The central bank of Peru acts as the clearing house of the system. 
97Participating members are El-Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. 
9Tus is the Caribbean Community Multilateral Clearing Facility. The countries belonging to the agreement are 
Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and the East Caribbean. 
~e participating members are Benin, Gambia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, Togo, Upper Volta, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Mauritania. 
1°7he participating members are Burundi, Rwanda, and Mauritania. 
'
0 'The participating countries are Bangladesh, Burma, India, Iran Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. 
1°1b.e members of the Regional Cooperation for Development are Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey. 
103The participating countries are Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen Arab Republic, and 
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. 
1~e participating countries are Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. 
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1) a Clearing Arrangement with a relatively short interval between settlement dates 
which provides only interim credit; 
2) a Payments Union which has an additional mechanism which provides medium-term 
credit facilities to the members of the arrangement; and 
3) a Reserve-Pooling arrangement which can range from the simple agreements to pool 
a portion of total reserves and extend medium term credit to members to a full 
monetary union. 
8.2 Clearing Arrangements 
The clearing arrangement provides an alternative to the existing payments network, which 
involves denominating transactions in a convertible currency. There is a mutually 
compensated settlement for intra-regional trade using an agreed upon unit of account. The 
net debts are settled at an agreed interval of time using a convertible currency. The 
advantage of this simple arrangement is that it necessitates only limited cooperation between 
the participating countries. Furthermore, policy coordination is not a requirement, an 
advantageous element in the context of LDCs, particularly for political reasons. 
An important feature of clearing arrangements is that although it necessitates only limited 
cooperation it has the potential of promoting consultations and cooperation among Central 
Banks and monetary authorities within a region. This feature makes it a stepping block 
towards economic cooperation or even integration. Michalopolus (1973, p.10) found that in 
areas where the clearing arrangement was instituted it followed or accompanied decisions to 
undertake important integration decisions. Where political and economic circumstances do 
not allow for an advanced type of economic cooperation in the mould of the EC this type of 
arrangement is important. 
The main problem with the clearing arrangement is the fact that many LDCs have a severe 
shortage of foreign exchange. This may lead to default in payment to the intra-regional net 
creditor countries on the date of settlement. The potential for default may result in the 
arrangement being under-utilised and inconsequential. Therefore, the inadequacy of the 
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clearing arrangements to guarantee currency convertibility is apparent. Currency 
convertibility is attained through the commitment of member Central Banks to discharge their 
respective foreign currency obligations as notified by the Clearing House. However, this 
commitment cannot always be guaranteed since: 
(1) "for some member countries, this effort at convertibility cannot be maintained if their 
exchange rates remain far from . the equilibrium and if regional trade remains 
indefinitely unbalanced. 
(2) in the frequent situations when their import programmes are undermined by short-term 
balance of payments problems, some countries may have problems discharging their 
payments obligations. 
(3) the non-availability of credit in the clearing system could induce a diversion to non-
regional sources that are able to offer credit". (PTA, 1993a, p. 7) 
Although the clearing Arrangement has in it a built-in credit facility in the form of 
settlements being made periodically, this may not be enough. Therefore, in the event of a 
member country not being able to honour its obligation to settle its debit balance it may 
arrange for a credit-line swap and receive assistance from one or more net creditor countries. 
Such credit could be provided by a net creditor country extending credit to the net debtor 
member over and above the credit limit for settlement of deficits in the Clearing House. The 
net debtor country will have to repay the credit extending country with interest over a certain 
period established under the agreement. {PTA, 1993a) 
The difficulty with this is that the credit is short-term and usually very limited. Furthermore 
the credit-line swap is arranged only when inability to pay arises. Therefore there is no 
guarantee that the creditor country will accept such an arrangement. Thus, in order to 
guarantee partial currency convertibility, an arrangement that will allow for assistance to a 
country that will not be able to honour its obligation is necessary. 
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8.2.1 A clearing arrangement for the CMA-PTA region 
In chapter 6 it was shown that the PT A Clearing House has been under-utilised mainly as a 
result of intra-regional trade imbalances. It is necessary at this stage to explain the concept 
of Theoretical Compensable and Uncompensable Trade. (PTA, 1993a) That is how much 
hard currency would be required to settle debt arising from intra-PT A trade if it was all 
settled through the Clearing House. 105 . The more balanced intra-regional trade is the 
greater the compensable trade will be. Table 8.1 shows that in 1992 only 41.7 percent of 
intra-regional trade was compensable. 
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Compensable Trade Uncompensable Trade 
1984 36.6 63.4 
1985 31.5 68.5 
1986 32.3 67.7 
1987 39.9 60.1 
1988 38.7 61.3 
1989 44.0 56 .0 
1990 43 .9 56.1 
1991 43.0 57.0 
1992 41.7 58 .3 
1990 (including SA) 35.2 64.8 
1992 (including SA) 42.2 57.8 
Source: For 1984-1991 (PTA, 1993a). For 1992 calculated from PTA (1994) and Republic of South Africa (1993). 
See Appendix BS and B6 for details. 
The inclusion of the CMA106 into the PTA Clearing House in 1992 would have improved 
the level of compensable trade slightly from 41. 7 percent to 42.2 percent. However, the 
problem with having unbalanced trade will increase, reducing the utilisation of the PTA 
Clearing House further. The PTA Clearing House is being under-utilised because net debtor 
countries prefer to use convertible currencies for intra-regional trade to avoid payment 
105If table 6.1 was to include all PTA countries compensable and uncompensable trade would be arrived at. 
1~is is in fact the inclusion of South Africa since other CMA mambers are participants in the PTA. 
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default. Furthermore, intra-regional net creditors are showing growing signs of reluctance 
to use the PT A Clearing House since they are concerned about net debtor countries 
accumulating debit balances that they will not be able to honour. The inclusion of the CMA 
will increase this problem because South Africa, potentially a substantial net creditor, will 
be wary of using the PTA Clearing House. 
Therefore, unless there is some sort of guarantee for South African exporters that the 
clearing arrangement will be default free, intra-regional trade will continue to be unattractive. 
The cost of insuring trade payments will influence both exporter and importer and the 
incentive of lower costs of trade finance will be lost. As long as this is the case the clearing 
arrangement will be inconsequential. 
8.3 Payments Union 
In order to overcome the problem of default in payment by intra-regional net debtor countries 
and to make it more instrumental in increasing intra-regional trade, a provision of medium-
term credit can be made. The provision can take one of two forms: 
a) a direct extension of credit by the net creditor countries, as mentioned above; or 
b) a direct extension of credit with the assistance of non-participating countries. 
The rationale behind the establishment of a payments union rests on the assumption that it 
will provide the participating countries with the necessary security with respect to balance 
of payments to enable them to liberalise intra-regional trade. It is often the case that LDCs 
governments are motivated to erect trade controls in order to combat short-term balance of 
payments disequilibria and as a basic policy of industrial promotion. The implementation of 
a payments union can be valuable in increasing trade liberalisation among member countries 
for purposes of balance of payments equilibrium and industrial promotion. 
The most successful payments union to date is the European Payments Union (EPU) which 
was established in 1950 and followed by the European Monetary Agreement (EMA) in 1958. 
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In addition to the clearing arrangements the most important features of the EPU were: 
(i) "The allocation to each member country of a quota (proportionate to its relative 
importance in intra-European trade), representing the limits within which the net 
surpluses or deficits would be settled - in varying proportions dependent on their 
cumulative position - by means of credits or in gold or dollars. 
(ii) The provision by the USA of the initial working capital of $350,000,000". (Fraser, 
1987, p.16) 
Whether a country's balances were to be settled by credit or gold depended on its balance 
for the current month and its cumulative position (which was its balance in the EPU from 
the first month). When a country had a cumulative deficit, it received or made gold 
payments, depending on whether it had a surplus or deficit for the current month according 
to column 1 in table 8.2.107 When a country had a cumulative surplus, it received or made 
gold payments, depending on whether it had a surplus or deficit for the current month 
according to the right hand schedule in table 8.2. 
Cumulative Surplus or 
Deficit 
(percent of EPU quota) 
From O to 20 percent 
From 20 to 40 percent 
From 40 to 60 percent 
From 60 to 80 percent 
From 80 to 100 percent 
Overall percentage 



















107In 1954 the EPU adopted a formula where 50 percent of each member's surplus or deficit was settled by 
credit and the other 50 percent in convertible currencies. 
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The higher the cumulative deficit which a country ran with the EPU the greater the gold 
payment it had to make and the less credit it received. Once it reached its credit quota all 
payments had to be made in gold. Countries with a cumulative surplus the size of their quota 
or greater did not earn gold in an amount equal to their subsequent surplus, because they 
were asked to extend the credit to the EPU. If the countries having a deficit in the current 
month were to be in the low end (top) of the schedule for cumulative deficit balances the 
gold payments into the EPU would be smaller than the payments it would have to make to 
corresponding surplus countries. (Kenen, 1991) It was this which necessitated the provision 
by the USA of $350 million, enabling greater credit extensions as payment was guaranteed. 
There is little doubt that the direct extension of credit has to be made by governments 
themselves and should not be expected to be extended by individual firms. If individual 
firms have to bear the burden of the credit extension this will act as a disincentive for intra-
regional trade for cost and risk reasons. Under such conditions they will prefer to look for 
markets, outside the region, where payment is assured immediately. 
8.3.1 A payments union for the CMA-PTA region 
A 1992 PTA (1993a) study on·the "Establishment of a Clearing and Support Facility in the 
PTA Clearing House" suggested a possible EPU-type arrangement for the PTA to reduce the 
risk of payments default and encourage intra-regional trade. This arrangement too, as in the 
case of the EPU, will necessitate the provision of initial working capital to enable payment 
guarantee. The PTA study (1993a) suggests a settlement structure which is given in table 
8.3. 
A net debtor country with a deficit of 25 percent of its debit limit would settle its debt 
entirely by credit, 108 deficits between 25 percent and 50 percent would be settled half in 
credit and half in convertible currencies; deficits between 50 percent and 75 percent will be 
settled 25 percent in credit and 75 percent in convertible currencies; deficits above 75 percent 
108Settlement by credit means that the net creditor country extends a credit to the net debtor country. It can 
be regarded as a revolving credit arrangement. Obviously, the amount of credit is still owed in hard currency. 
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would be settled entirely in convertible currencies. 
A net creditor country with a surplus of less than 25 percent will have its account settled 100 
percent in convertible currencies; surpluses between 25 percent and 50 percent will be settled 
75 percent in convertible currencies and 25 percent in credit; surpluses of between 50 percent 
and 75 percent would be settled 50 percent in convertible currencies and 50 percent in credit; 
surpluses of above 75 percent will be settled 25 percent in convertible currencies and 75 
percent in credit. 
Deficit/Surplus Range Deficits Surplus 
as % of Debit/Credit Limit 
Dollars Credit Dollars Credit 
From 0-25 0 100 100 0 
From 25-50 50 50 75 25 
From 50-75 75 25 50 50 
From 75-100 100 0 25 75 
Source: PTA (1993a, p.49). 
This structure of settlements accommodates, with some flexibility, the ability of countries to 
settle timeously. It encourages member countries to increase intra-regional trade and 
maintain a more balanced intra-regional trade by virtue of favouring lower imbalances. It 
may be suggested that this could have the opposite effect and encourage lower intra-regional 
trade since intra-regional net creditors will prefer to trade with outside the region and receive 
payment in convertible currencies. However, conditions of partial currency convertibility 
favour intra-regional trade rather than trade outside the region. Therefore, locals will be 
inclined to take the route of increasing intra-regional trade. However, in the case where 
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there are structural intra-regional net creditors109 the payments union may fail to encourage 
intra-regional trade sufficiently. 
It appears that no structural intra-regional net creditors exist in the PTA. From table B2. l 
and B2.2 (in the appendix) it is clear that during the period of 1980 to 1992 Djibouti, and 
Zimbabwe have reversed their position from intra-regional net debtor to intra-regional net 
creditor countries while Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia have reversed their position in 
the other direction. Some countries which have not experienced a reversal of their trade 
balance have shown substantial change in the magnitude of their debit or credit balances. 
For example, in 1992 Kenya had a substantially lower net credit balance than was the case 
in 1980. 
Introducing South Africa into a payments union may have a significant effect on the size of 
the necessary initial working capital, and will introduce the problem of having an intra-
regional structural net creditor. The question is how big must the initial working capital of 
the payments union be in order for it to be able to honour its obligations fully? For this two 
payments unions will be considered. The first will include PTA members only - a small 
PTA Payments Union (PTAPU), and the second will include PTA members and South Africa 
- a large PT APU. 
To establish the size of the payments union capitalisation, it is necessary to consider the 
quotas that will be introduced. Following Kenen's (1991) study it is assumed here that 
quotas are set at 20 percent of each member's total intra-regional trade (that is imports plus 
exports). " 0 The quotas for a small PTAPU and a large PTAPU are shown in table 8.4. 
1~ ese are net creditors that maintain that position over a prolonged period of time and there is no indication 
that their net credit position is either about to be reversed or declining. 
110lt may be more correct to use the credit and debit limits that are used in the PT A Clearing House. However, 
since they are not identical it will be simpler to assume a 20 quota with the result being approximately the same. 
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Country Small PTAPU Large PTAPU 
1990 1992 1990 1992 
Angola 1.30 2.15 5.02 26.05 
Burundi 6.94 8.24 5.43 8.24 
Comoros 0.83 0.53 2. 10 0.53 
Djibouti 8.54 10.50 8.72 10.50 
Ethiopia 5.42 8.65 6.96 8.65 
Kenya 41.93 62.46 59.68 73.92 
Lesotho 1.36 0.49 0.46 0.49 
Malawi 13.35 17.88 48.34 64.09 
Mauritius 5.28 6.41 29.55 41.16 
Mozambique 15.86 15.93 52.60 63.71 
Rwanda 9.14 10.04 8.74 10.56 
Somalia 6.16 7.37 7.02 7.37 
Sudan 0.64 7.99 7.39 9.41 
Swaziland 4.29 6.61 5.86 6.71 
Tanzania 9.33 19.45 11.05 21.95 
Uganda 19.24 22.38 18.74 40.72 
Zambia 33.73 23.65 61.15 99.43 
Zimbabwe 48.54 48.99 162.66 200.69 
S. Africa 262.55 396.10 
Total 231.87 279.71 764.04 1090.27 
Source: calculated trom tables ts..: m the appendix and 4.1 and 4 .•. 
The size of the initial capitalisation can then be calculated by taking the most extreme 
scenario where the member with the largest quota ran a long sequence of deficits, and the 
country with the smallest quota ran a long sequence of surpluses, while all other members 
have balanced intra-regional trade. 111 This extreme position would minimise the 
convertible currencies receipts of the PTAPU and maximise its payments. A small PTAPU 
with the structure suggested in table 8.3 will necessitate initial capitalisation of US$46.45 
million112 (30.83) in order to insure against payment default. A large PTAPU will 
11 1This is based on the unrealistic premise that South Africa would be a net debtor rather than net creditor to the 
payments union. In the more realistic position of South Africa being a net creditor the payments union will gain 
convertible currencies from it rather than have to make payments to it. 
112This is the difference between Kenya's quota (the highest) and Comoros's quota (the lowest). If Kenya cannot 
honour its payment the PT APU will pay Comoros 75 percent of the balance owing to it and the extra 25 percent will 
be granted as credit. 
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necessitate initial capitalisation of US$296.68 million (193.14).113 The initial capitalisation 
of the small PTAPU and the large PTAPU amount to 16.3 (20.5) and 27.2 (25.3)114 
percent of total quotas. This compares to 9 percent of total quotas of the EPU initial 
capitalisation and 18 percent of a possible East European Payments Union. (Kenen, 1991, 
p.263) 
Currencies of CMA-PT A members have different degrees of convertibility. The introduction 
of a PTAPU (small or large), although having a positive effect on intra-regional trade 
liberalisation, may have a detrimental effect on the move towards full currency convertibility. 
The creation of a PTAPU may disrupt the lifting of exchange controls. A country 
participating in a payments union is compelled to centralise its payments to the other 
members. However, since some PTA countries have moved away from a system of 
centralised payments (e.g. countries that are using the export retention schemes) the PTAPU 
may be a step backwards. (Kenen, 1991) 
A large PTAPU will depend on South Africa's willingness to provide credit to the PTAPU 
as it will be a structural net creditor. 115 The advantage to South Africa in doing so is the 
potential market that exists for South African exports of approximately US$3.5 billion 
annually. The decision as to whether it is to South Africa's benefit to provide the PTAPU 
credit, therefore, hinges on whether the cost of such credit will be smaller than the benefits 
in increased exports. Given that South Africa's trade balance with the PTA in 1992 (1990) 
was US$1303.4 million (853.18) and its quota in a PTAPU would have been US$396.10 
million (262.55) South Africa would have extended the PTAPU credit of 75 percent of its 
credit limit or US$297. l 116 million (196.9). It is questionable whether South Africa can 
afford to forgo US$297.1 million of convertible currency earnings in the short-run. There 
113The figures are for 1992 and those in brackets are for 1990. The calculations are: 
For a small PTAPU (62.46 - 0.53) = 61.93 * 0.75 = 46.45 payment to Comoros. 
For a large PTAPU (396.10- 0.53) = 395.57 * 0.75 = 296.68 payment to Comoros. 
11"This may be a slight overestimation since South Africa's trade with Lesotho and Swaziland is not included in 
this measure. 
115 A net creditor is getting payed 25 percent in convertible currencies and the rest is credit. 
116Credit and Debit limits are given in table 8.6. 
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is little doubt, therefore, that South Africa would be apprehensive about extending credit to 
its neighbours to this extent. 
It must be remembered, in this regard, that the initial capitalisation of the PT APU does not 
have to be made by member countries only. Rather, as was the case of the EPU, assistance 
of foreign countires and institutions will most probably be required. 
8.4 Reserve Pooling 
The rationale for reserve pooling arrangements is to provide some sort of defence for balance 
of payments fluctuations experienced by LDCs in a region. The pooling of reserves enables 
members to deal with occasional balance of payments disturbances. The main benefits from 
this type of arrangement are best explained by the proposals for creating an Asian Reserve 
Bank: 
a) "facilitating members' participation in proposals for trade liberalization and 
expansion, either individually, regionally, or worldwide; 
b) reducing the likelihood that members losing reserves will adopt income, an exchange 
rate, and trade policies that would reduce regional and world economic welfare; 
c) directly economizing on the reserves held by members and so freeing some portion of 
these reserves to be used for investment in development projects in the region, raising 
regional growth rates and expanding regional markets; 
d) providing, at low or zero marginal cost, reserve "insurance" for the cooperating 
nations and so reducing risk, when payments problems arise, of trade distorting and 
income reducing speculative movements in capital and commodities". 
(Michalopoulos, 1973, p.16) 
In accordance with the objectives of the institutional arrangements different types of reserve 
pooling have been instituted. 
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i) Currency Union 
A currency union is defined here as the use of a single currency in countries belonging to 
a monetary arrangement. Under a currency union all foreign exchange reserves are pooled 
and there is a Central Bank which is in charge of the monetary policy of the area. 
The best example of a currency union is that of the franc area countries of Central and West 
Africa. It comprises of two currency unions, 117 the West African Monetary Union and the 
Equatorial and Central African Monetary Union, 118 each using its own Central Bank. 
(Honohan, 1992, p.398) Members of the agreement are required to maintain uniform rules 
on external exchange controls while interest rates and banking regulations are harmonised. 
(Edwards, 1985, p.314) 
The reserves of the participating countries are pooled and deposited in the French treasury 
which guarantees the convertibility of the CF A franc into French francs, as well as unlimited 
overdraft facilities. If a participating country's reserves become negative, the country pays 
a charge on the debit balance. 
ii) Monetary Union 
The second type of reserve pooling is a monetary union which can be regarded as a less 
advanced version of reserve pooling than that of a currency union. Under this type of 
arrangement the participating countries issue their own legal tender but manage their 
monetary policy jointly. Country members to the agreement follow a uniform exchange rate 
regime while pooling part of their reserves. 
An arrangement which follows this method of reserve pooling is the Central American 
117Tbe two currency areas have currencies with slightly different names (franc de la Communite Financiere 
Africane and Franc de la Cooperation Financiere en Afrique Centrale), but are both fixed at parity of 0.02 to the 
French franc. 
11 'The West African Monetary Union countries are Benin, Burkino Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, 
and Togo. The Equatorial and Central African Monetary Union countries are Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. (Fraser, 1987, p.353) 
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Monetary Arrangement (CAMA). The Central Banks of the signatory countries undertake 
to follow a uniform exchange rate regime with the basic characteristic of stability and 
convertibility of the currencies for transactions and payments among the countries to the 
arrangement. 
Another arrangement which has some of the monetary union characteristics is the CMA. The 
countries in the arrangement hold their currencies at par with each other and follow the same 
exchange control policies. However, it cannot be regarded as a pure monetary union since 
although consultations do take place between the monetary authorities, there is no indication 
that the management ·of monetary policy is joint. 
iii) Monetary Fund 
The currency union and monetary union emphasise the importance of joint monetary policy 
management. A third type of reserve pooling is one which puts most of its emphasis on 
balance of payments finance. 
The monetary fund can either be part of the monetary union as in the case of the CAMA, 
or it can stand alone where a monetary union does not exist, as in the case of the Arab 
Monetary Fund and the Andean Reserve Fund. (Edwards, 1985) 
The CAMA has a stabilisation fund as part of its monetary union . This mechanism has as 
its purpose the provision of financial assistance for countries which are in a position of 
temporary disequilibria in the balance of payments. In order to achieve this, each member 
state has to deposit a fraction of its international reserves in the fund. (Fraser, 1987, p.359) 
While both currency unions and monetary unions make use of a Clearing House for the 
clearance of intra-union trade payments, the Arab Monetary Fund and the Andean Reserve 
Fund do not. Although the exact details may differ from one monetary fund to another they 
have similar characteristics. The objective of such funds is to assist countries who subscribe 
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to it at times of global balance of payments difficulties. 119 The assistance takes place by 
granting loans to the countries in need. A loan is made available only when a country does 
not have sufficient reserves and is limited by a formula which takes into consideration the 
country's balance of payments deficit, its contribution to the fund's capital, and the level of 
its intra-fund trade. 
8.4.1 A reserve pooling arrangement for the CMA-PTA region 
Table B7 summarises the necessary relationship and characteristics of a currency and 
monetary union with regard to the relationship among its members. Both arrangements 
require partial currency convertibility. 
Both the currency union and the . monetary union require that all members fix their currency 
to each other or to that of another currency. As a starting point this is a highly unlikely 
condition in the CMA-PTA region as attempts by countries in the PTA to follow a fixed 
exchange rate regime have been mostly unsuccessful. There is insufficient evidence, at this 
stage, that there is adequate political conviction to follow macroeconomic policies which are 
necessary for such an exchange rate regime. It is not surprising then that some PT A 
members have turned to pursue more flexible exchange rate regimes, a trend that can be 
expected to continue. This indicates that currency union or monetary union are rather 
unlikely in the PT A for some time. The inclusion of South Africa into the PT A will do little 
to change this situation in the short-term. Looking at trade relationships between South 
Africa and the PTA there is no case for most members to fix their currency to the rand. 
Therefore, a more viable agreement to consider is one which may assist PT A members to 
guarantee partial currency convertibility. 
The study commissioned by the PTA to consider the appropriate credit scheme in support of 
intra-regional trade expansion (PT A, 1993a) suggests possible reserve fund arrangements. 
These will be considered and then if potentially appropriate adapted to the circumstances of 
119 As opposed to intra-regional balance of payments difficulties. 
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South Africa joining them. 
i) Contribution commitments of Central Banks 
The Contribution commitments of Central Banks arrangement suggests that when one of the 
member countries cannot settle its debt on the day of settlement all the other participants will 
lend it the necessary amount of foreign currency. The study (PTA, 1993a) suggests that the 
amount that each country will contribute in such an event should be in proportion to the ratio 
of each Central Bank's credit limit to the total of all credit limits . Therefore, if for example 
Angola runs an intra-regional deficit of US$10 million which it cannot settle in hard currency 
Burundi, whose credit limit in the PTA Clearing House is 2.54 percent of all credit limits, 
will have to contribute US$2.54 million towards the total. 
The total contribution to such a fund, the study (PTA, 1993a) suggests, should be 
approximately 20 percent of the trade which will be settled ·n convertible currencies 
(uncompensable trade). In 1992 (1990) the uncompensable trade amounted to US$407.8 
million (325.16) which was 58.3 percent (56.1 percent) of total settlements.120 This 
translates to a fund of US$81.6 million (65). 
In order to enhance the credibility and functionality of the fund it would be necessary for 
outside funding, in the form of loans and grants, to be arranged. However, in order to 
establish the credibility of participants to the fund it is essential that they contribute more 
than outside donors. The study (PT A, 1993a) therefore suggests that 60 percent of the fund 
which was in 1992 terms US$49 million (39) be financed by PT A members. The individual 
members contributions are shown in table 8.5. 
120See table in appendix BS. 
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Debit Limit1 Credit Limit1 % ofLimits2 Commitment' 
Angola 1.39 1.73 0.57 0.279 
Burundi 6.16 7.70 2.54 1.245 
Comoros 0.72 0.90 0.30 0.147 
Djibouti 8.95 11.19 3.69 1.808 
Ethiopia 6.54 8.17 2.69 1.318 
Kenya 52.04 65.05 21.43 10.501 
Lesotho 1.21 1.51 0.50 0.245 
Malawi 13.17 16.46 5.42 2.656 
Mauritius 4.35 5.44 1.79 0.877 
Mozambique 17.02 21.28 7.01 3.435 
Rwanda 10.59 13.23 4.36 2.136 
Somalia 6.34 7.92 2.61 1.279 
Sudan 5.21 6.51 2.15 1.053 
Swaziland 4.77 5.96 1.96 0.960 
Tanzania 9.24 11.56 3.81 1.867 
Uganda 20.35 25.44 8.38 4.106 
Zambia 28.40 35.50 11.70 5.733 
Zimbabwe 46.38 57.98 19.10 9.356 
Total 242.83 303.54 100.00 49 
Source: Adapted from YfA (l~~Ja, p.-'l). 
1Debit and Credit limits are calculated as 20 and 25 percent respectively of average intra-regional trade of each 
country. 
2Individual country's limit/total limit 
360 percent of total contribution (49,000,000) * percent of total limit 
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Contribution commitments of Central Banks poses a simillar difficulty to that suggested for 
Credit-Line swaps. It only comes into effect once a country is unable to pay its debt on the 
settlement date. Therefore, there is no guarantee that contributions will be made when they 
become necessary. 
ii) A reserve fund 
This facility is based on the monetary fund arrangement that was discussed in section 8.4(iii). 
It is a variant of the reserve pooling arrangement that can be used for short-term finance 
(which is a type of credit guarantee against country risk) or in its more advanced form as a 
balance of payments stabilisation fund as well. 
This arrangement has the advantage of increasing foreign exchange savings. This results 
from the advantage to be gained from the variability in the prevailing time pattern of 
international payments of the member countries with the rest of the world arising from 
cyclical, seasonal or other factors. Since foreign exchange reserves are held primarily in 
order to pay for international transactions, if reserves are pooled less reserves have to be held 
by each member. The reserves that are saved can then be used as a source of intra-regional 
development and trade finance or invested in higher yielding markets outside the region. 
(PTA, 1993a, p.53) 
Of specific relevance is the fact that a reserve fund has not only the potential of assisting the 
guarantee for partial currency convertibility. It also has the potential, through assistance in 
overall balance of payments difficulties, of evolving into a full currency convertibility 
facilitator. In addition this arrangement has the advantage of substantial indirect benefits. 
These originate from the pooling of information, the exchange of ideas that are necessary for 
closer future monetary cooperation as well as greater inflow of borrowed capital from 
international sources which will be possible because of the greater security that the 
arrangement creates. The study (PTA, 1993a) suggests that successful implementation of 
such a fund may be a step towards the creation of a monetary union or even a currency 
union. Therefore, it suggests a reserve fund as the most appropriate facility to be adopted 
for the PTA. 
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The contribution of each country will be identical to that in table 8.5 which is arrived at on 
the basis of the net credit and debit limits that the participating countries are allowed to have 
in the PT A Clearing House. These limits are calculated annually on the basis of the best 
available information on trade flows between participating countries during the previous three 
years. For instance, average annual intra-regional trade of Djibouti for 1989, 1990, and 
1991 amounted to US$44. 76 million. This translates to a US$8. 95 million debit limit and 
a US$11.19 million credit limit. In order not to put excessive pressure on the members of 
the arrangement, the contribution could be made over a period of time. 
Certain problems occur once South Africa is admitted to a regional reserve fund. South 
Africa's credit and debit limits cannot be calculated using the previous (to 1992) three years 
of trade data as those are not available. Therefore, the average trade levels of 1990 and 
1992 were used to estimate the contribution commitments once South Africa is admitted to 
a reserve fund. According to this South Africa's debit and credit limits would be US$396. l 
million and US$495.13 million respectively. 121 
To accommodate South Africa's membership in the PTA Clearing House it will be necessary 
to increase the size of the suggested facility considerably. Therefore it would be necessary 
to increase the size of the suggested reserve fund to US$314 million (247).122 We maintain 
the assumption that 40 percent -of the fund will be contributed by outside bodies such as the 
EC and the World Bank while the remaining 60 percent will be contributed by the 
participating countries. The schedule of resource contribution once South Africa is added 
to the arrangement is shown in table 8.6. 
121Table 4.1 is in rand. The exchange rate used to calculate the dollar value is R/$1.3568 which is the periods 
average (line sb) in the IMF International Financial Statistics (IMF) 
121"his is 20 percent of uncompensable trade (exports or imports). 
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Debit Limit1 Credit Limit1 % of Limits2 Commitment' 
Angola 15.54 19.42 1.68 3.157 
Burundi 6.83 8.54 0.74 1.389 
Comoros 1.31 1.64 0.14 0.267 
Djibouti 9.61 12.01 1.04 1.953 
Ethiopia 7.81 9.76 0.84 1.586 
Kenya 66.80 83.50 7.20 13.574 
Lesotho 0.48 0.60 0.05 0.097 
Malawi 56.21 70.27 6.06 11.423 
Mauritius 35.36 44.20 3.81 7.185 
Mozambique 58.15 72.69 6.27 11.817 
Rwanda 9.65 12.07 1.04 1.961 
Somalia 7.20 9.00 0.78 1.463 
Sudan 8.40 10.50 0.91 1.707 
Swaziland 6.29 7.86 0.68 1.277 
Tanzania 16.50 20.62 1.78 3.353 
Uganda 29.73 37.16 3.21 6.041 
Zambia 80.29 100.36 8.66 16.315 
Zimbabwe 181.67 227.09 19.59 36.917 
S.Africa 329.33 411.66 35.52 66.920 
Total 927.16 1158.95 100.00 188.4 
)ource: Calculated from tables 4.1 and 4.2 and PTA (1994). 
1Debit and Credit limits are calculated as 20 and 25 percent respectively of average intra-regional trade. 
2Individual county's limit/total limit 
360 percent of total contribution (188,400,000) • percent of total limit 
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It appears that, with the addition of South Africa to the arrangement, substantial changes to 
the contribution commitments to the fund will be necessary. Zimbabwe and South Africa's 
joint contribution to the fund will amount to approximately 55 percent (56 percent) of the 
total fund. Uncompensable trade as indicated in tables B5 and B6 (in the appendix) will drop 
from 58.37 percent (56.1 percent) to 57.8 percent (55.3 percent) which may marginally 
contribute to the success of such an arrangement. However the fact that intra-regional trade 
is so unbalanced and significantly skewed restricts the potential of a reserve fund. 
As South Africa will become the biggest contributor to a reserve fund, the fund should 
possibly start off in its basic capacity as partial currency convertibility guarantor and not as 
a balance of payments stabilisation fund. This is because a distinct possibility exists that 
South Africa, being such a large regional net creditor, will become a financier of members 
extra-regional balance of payments deficits. Only once this arrangement has proven 
successful, can it be considered as a balance of payments stabilisation fund. However, in 
favour of such an arrangement, it must be stressed that South Africa would still receive 
interest payable on its reserves. 
The decision as to whether to implement a reserve fund or payments union is difficult. 
Seeing that the objective of creating a payments arrangements is to improve intra-regional 
trade relations, the PT APU may seem more appropriate as it could enhance intra-regional 
trade due to its structure. There is, however, the threat that continued unbalanced trade, 
with South Africa remaining a structural intra-regional net creditor, will lead to South 
Africa's non-willingness to participate in the PTAPU as it will have to forego substantial 
convertible currency earnings, at least, in the short-run. The cost to South Africa of 
participating in a PT APU would be much higher than participation in a PT A reserve fund 
as suggested here. Furthermore, there is the danger that bias towards intra-regional trade 
and tightening foreign exchange restrictions will impede the ultimate goal of full currency 
convertibility. Therefore, the reserve fund would be a more appropriate mechanism since 
it would enhance intra-regional trade due to lower risk involved and assist in balance of 
payments difficulties ( only if these are not permanent) which could be a step towards full 
currency convertibility. Another advantage is that whereas in the case of a PT APU there has 
to be a clearing house this is not the case with a reserve fund. Although it may be necessary 
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at the outset it could be phased away at a later stage, liberalising payments further. 
However, the reserve fund would be a viable alternative only if South Africa does not 
emerge as a long-term net financier of other members permanent balance of payment 
imbalances. Therefore it is of the outmost importance that the arrangement is a transitional 
one. There will be a need for regional governments under a reserve fund to follow policies 





Attempts to improve economic conditions in Southern and Eastern Africa have so far had 
limited success. Recently part of the strategy to improve economic growth has included 
moves towards opening up of economies and liberalising international trade. A significant 
step in this direction would be to guarantee full currency convertibility. Most countries in 
the region do not have a fully convertible currency and have not met the preconditions for 
transformation to full currency convertibility. A one step move towards full currency 
convertibility may have negative effects which will make it unsustainable. Therefore 
transformation to full currency convertibility should rather be gradual. 
Achieving the preconditions for transformation to full currency convertibility - an appropriate 
exchange rate, adequate international liquidity, and sound macroeconomic policies - will 
require governments to adopt policies directed at this goal and most importantly to follow an 
exchange rate regime with a market related exchange rate. 
In most cases currency inconvertibility is a result of balance of payments pressures which 
come about as a consequence of implementing a fixed exchange rate regime while attempting 
to follow independent macroec.onomic policies. Fixing the exchange rate while following 
unsustainable macroeconomic policies puts pressure on international reserves and ultimately 
results in (or sustains) currency inconvertibility. It is apparent that the economic 
characteristics of most countries in the region are such that the most appropriate exchange 
rate regime to follow under the criteria of micro and macro economic efficiency is an 
intermediate exchange rate regime. This type of exchange rate regime will allow the 
exchange rate to be closer to its market determined level even where developed financial 
markets do not exist. 
As a transitional measure partial currency convertibility may be implemented. In this way 
a non-tariff trade barrier among the countries in the region would be lifted and intra-regional 
I 
trade enhanced while saving on convertible currencies. With South Africa being incorporated 
into an arrangement which creates partial currency convertibility, PT A members stand to gain 
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closer economic relations and cheaper imports from South Africa than those from countries 
outside the partial currency convertibility arrangement. At the same time South Africa can 
benefit from a larger export market since potential for future extended trade does exist. 
An example of a successful monetary arrangement which has served to create partial 
currency convertibility is that of the CMA. It is apparent that close economic relations with 
South Africa and partial currency convertibility have led Lesotho and Swaziland to a point 
where no official arrangement is necessary in order to maintain partial currency 
convertibility. The CMA agreement as it stands today is not needed for the creation of 
partial currency convertibility and probably full currency convertibility as well. However, 
without the CMA arrangement in the past, there is little doubt that Lesotho and Swaziland 
would be in the same position as most other PT A members. 
The PT A Clearing House is another arrangement which creates partial currency convertibility 
in the region but does not incorporate South Africa. The PT A Clearing House is a 
rudimentary arrangement which although functioning well is substantially under-utilised. The 
main reasons for the PT A Clearing House being under-utilised is that it does not address 
problems of balance of payments disequilibrium and international reserve shortages as well 
as the unbalanced regional trade. 
Most PT A members do not meet the preconditions for transformation to full currency 
convertibility. The most indicative factor of this is the fact that all PT A currencies are 
overvalued. Furthermore, there is no indication that they have adequate international 
liquidity in order to transform to full currency convertibility at present. 
Currency inconvertibility increases the risks which are involved in international trade. In 
order to reduce these risks it is necessary to use trade finance methods which reduce these 
risks. The more risky international trade transactions are, the greater the costs of reducing 
the risk. Most PT A members are regarded as very risky countries to trade with. Therefore, 
trade finance instruments which are offered for trade with PT A members are restricted and 
accompanied by high costs. This is also the case with trade between South Africa and PT A 
members which are not CMA members. Furthermore, due to the poor economic prospects 
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in the region, correspondent banking is undeveloped. The improvement of correspondent 
banking in the region could enable banks to offer less costly trade finance instruments if 
partial currency convertibility is achieved. In other words the poor credit ratings can be 
improved and resulting high costs of trade financing can be significantly reduced if partial 
currency convertibility is achieved. 
Since the PT A Clearing House was found to be under-utilised, the incorporation of South 
Africa would not improve this position and might even worsen it. Therefore, it is found that 
a more advanced arrangement that will address the problem of the lack of short-term trade 
finance is necessary. To this end two arrangements are possible. First, a payments union 
which has a built-in mechanism that encourages intra-regional trade and allows for trade 
finance which guarantees against payment default. There is a considerable difference when 
considering a small PT APU and a large PT APU. The incorporation of South Africa into a 
PT APU becomes problematic since, as it is a structural intra-regional net creditor, it will be 
granting the PTAPU credit of 75 percent of its net balance at a cost of approximately 
US$297.1 million in convertible currencies, using 1992 data. Furthermore, since the PTAPU 
would use a clearing house the arrangement may be under-utilised since export incentive 
schemes may undermine it. Therefore a PTAPU may act as a deterrent to trade 
liberalisation. The second arrangement, a reserve fund, requires each participating member 
to contribute to a fund that will · be used as guarantee of trade payments. The problem, here 
too, is that the incorporation of South Africa will mean a contribution of approximately 
US$67 million or 35 .5 percent of total resource contribution commitments of all members, 
using 1992 data. This has the danger of making South Africa a financier of other countries 
balance of payments difficulties. However, this is significantly less than in the case of the 
PT APU and South Africa will still earn interest from its reserve. Before agreeing to join a 
reserve fund South Africa will have to be sure that this is a transitional arrangement only. 
A proof of this will be the undertaking of policies which will be directed at ·achieving the 
preconditions for transformation to full currency convertibility. 
Introducing a reserve fund in a vacuum is doomed to fail as balance of payments 
disequilibrium may persist. It is of paramount importance that foreign exchange be made 
available to producers for the importation of machinery and raw materials. If this is not the 
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case, although partial currency convertibility will exist, regional currencies will continue to 
be useless for trade payments and this arrangement will be ineffective. 
For a successful payments arrangement which will enhance intra-regional trade, economise 
on foreign exchange, and act as a step towards full currency convertibility, assurance must 
be given to participants as to the availability of foreign exchange. In effect under a reserve 
fund it may be advisable not to have a clearing house so as to eliminate the problem of 
having centralised payments. Removing the clearing arrangement but guaranteeing 
convertibility of all balances that arise from regional trade may be preferable. 
There is little question that achieving partial currency convertibility between South Africa and 
the PTA will not, on its own, achieve all the potential of regional economic cooperation and 
increased trade. Therefore further studies are required to consider how best economic 
cooperation in the fields of communications, customs, industry and transport can be achieved. 
It must be emphasised that PT A members should aspire to full currency convertibility as this 
is one of the more important and basic moves they can take to indicate to the rest of the 
world their willingness to open their markets and pursue economic policies which are 
consistent with the goals of future growth. This would be an important element in the 




EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS AND CURRENT ACCOUNT RESTRICTIONS IN 
THE PTA-CMA REGION 
Angola 
a. Exchange arrangements - The currency of 
Angola is the New Kwanza. The exchange rate 
system consists of two rates - the official rate, 
which is pegged to the US dollar, and the free 
market rate, which is market-determined. The 
official rate applies to public sector transactions and 
to traditional exports (oil and diamonds). 
The free market rate applies to purchases of foreign 
exchange, checks, traveller' s checks, payment 
orders, and other instruments used in international 
transactions by individuals, organiz.ations, firms 
and tourist operators, and to sales of foreign 
exchange for travel and special expenses or 
transfers abroad. 
There are no taxes or subsidies on the purchases 
or sales of foreign exchange. There are no 
arrangements for forward cover against exchange 
rate risk operating in the official or the commercial 
banking sector. 
b. Administration of Control - The NBA has 
delegated authority to banks to licence and execute 
permitted foreign exchange invisible transactions. 
Commercial banks and foreign exchange dealers 
licensed by the NBA are authorised to deal in 
foreign exchange at the floating exchange rate. 
The NBA operates in the floating rate foreign 
exchange market only in its dealings with financial 
institutions. All imports and exports are subject to 
licensing. 
c. Prescription of Currency - The NBA prescribes 
the currencies to be used for imports, depending 
upon the country with which the transactions are to 
be carried out. The currencies are usually those of 
the exporting countries or the US dollar. 
d. Imports and Import Payments - All imports are 
subject to licensing, with limits pre-established in 
the import plan, and are subject to the availability 
of foreign exchange, except imports of spare parts, 
accessories or similar goods, medicines, equipment, 
and raw materials, up to a quarterly maximum of 
$50,000 (or its equivalent) an importer; licences 
are expeditiously issued by the NBA. 
Licences are granted only to registered 
enterprises of proven technical, commercial and 
financial capacity and are issued on the basis of a 
foreign exchange allocation and restricted to 
imports of goods for which the enterprise is 
registered. A myriad of administrative regulation 
applies. 
e. Exports and Export Proceeds - Exports of 
certain goods are prohibited. Restrictions apply to 
the exportation of products that are in short 
domestic supply. All other exports are subject to 
prior licensing. Licences may be obtained by 
registered enterprises, and proceeds must be 
collected within 30 days of shipment and 
surrendered to the NBA. 
Burundi 
a. Exchange arrangements - The currency of 
Burundi is the Burundi franc, the external value of 
which is pegged to a basket of currencies that 
reflects the pattern of Burundi's international trade. 
Commercial banks are authorized to buy and sell 
foreign exchange on their own account and on 
behalf of their customers at rates within 1 % of 
either side of the middle rate established by the 
central bank. Commercial banks are allowed to 
borrow foreign exchange to hedge against exchange 
rate risk. 
b. Administration and control - Control over 
foreign exchange transactions and foreign trade is 
vested in the central bank; authority to carry out 
some transactions is delegated to five authorized 
banks. 
c. Prescription of currency - Outgoing payments 
may be made and may be obtained in any 
convertible currency. 
d. Imports and Import Payments - Imports are fully 
liberalized, except for a limited number of goods 
the importation of which is restricted mainly for 
security reasons. Foreign exchange is made 
available either at the time of shipment of the goods 
on the basis of the shipping documents or following 
importation of the goods. 
e. Exports and Export Proceeds - All exports are 
fully liberalized. All proceeds from traditional 
exports must be surrendered to an authorized 
banks. Exporters of nontraditional products may 
retain 30 percent of the proceeds. Exports of 
mineral products, coffee, hide, and all exports that 
are not authorised by ministerial order are subject 
to export duties. 
Comoros 
a. Exchange Arrangement - The currency of the 
Comoros is the Comorian Franc, which is pegged 
to the French franc, the intervention currency, at 
the fixed rate of CFl per F0.02. 
With the exception of those relating to gold, the 
exchange control measures of the Comoros do not 
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apply to (1) France and Monaco; and (2) all other 
countries whose bank of issue is linked with the 
French Treasury by an Operations Account. 
Hence, all payments to these countries may be 
made freely. All other countries are considered 
foreign countries. Forward cover against exchange 
rate risk is authorised by the Central Bank of the 
Comoros and is provided to traders by the 
commercial bank for up to three months. 
b. Administration of Control - Import and export 
licences are issued by the Directorate-General of 
Economic Affairs in the Ministry of Economy and 
Trade. 
c. Prescription of Currency - Settlements with all 
countries other than defined above are usually made 
through correspondent banks in France in any of 
the currencies of those countries or in French 
francs through foreign accounts in francs. 
d. Imports and Import Payments - Importation of 
certain other goods is prohibited from all countries. 
The importation of other goods, except those 
originating from member countries of the European 
Community, Monaco and the Operations Account 
countries, is subject to individual licensing. All 
import transactions relating to foreign countries 
must be domiciled with the authorised bank if the 
value is CF 500,000 or more. 
e. Exports and Export Proceeds - With a few 
exceptions, exports to any destination are free of 
licensing requirements. Proceeds from exports to 
foreign countries must normally be collected; the 
receipts must be repatriated within 30 days of the 
expiration of the commercial contract and sold 
immediately to the authorised bank. 
Djibouti 
a. Exchange Arrangement - The currency of 
Djibouti is the Djibouti Franc, which is freely 
convertible into US dollars, the intervention 
currency. Commercial enterprises are free to 
negotiate forward exchange contracts for 
commercial and financial transactions through local 
banks or banks abroad. All transactions are 
negotiated at free market rates. There are no 
arrangements for forward cover against exchange 
rate risk operating in the official or the commercial 
banking sector. 
b. Administration of Control - There is no 
exchange control. The Djibouti franc is issued in 
notes and coins by the National Bank of Djibouti, 
which issues and redeems the currency against US 
dollars. Deposits in US dollars constitute the cover 
for the notes issued. 
c. Prescription of Currency - No prescription of 
currency requirements are in force. 
d. Imports and Import Payments - Formally, 
- "'.,,, •• . .. ' •• • '. • •• , ... f' .. • ..... , •• "J,, ... , " • .... .,. ,· •• ; 
customs duties are not charged on imports, but, in 
practice, fiscal duties are levied by means of the 
general consumption tax, at the rate of 30 percent 
on luxury goods and 20 percent on all other goods. 
e. Exports and Export Proceeds - There are 
virtually no restrictions. Export proceeds may be 
retained. 
Ethiopia 
a. Exchange Arrangement - The currency of 
Ethiopia is the Ethiopian Birr, which is pegged to 
the US dollar, the intervention currency. 
Authorised dealers must have the approval of the 
National Bank to undertake forward exchange 
transactions. There are no arrangements for 
forward cover against exchange rate risk operating 
in the official or commercial banking sector. 
b. Prescription of Currency - Outgoing payments 
are normally made in convertible foreign exchange 
appropriate to the country of the recipient or in US 
dollars. The net proceeds of exports must be 
received in a freely convertible foreign currency or 
in any other acceptable foreign currency. 
c. Administration of Control - All transactions in 
foreign exchange must be carried out through 
authorized dealers under the control of the National 
Bank. All payments abroad require licences. All 
exports are licensed to insure the surrender of 
foreign exchange proceeds. 
d. Imports and Import Payments - All imports from 
South Africa are prohibited, and all imports from 
other sources require a licence. Payments abroad 
for imports require exchange licences, which can 
be obtained when a valid importer's licence is 
presented. Applications for exchange licences are 
conditional upon the provision of satisfactory 
information on costs and payment terms and the 
submission of evidence that adequate insurance has 
been arranged with the Ethiopian Insurance 
Corporation, particularly for goods imported under 
letters of credit. 
e. Exports and Export Proceeds - All commodity 
exports require permits from the Exchange 
Controller and some require, in addition, the 
approval of specified public bodies. Foreign 
exchange receipts are surrendered to the National 
Bank, generally within three months. 
Lesotho 
a. Exchange Arrangement - The currency of 
Lesotho is the Loti (plural Maloti) , which is pegged 
to the South African rand at Ml per RI. 
Authorised dealers are permitted to conduct 
forward exchange operations through their 
correspondent banks abroad at rates quoted by the 
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latter. Forward exchange cover is not, however, 
common in Lesotho. 
b. Exchange Control Territory - In its relations 
with countries outside the CMA, Lesotho applies 
exchange controls that are largely similar to those 
of South Africa and Swaziland. 
c. Administration of Control - The Central Bank of 
Lesotho controls external currency transactions and 
delegates to commercial banks the authority to 
approve certain types of current payments up to 
established limits. 
d. Imports and Import Payments - Imports from 
countries outside the Customs Union are usually 
licensed in conformity with South Africa's import 
regulations; Lesotho reserves the right to restrict 
certain imports. 
e. Exports and Export Proceeds - Unless otherwise 
permitted, all export proceeds must be remitted to 
Lesotho and surrendered within six months of the 
date of the export transaction. 
Mauritius 
a. Exchange Arrangement - The currency of 
Mauritius is the Mauritian Rupee, the external 
value of which is determined on the basis of its 
relationship to a weighted basket of currencies of 
Mauritius's major trading partners. 
Forward exchange facilities in pounds sterling, 
French francs, and US dollars are made available 
by the Bank of Mauritius for industries operating in 
the export processing zone (EPZ) and for banks 
engaged in foreign borrowing for on lending to the 
sugar sector. The maximum period for forward 
cover is six months; the forward rates.are based on 
a uniform margin of 3 percent a year. In addition, 
companies operating in the EPZ and other 
Mauritian exporters and traders dealing in priority 
imports are authorised to engage in forward cover 
transactions in foreign exchange markets abroad 
through their banks in Mauritius. 
b. Administration of Control - Exchange control is 
administered by the Bank of Mauritius under 
powers delegated by the Financial Secretary. 
Commercial banks, as agents of the Bank of 
Mauritius, are authorised to approve and effect 
payments for current transactions. 
c. Prescription of Currency - Payments to 
nonresidents may be made in Mauritian rupees 
from a nonresident account or in any convertible 
foreign currency. Similarly, payments from 
nonresidents may be received in Mauritian rupees 
from a nonresident account or in any convertible 
foreign currency. Mauritius maintains a bilateral 
payments agreement with Madagascar. 
d. Imports and Import Payments - Importers must 
be licensed under the Licences Ordinance. All 
imports other than exempt or prohibited goods 
require import permits from the Ministry of Trade 
and Shipping; the permits are essentially for 
statistical and tax purposes. Commercial banks are 
authorised to approve and transfer funds for import 
payments without limit. 
e. Exports and Export Proceeds - All export 
proceeds in any currency other than Mauritian 
rupees must be repatriated within six months of 
shipment and offered for sale to an authorised 
dealer. 
Mo:mmbique 
a. Exchange Arrangement - The currency of 
Mozambique is the Metical. Exchange rates are 
determined by supply and demand conditions, and 
authorised operators are free to set buying and 
selling rates. 
There are no arrangements for forward cover 
against exchange rate risk operating in the official 
or the commercial banking sector. 
b. Administration of Control - Imports and exports 
are authori:zed through licences, issued by the 
Ministry of Commerce for statistical purposes. 
c. Imports and Import Payments - All imports 
exceeding the equivalent of $500 are subject to 
licensing by the Ministry of Commerce; licenses 
are provided routinely. 
d. Exports and Export Proceeds - All exports are 
subject to a license. All export proceeds must be 
collected through the Bank of Mozambique (BM) 
and sold in the secondary exchange market. 
Rwanda 
a. Exchange Arrangement - The currency of 
Rwanda is the Rwanda Franc which is pegged to 
the SOR at RF 201.39 per SOR 1. There are no 
arrangements for forward cover against exchange 
rate risk. 
b. Administration of Control - Control over foreign 
exchange transactions is vested in the central bank; 
authority to carry out some of these transactions is 
delegated to authorised banks. Arrears are 
maintained with respect to external payments. 
c. Prescription of Currency - To facilitate trade and 
other external transactions, the central bank 
maintains agreements with the central banks of the 
Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries 
(CEPGL), Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire. Under 
these arrangements, settlements are made through 
reciprocal accounts in convertible domestic 
currency; balances on such accounts are 
periodically transferable. Payments to and from 
the member countries of the Preferential Trade 
Area for Eastern and Southern African States 
(PT A) (Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
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Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, 
Somalia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, 
and Zimbabwe) are made through the PTA's 
clearinghouse. Otherwise, payments for imports 
must be made in the currency quoted by the central 
bank, which, in principle, is the currency of the 
country of origin. 
d. Imports and Import Payments - Imports of all 
(with some exceptions) goods have been permitted 
under an open licence (OGL) system and foreign 
exchange is provided upon request. 
e. Exports and Export Proceeds - All exchange 
proceeds from exports must be surrendered to an 
authorised bank within eight days of their 
collection. 
Somalia 
a. Exchange Arrangement - The currency of 
Somalia is the Somali Shilling, which is pegged to 
a basket of currencies of Somalia's main trading 
partners. The official exchange rate is adjusted 
weekly to reflect weekly to reflect changes in the 
cross rates of currencies in the basket and the 
relative changes in the cross rates of currencies in 
the basket and the relative rates of inflation in 
Somalia and its trading partners. 
There are no arrangements for forward cover 
against exchange risk operating in the official 
sector. The commercial banks also do not conduct 
forward exchange transactions on behalf of the 
public, although they are not prohibited from doing 
so. 
b. Administration of Control - Exchange controls 
are administered by the Central Bank.. 
c. Prescription of Currency - Settlements with all 
other countries must be made in Somali shillings or 
in specified currencies. 
d. Imports and Import Payments - All items, with 
the exception of items prohibited for reasons of 
public safety and social policy, may be imported 
freely . 
All payments for private imports must be effected 
through letters of credit. Private importers may 
open letters of credit for imports at a commercial 
bank on the basis of foreign exchange made 
available for that purpose through a foreign 
currency account with the commercial bank; in 
such a case, the foreign exchange involved is kept 
in a suspense account until the time of settlement of 
the letter of credit. A non-interest-bearing cash 
advance deposit of 100 percent is required to open 
letters of credit for private sector imports; the 
deposit is retained until the letters of credit are 
settled. 
e. Exports and Export Proceeds - All export 
proceeds must be repatriated. Exporters of bananas 
and livestock may retain 40 percent of their foreign 
exchange receipts in export/import accounts and 
must surrender the remainder to the Central Bank 
or to authorised dealers. Exporters of 
nontraditional goods may retain 70 percent of their 
export earnings. For exports other than those made 
under letter-of-credit arrangements, an advance 
payment deposit of 100 percent of the value of 
exports is required. 
Sudan 
a. Exchange Arrangement - The currency of Sudan 
is the Sudanese Pound. The official exchange rate 
of the Sudanese pound is determined under an 
exchange market arrangement in which the rate is 
determined by the Committee for the Fixing of the 
Exchange Rate of the Union of Banks (Bankers' 
Association) and is quoted uniformly by all 
commercial banks. 
In principle, commercial banks are authorized by 
the Bank of Sudan to sell foreign exchange to be 
transferred abroad for all purposes. In practice, 
commercial banks conduct informal rationing by 
making foreign exchange available according to the 
priorities established by each bank manager. In the 
case of payments for imports, commercial banks 
are authorised to sell foreign exchange to licensed 
traders. Under a central bank regulation, the 
commercial banks are obligated to require 100 
percent cash cover before agreeing to the sale of 
foreign exchange. Commercial banks do not bear 
any exchange risk for any foreign exchange 
transaction. 
There are no arrangements for forward cover 
against exchange rate risk operating in the official 
of the commercial banking sector. 
b. Administration of Control - Exchange control is 
administered by the Bank of Sudan, with the 
assistance of the authorised banks and specialised 
banks acting as exchange houses. 
c. Prescription of Currency - Payments to all 
countries and all monetary areas (the "convertible 
area") may be made in foreign currency from any 
free foreign currency account or special foreign 
currency account, while receipts from the 
convertible area may be accepted in any convertible 
currency. 
d. Imports and Import Payments - In principle, 
commercial banks are authorised to sell foreign 
exchange to finance all imports ( except those on the 
negative list) irrespective of their final use. 
Insurance for imports must normally be taken out 
with local companies. Imports financed at the free 
unified rate, including those financed through the 
opening of letters of credit, could be subject to an 
advance deposit of up to the full c.i.f. value. 
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e. Exports and Export Proceeds - Export licences 
are not required for any category of exports. 
However, all exporters must submit export 
contracts and the "EX" export form to commercial 
or specialised banks for approval. · 
All export proceeds, except those permitted to be 
retained under the Export Enhancement Scheme, 
must be repatriated to the domestic banking system 
at the official exchange rate. 
Swaziland 
a. Exchange Arrangement - The currency of 
Swaziland is the Lilangeni (plural Emalangeni), 
which is pegged to the South African rand at El 
per Rl. 
The Central Bank of Swaziland (CBS) permits 
authorised dealers to engage in forward exchange 
operations. Commercial banks are generally able 
to meet demands for forward sales of foreign 
currency against emalangeni. The forward 
exchange rates are market determined. 
b. Exchange Control Territory - In relations with 
countries outside the CMA, Swaziland applies 
exchange controls that are generally similar to those 
of South Africa but has not adopted the dual 
exchange rate system that was reintroduced in that 
country in September 1985. Financial rand may 
not be acquired by, or held for account of, any 
resident of Lesotho, South Africa, or Swaziland. 
c. Administration of Control - The Central Bank of 
Swaziland, on behalf of the Ministry of Finance, 
controls all external currency transactions. 
d. Imports and Import Payments - Imports from 
countries outside the customs union are licensed in 
conformity with specific import regulations. 
Import licences granted in Swaziland entitle the 
holder to buy the foreign exchange required to 
make the import payment. 
e. Exports and Export Proceeds - All exports are 
subject to licensing. For goods shipped to 
countries outside the customs area, licensing is 
administered to ensure that export proceeds are 
repatriated in the prescribed manner and within the 
stipulated period. 
T8117.ania 
a. Exchange Arrangements - The currency of 
Tanzania is the Tanzania Shilling, which is pegged 
to a basket of currencies of Tanzania's main trading 
partners. 
The Bank of Tanzania does not offer forward 
cover against exchange rate risk. However, 
authorized dealers may enter into forward contracts 
for purchases and sales of foreign currencies. 
b. Administration of Control - With the exception 
with transactions made through foreign exchange 
bureaus all outward payments must be approved by 
the Bank of Tanzania. 
c. Prescription Currency - Settlements between 
residents of Tanzania and nonresidents must be 
made either in convertible currencies or in 
Tanzania Shilling by debit or credit to a convertible 
nonresident account. 
d. Imports and Imports Payments - All goods with 
a value exceeding $5,000 require licence before 
they can be imported. 
The importation of certain categories of goods is 
permitted under an open general licence (OGL) 
system based on a negative list. Under the OGL 
system, the minimum value for each import licence 
is set at $5,000. 
e. Exports and Export Proceeds - Export proceeds 
most be repatriated in convertible currencies within 
two months of the date of exportation. Exporters 
of traditional products may retain up to 10 percent 
of foreign exchange earnings, and exporters of 
nontraditional products may retain up to 50 percent. 
Uganda 
a. Exchange Arrangements - The currency of 
Uganda is the Uganda Shilling. The exchange rate 
system consists of three rates; the foreign exchange 
bureau rate, the official rate, and the auction rate. 
The exchange rate in the foreign exchange bureau 
market is determined by supply and demand 
conditions. The official rate is determined as the 
average of the foreign exchange bureau exchange 
rate and is applied to proceeds for coffee exports, 
some government imports, and debt service 
payments. 
Authoriz.ed banks may deal forward with 
customers, in pounds sterling, U.S dollars, and 
certain other convertible currencies, provided that 
there is an underlying approved import or export 
contract. 
b. Administration and control - Import and export 
control regulations are administered by the Ministry 
of commerce, which has powers to prohibit imports 
and exports. 
c. Prescription of currency - The Bank of Uganda 
settles accounts in U.S. dollars with PTA members 
through the Pl' A Clearing House. Authorized 
payments by residents of Uganda may be made in 
Uganda shilling to the credit of an external account 
in Uganda, or in any other currency. 
d. Imports and Import Payments - Most imports are 
controlled through the import-licensing system. 
Foreign exchange allocation to various ministries 
and departments must be backed by documents 
showing the approval of the Central Tender Board. 
e. Exports and Export Proceeds - Exporters may 
retain proceeds from exports other than coffee and 
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sell them in the foreign exchange bureaus. 
Zambia 
a. Exchange Arrangements - The currency of 
Zambia is the Zambian kwacha. Most transactions, 
except for imports under the OGL system, take 
place at the exchange rate determined by supply 
and demand conditions in the foreign exchange 
bureau market. for some foreign transactions, 
foreign exchange is allocated by the Bank of 
Zambia, which fixes its buying and selling rates on 
the basis of the exchange rate quoted by the foreign 
exchange bureaus, with appropriate spreads to 
reflect the bank's exchange margin. 
Authorized banks and foreign exchange bureaus 
are free to deal in the currencies of neighbouring 
countries, subject to approval by the Bank of 
Zambia. 
There are no arrangements for forward cover 
against exchange rate risk operating in the official 
or the commercial banking sector. 
Zimbabwe 
a. Exchange Arran·gements- The currency of 
Zimbabwe is the Zimbabwe dollar. The exchange 
rate of the Zimbawean dollar is determined on a 
basis of a trade-weighted basket of currencies. The 
U.S. dollar is the intervention currency. 
Forward exchange rate contracts are permitted 
only for trade transactions. There is no limit on 
the size of such contracts, but they must be limited 
to periods of six to eight months, depending on the 
currency involved and the type of coverage. 
b. Administration and control - Exch~ge control is 
administered by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. 
c. Prescription Currency - All payments by 
nonresidence must be effected in denominated 
currencies. 
d. Imports and Imports Payments - With the 
exception of imports covered by the OGIL and 
Export Retention Scheme, all imports are subject to 
licensing requirements. 
Allocation for local markets are assessed on the 
basis of priority and foreign exchange availability, 
whereas those for export markets take the form of 
initial allocations based on past performance. 
e. Exports and Exports Proceeds - Export-licensing 
requirements are imposed for reasons of health and 
social welfare, as well as ensure an adequate 
domestic supply of essential products. 
Export receipts must be sold to authorized 
dealers. 
IMF (Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements 
and Exchange Restrictions, 1993) 
138 
APPENDIX B - REGIONAL TRADE DATA 
TABLE Bl 
Comparison of SA Exports and PTA Imports for 1989 (in US dollars '000) 
SITC SA PTA SITC SA PTA 
251 325.201 13.906 711 4.315 10.614 
335 37.014 13.595 721 15.044 42.954 
515 24.077 16.965 723 32.108 77.578 
522 316.013 27.778 728 36.440 35.541 
533 11.483 30.890 736 10.796 40.659 
541 23.741 181.278 741 113.426 64.011 
554 13.483 37.942 742 13.499 60.721 
562 58.735 88.591 743 13.219 62.813 
591 25.252 95.858 744 12.276 95.424 
-598 28.866 69.847 745 16.164 20.917 
625 15.513 74.642 749 31.614 83.534 
628 5.203 16.914 764 16.640 222.226 
635 13.627 18.524 772 24.448 106.786 
641 224.692 83.266 773 10.782 72.344 
642 29.000 25.672 775 10.337 23.344 
651 42.337 13.919 778 22.386 78.330 
652 34.631 78.898 781 55.656 323.057 
657 11.110 17.719 782 23.330 321.491 
658 7.468 17.885 784 68.332 223.856 
662 12.350 31.998 786 51.729 28.643 
665 10.588 11.524 821 35.422 29.021 
682 392.820 10.780 872 8.995 30.760 
684 166.700 21.418 874 18.254 67.094 
691 17.876 79.600 892 6.622 38.528 
692 19.401 20.177 893 18.103 56.736 
693 17.464 14.502 897 28.892 14.724 
694 46.772 11.238 
695 51.573 58.249 
699 52.657 52.359 
Total 2.634.485 3.567.669 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































PREMIUM RATE PERCENTAGE TABLE 





































Terms of Payment 
Cash against presentation of shipping documents from an irrevocable Letter of Credit opened 
and/or confirmed before Shipment of Goods by a bank in the buyer's country and not 
confirmed by a bank in South Africa. Payment under the Letter of Credit may not be upon 
any action or discretion of the buyer. 
Cash against presentation of shipping documents through a bank in the buyer's country. 
Open Credit - including accepted bills of exchange - payment to be made latter than 3 months 
but not latter than 6 months after date of shipment or month-end statement or delivery or 
arrival of the goods. 
Payment from an irrevocable Letter of Credit opened and/or confirmed before shipment of 
the goods by a bank in the buyer's country and not confirmed by a bank in South Africa and 
payable after, but not later than 3 months from the date of presentation of the shipping 
documents. Payment under the Letter of Credit may not be conditional upon any action or 
discretion of the buyer. 
Payment from an irrevocable Letter of Credit opened and/or confirmed before shipment of 
the goods by a bank in the buyer's country and not confirmed by a bank in South Africa and 
payable after 3 months but not later than 6 months from the date of presentation of the 
shipping documents. Payment under the Letter of Credit may not be conditional upon any 
action or discretion of the buyer. 
Telegraphic Transfer within 7 days from the date of shipment. Rate will only apply provided 
the insured actually receives payment in South Africa within 7 days from the date of Bill of 
Landing. Otherwise the cad rate or, where documents are released before payment, the open 
credit premium rates apply. 
Source: Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation. 
151 
TABLEBSa 
Compensable and Uncompensable Trade and Foreign Exchange Requirements for 
Settlements of Net Balances in US$ million (1990) PTA 
Compensable Uncompensable 
Imports Exports Total Trade= The Trade = 
lower of (1) and (3) - (4) 
(2) times 2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Angola 6.49 
0.00 6.49 0.00 6.49 
Burundi 32.61 2.08 34.69 4.16 30.53 
Comoros · 4.16 0.00 4.16 0.00 4.16 
Dj.ibouti 18.59 24.10 42.69 37.18 5.51 
Ethiopia 8.74 18.35 · 27.09 17.48 9.61 
Kenya 20.14 189.50 209.64 40.28 169.36 
Lesotho 6.70 0.12 6.82 0.24 6.58 
Malawi 34.93 31.81 66.74 63.62 3.12 
Mauritius 19.54 6.84 26.38 13.68 12.70 
Mozambique 75.17 4.12 79.29 8.24 71.05 
Rwanda 40.97 4.73 45.70 9.46 36.24 
Somalia 29.49 1.31 30.80 2.62 28.18 
Sudan 2.58 0.60 3.18 1.20 1.98 
Swaziland 3.44 18.01 21.45 6.88 14.57 
Tanz.ania 29.15 17.50 46.65 35.00 11.65 
Uganda 91.91 4.30 96.21 8.60 87.61 
Zambia 96.77 71.90 168.67 143.80 24.87 
Zimbabwe 58.29 184.40 242.69 116.58 126.11 
Total 579.67 579.67 1159.34 509.02 650.32 
Percentage 43.9% 56.1 % 
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TABLE BSb 
Compensable and Uncompensable Trade and Foreign Exchange Requirements for 
Settlements of Net Balances in USS million (1992) PI' A 
Compensable Uncompensable 
Imports Exports Total Trade= The Trade= 
lower of (1) and (3) - (4) 
(2) times 2 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Angola 10.63 0.10 10.73 0.20 10.53 
Burundi 32.82 8.40 41.22 16.80 24.42 
Comoros 2.61 0.04 2.65 0.08 2.57 
Djibouti 
23.70 28.80 52.50 47.40 5.10 
Ethiopia 10.91 32.32 43.23 21.82 21.41 
Kenya 48.02 264.30 312.32 96.04 216.28 
Lesotho 1.52 0.93 2.45 1.86 0.59 
Malawi 59.29 30.09 89.38 60.18 29.20 
.Mauritius 19.82 12.24 32.06 24.48 7.58 
Mozambique 69.59 10.04 79.63 20.08 59.55 
Rwanda 49.93 0.25 50.18 0.49 49.68 
Somalia 36.18 0.69 36.87 1.38 35.49 
Sudan 39.24 0.70 39.94 1.40 38.54 
Swaziland 2.27 30.78 33.05 4.54 28.51 
Tanzania 46.06 51.20 97.26 92.12 5.14 
Uganda 109.48 2.42 111.90 4.84 107.06 
Zambia 80.41 37.82 118.23 75.64 42.59 
Zimbabwe 56.79 188.15 244.94 113.58 131.36 
Total 699.27 699.27 1398.54 582.93 815.60 
Percentage 41.7% 58.3% 
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TABLE B6a 
Compensable and Uncompensable Trade and Foreign Exchange Requirements for 
Settlements of Net Balances in US$ million (1990) PT A including South Africa 
Compensable Uncompensable 
Imports Exports Total Trade= The Trade= 
lower of (1) and (3) - (4) 
(2) times 2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Angola 25.09 0.02 25.11 0.05 25.07 
Burundi 21.04 6.11 27.15 3.06 24.09 
Comoros 10.36 0.13 10.49 0.12 10.37 
Djibouti 19.8 23.80 43.60 27.40 16.20 
Ethiopia 8.22 26.60 34.82 13.50 21.32 
Kenya 63.65 234.74 298.39 35.10 263.29 
Lesotho 2 0.32 2.32 0.18 2.14 
Malawi 180.93 60.76 241.69 91.36 150.33 
Mauritius 
135.35 12.42 147.77 17.90 129.87 
Mozambique 245.87 17.12 262.99 22.72 240.27 
Rwanda 31 12.71 43 .71 7.46 36.25 
Somalia 34.49 0.63 35.12 1.94 33.18 
Sudan 36.15 0.80 36.95 1.02 35.93 
Swaziland 4.74 24.57 29.31 5.08 24.23 
Tanz.ania 38.46 16.81 55.27 27.20 28.07 
Uganda 91.72 1.98 93.70 6.38 87.32 
Zambia 271.69 34.07 305.76 109.58 196.18 
Zimbabwe 459.59 353.71 813.30 513.78 299.52 
South Africa 229.96 1082.80 1312. 76 459.92 852.84 
Total 1910.11 1910.11 3820.22 1343.74 2476.47 
Percentage 35.2% 64.8% 
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TABLEB6b 
Compensable and Uncompemable Trade and Foreign Exchange Requirements for 
Settlements of Net Balances in US$ million (1992) PTA including South Africa 
Im pons Exports Total Compensable Uncompensabl 
Trade = The e Trade = 
lower of (1) and (3) - (4) 
(2) times 2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Angola 129.91 0.34 130.25 0.68 129.57 
Burundi 32.78 8.40 41.18 16.80 24.38 
Comoros 2.61 0.04 2.65 0.08 2.57 
T>jibouti 23.7 28.80 52.50 47.40 5.10 
Ethiopia 10.91 32.32 43.23 21.82 21.41 
Kenya 97.52 272.09 369.61 195.04 174.57 
Lesotho 1.52 0.93 2.45 1.86 0.59 
Malawi 246.48 73.97 320.45 147.93 172.51 
Mauritius 189.53 16.28 205.81 32.55 173.25 
Mozambique 291.79 26.77 318.56 53.54 265.02 
Rwanda 52.57 0.25 52.82 0.50 52.32 
Somalia 36.18 0.69 36.87 1.38 35.49 
Sudan 46.22 0.82 47.04 1.63 45.40 
Swaziland 2.76 30.78 33.54 5.52 28.02 
Tanzania 55.16 54.57 109.73 109.14 0.59 
Uganda 201.16 2.44 203.60 4.87 198.72 
Zambia 444.71 52.42 497.13 104.83 392.29 
Zimbabwe 565.59 437.85 1003.44 875.70 127.74 
South Africa 340.44 1640.08 1980.52 680.89 1299.64 
Total 2771.54 2679.82 5451.37 2302.17 3149.19 
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